Michael Georgitsis. The straw man. The unknown leader of the coup. The colonels’ obedient tool for carrying out their unlawful plans in Cyprus. The colonel who was promoted overnight to brigadier general to lead the coup. To achieve its goal, the junta did not hesitate to execute the then-Commander of the National Guard, Georgios Denisis, who had strongly opposed the coup plans.

On July 1, 1974, a signal arrived at the General Staff of the National Guard, and Georgitsis received a travel order for Athens. Upon his arrival at Elliniko, a SIMCA vehicle transported him to the Pentagon. Waiting for him there were Dimitrios Ioannidis, the commander of the commando forces, Konstantinos Kompokis, and the Chief of the Armed Forces, Grigorios Bonanos, were waiting for him to assign him a top-secret mission: the overthrow of Makarios. The flimsy pretext is a statement by Makarios regarding Cyprus’s neutrality in the event of Greek involvement in the Aegean.

“You understand what kind of plans we’re talking about. Since they couldn’t proceed with Denisis, they looked among the mid-level officers and found the man who would do the job for them—a compliant man.”
Petros Papaoliviou – Professor of History, University of Cyprus

In Athens, a plan was hatched to mislead Makarios. After his return to Nicosia on July 6, Giorgitsis conveyed a message from Bonanos to Makarios: to avoid incidents with the reserves, to restore relations with the junta, and that he agreed with the plan he had sent for the reorganization of the National Guard.

Testimonies of paratroopers

Back in Nicosia, the execution of the coup reveals that the Junta was not only indifferent to Cyprus but also to the fate of the commandos themselves. “There was no plan,” notes Sotiris Kaitanis in his book. The then-reserve paratrooper officer, as well as many soldiers from the 32nd Paratrooper Squadron who set out from the BMH to take part in the attack on the presidential palace, emphasize that the officers led them like sheep to the slaughter.

“There was no briefing or order given beforehand. No plan of action. The tanks were stationed outside the presidential compound, while the paratroopers were ordered to enter the building’s main entrance. “Since when do paratroopers provide cover for tanks?”
Sotiris Kaittanis – Paratrooper, 1974

Classified reports received by Greek intelligence services during the critical days leading up to the invasion documented intense military activity along the coast of Mersin. The declassified report dated July 17 goes into even greater detail, warning that Turkish forces were finalizing their preparations for a possible landing, while the Turkish press ran headlines such as “We Will Intervene in Cyprus.” In Athens and Nicosia, however, treachery was weaving its web.

Georgitsis’s testimony, in 1986 before the Greek Parliament’s Investigative Committee on the Cyprus File reveals the flippancy with which Ioannidis and Bonanos treated the possibility of a Turkishreaction.

Georgitsis: “When we asked what Turkey’s reaction would be, both the Chief of the Armed Forces and Mr. Ioannidis said that there was ‘cover.’”
Chair of the Investigative Committee: “From whom?”
Georgitsis: “They didn’t specify, but it seemed to be from the United States.”

A day later, on July 18, journalist Michael Nicholson of the British news organization ITN was in Nicosia, filming scenes at the checkpoints and the destroyed government buildings. In an interview he secured with Nikos Sampson, an interesting question was raised.

Michael Nicholson, British journalist: “Are you concerned about a possible Turkish intervention?”
Nikos Sampson: “No, I’m not concerned.”

Watch the report by Christoforos Nestoros: