The well-known motto “One for All and All for One” perfectly captures the substance and spirit of the Mecca Agreement, which was signed yesterday by the leaders of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. Commenting on the agreement, representatives of their respective governments emphasize in particular the “collective defense clause,” which stipulates that if a third country launches a military attack against one of the three signatory countries, the attack will be considered directed against the other two as well.

At the same time, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan continue to emphasize that the Mecca Agreement “is not directed against any other country.” This is a standard formulation that is repeated every time an intergovernmental defense agreement is signed, since the question always arises “against exactly what threat is defense necessary?” Given this logical sequence, then, the substantive significance of this formal assurance—that the Mecca Agreement was signed without being directed against any other country (or countries)—is, in reality, of minimal importance.

The Power of Complementarity

Beyond the climate of war and the conflict-ridden circumstances of today’s Middle East, the Mecca Agreement brings together three Sunni Muslim countries that complement one another.

Turkey possesses strong and capable armed forces and, in recent decades, has made no secret of the revisionist orientation of its foreign policy. Pakistan is the only Muslim country with a nuclear arsenal, and its recent mediation efforts between Iran and the United States have given it a role in the balance of power in the Middle East—a role that, until very recently, it seemed it had not even imagined. Saudi Arabia is an energy superpower thanks to its oil reserves and makes no secret of its ambition to acquire nuclear know-how and infrastructure—with the Trump administration appearing equally eager to accommodate this intention.

This specific cooperation framework has the potential to “bring together” three countries, each of which is capable of complementing the others. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have already signed a defense agreement in recent months, with Turkey essentially seeking to “join” the existing framework of cooperation.

What will be the impact of the Mecca Agreement? 

The issue that arises is that all three of these countries are grappling with unresolved sovereignty disputes with their neighbors. Turkey has not forgotten the well-known casus belli with Greece; the unresolved issue of the occupation of Cyprus has persisted for over 50 years, it plays an active military role in Syria, and at any moment it does not hesitate to exercise military force in northern Iraq. Pakistan, for its part, from the declaration of its independence to the present day, has repeatedly found itself on the brink of a full-scale military conflict with its neighbor, India. Finally, Saudi Arabia is literally in the “eye of the storm,” as its oil facilities and urban centers are under attack by missiles and drones, both from Iran and from Yemen’s Houthi rebels, who are instigated and armed by Iran. In fact, over the past 24 hours, tensions between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis have escalated, with media leaks in international outlets suggesting that ground military engagement cannot be ruled out.

Specifically regarding Saudi Arabia, could yesterday’s signing of the Mecca Agreement perhaps signal the opening of yet another front, with the Saudi Arabian army attacking the Houthis in Yemen? And if so, might this mean that Turkey and Pakistan will decide to “open” a front in Yemen? Given what was agreed upon yesterday, even this scenario cannot be ruled out.

Until something like that happens, however, the following question remains: Ultimately, beyond what has been set out in writing, what will the Mecca Agreement’s actual impact be on the ground? If the motto “One for All and All for One” truly holds, this is expected to become evident. It would be wise, however, not to forget that many similar intergovernmental defense agreements have been signed in the past in the Middle East, which later, in practice, proved to be nothing more than a dead letter.

Iran’s stance is controversial

Just a few hours after it was signed, the Mecca Agreement was likened to a “dead letter” by Ebrahim Rezaei, a member of the Iranian National Assembly and the country’s National Security Council. He even warned Saudi Arabia, describing the signing of the agreement as “yet another desperate attempt by Riyadh to find new patrons” to replace or, at the very least, supplement the United States.He refrained, however, from commenting on the stance of Turkey and Pakistan, which co-signed the agreement.

On the other hand, this morning (August 8), Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, in a post on Platform X, is pursuing the exact opposite communication strategy. Araghchi neither warns the Saudi leadership nor criticizes the Mecca Agreement. On the contrary, he praises it, even presenting it as a potential starting point for cooperation among countries in the region to resolve their differences without the involvement of “foreign actors.” This is Tehran’s long-standing position, which has been expressed for decades at the diplomatic level, essentially seeking to remove the U.S. and Western powers, as well as Israel, from Middle Eastern issues “that must be resolved without external interference”—whatever that may mean—as interpreted through the lens of Iran’s geopolitical perspective.

The Three “New Camps” Taking Shape in the Middle East

As we await clarification on exactly what the military footprint of the Mecca Agreement will be, it appears that the “new camps” of alliances in the Middle East have already taken shape, while the U.S. is clearly hesitating to exercise its military power in the region and bring about a definitive “Game Over” on the Iranian front.

The “pro-Turkish camp” consists of Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, as well as Syria, northern Iraq (where Ankara exerts active influence), and the legitimate government of Yemen, which continues to control areas in the country’s eastern provinces thanks to the support provided by the Saudi Arabian military.

Its main rival is the axis of countries that maintain relations with Israel. This axis includes the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and India, while its sphere of influence includes Somaliland (where the UAE and Israel fully control local decision-making centers) and Jordan, which has always served as a de facto forward outpost, ensuring the greatest possible strategic depth for Israel.

Although this “camp” has taken shape in practice, at the institutional level, at least for now, it remains non-existent, and it is by no means certain whether minority groups in various parts of the region (e.g., Druze in Lebanon and Syria, or Kurds in Syria and Iraq) would not wish to join it. All possibilities remain open.

Finally, the “Iranian-Shiite camp” continues to maintain its power as long as the current Iranian regime remains in place, with the participation of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria, the Houthis in the western provinces of Yemen, who control the Bab el-Mandab Strait —and finally, the pro-Iranian Shiite militias in Iraq that have proven themselves to be formidable combatants.

The Special Case of Hamas

It is interesting to consider which “camp” it would be correct to consider Hamas as belonging to, as the organization is going through a period that will determine whether it continues to exist or not. With the recent appointment of the new leader of its political wing, Khalil al-Hayya, Hamas appears to have displeased the Qatari royal family, which now demands to maintain control over the movements of the organization’s officials who remain in Doha.

Given that Khalil al-Hayya is considered close to the decision-making circles in Tehran, behind-the-scenes reports are mounting that Hamas is relocating its security apparatus to Turkey, where it believes it will enjoy greater freedom, both in terms of organizing any future operations in Gaza and the West Bank and in terms of maintaining its channels of communication with Tehran. Nevertheless, nothing should be taken for granted at this point regarding the position the organization will seek to occupy on the “new map” of regional alliances and alignments, especially following yesterday’s signing of the Mecca Agreement.

Qatar’s

Role As for Qatar’s role, the following points are worth noting: The experience and flexibility that its diplomatic and economic power has always demonstrated are expected, once again, to prove to be its strongest assets. Qatar has managed to maintain its strategic influence by reconciling conflicting interests—a role it clearly has no intention of relinquishing to anyone. Instead, it will simply ensure that it retains its own distinct position on the “new map.” He will seek to capitalize on this role by demanding the privileges of a “willing intermediary.” For now, it appears to be awaiting proposals, which sooner or later it will be called upon to evaluate.

Athens and Nicosia

: Cyprus and Greece must closely monitor developments. An initial indication of how the situation is being viewed came from the report that Greece will supply the UAE Air Force with two Apache helicopters.

Although opinions have been circulating on Greek social media since yesterday (August 7) that “it is time for Greece to withdraw its Patriot batteries from Saudi Arabia,” it would be wise for Athens not to act impulsively and to try to gauge the prevailing mood, primarily in Riyadh.

Communication Between Israel and India

The Netanyahu government also appears to be adopting a wait-and-see stance, preferring so far to be particularly sparing in its statements. However, it is by no means a coincidence that, exactly one day before the leaders of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan signed the Mecca Agreement, Netanyahu spoke by phone with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi “regarding developments in the Middle East.” As for the official statement from the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem, it was as expected: terse and vague.

Dr. Gabriel Charitos is a visiting professor of international relations in the Department of International and European Studies at Panteion University and a senior analyst at the Cyprus Institute for Politicaland Democracy (IMPD). Since the outbreak of the war on October 7, 2023, he has been collaborating with ALPHA Cyprus as an analyst on Middle East issues.

Watch Gabriel Charitou’s live report from Jerusalem on last night’s main news broadcast on ALPHA Cyprus (7/8) with Nikos Symeou