*By Toumazos Tsielepis
- Lawyer and international relations expert, former member of the negotiating team
I felt it was useful to comment on the recent public statements and disagreements between Averof Neophytou and Haris Georgiadis regarding the 1978 U.S.-British-Canadian framework for a solution to the Cyprus problem from 1978 and the Galli Proposals. Not, of course, with the intention of interfering in the internal affairs of DISY, but because I believe that especially now, as a new effort to resume the negotiation process is underway, after nine full years, we must have an accurate picture of past maneuvers and policies so that similar mistakes can be avoided.
ΣΧΕΤΙΚΑ ΑΡΘΡΑ
Mr. Neophytou, among other things, blames AKEL for the “NO” vote on the 1978 Western Framework. Certainly, things could have been handled better, but let’s not forget that at the time, memories of the coup and the invasion—as well as NATO’s subversive role—were still very fresh. In essence, however, that framework was not a missed opportunity, as many claim. A simple comparison of it with all the United Nations plans that followed proves this point.
As is well known, the basis for negotiation and resolution of the Cyprus problem—agreed upon for decades now—enshrines a single sovereignty, a single international legal personality, and a single citizenship, and this is no coincidence. These are, precisely, the most important elements that distinguish a federation from a confederation and a two-state solution. The Western Framework was seriously flawed in this crucial area. It did refer to sovereignty, but without specifying that there would be a single sovereignty, which left open the possibility of parallel sovereignty among the constituent states. It made absolutely no mention of international legal personality or citizenship.
The framework also had other serious gaps regarding the basis for negotiations, such as, among other things, the absence of any reference to a prohibition on secession or to the enshrinement of the unity of the federal state. It also allocated far fewer powers to the central government, at least in comparison with the relevant United Nations documents. Worse still, it omitted important powers such as citizenship and security—an omission that became even more problematic given that the remaining powers were left to the constituent states.
As for Famagusta, it is not true that it would be returned without any conditions. The provision for the return of the occupied city, in phases and depending on the progress of the talks, was an integral part of the Framework and, consequently, the obvious quid pro quo was acceptance of the Framework, with all its drawbacks, as mentioned above. It is worth remembering that, just a few months later, the return of the city was provided for not merely in a third-party plan but in the 1979 High-Level Agreement; unfortunately, this contractual commitment has not been implemented to this day.
Consequently, Mr. Neophytou is wrong when he says that the Western Framework was a missed opportunity. On the contrary, he is correct in believing that history will hold DISY responsible for burying the Gali Ideas. Mr. Georgiadis’s claim that this is a completely unfair and unsubstantiated position comes as a surprise to any objective citizen who recalls DISY’s erratic stance back in 1993. It is true that Glafkos Clerides supported Vassiliou’s policy on the Cyprus issue, but suddenly, just a few months before the presidential election, he transformed from an outspoken supporter of the Gali Plan into its fierce opponent. The facts speak for themselves; they are beyond dispute, and we will return to this if necessary.
This is how Glafkos Clerides won the 1993 election. He had inherited a very promising outlook regarding the Greek Cypriot side’s aspirations in the Cyprus issue. The then UN Secretary-General, Boutros Ghali, had submitted his final report on the Cyprus issue to the Security Council on November 23, 1993, prior to the presidential elections. That report was a real blow to Denktash.
Among other things, the Secretary-General emphasized: “First and foremost, it is essential that the Turkish Cypriot side adjust its positions, particularly regarding its understanding of the federation, displaced persons, and territorial adjustments when the joint meetings resume in March 1993, so that these issues fall within the framework of the Package of Ideas” (para. 61).
Elaborating on this requirement, the Secretary-General, among other things, emphasized that “the area under the control of the Peacekeeping Force should, in accordance with Resolution 550 (1984), be expanded immediately to include Varosia (para. 63, point 3). Furthermore, the Secretary-General accused the Turkish Cypriot side of “relying on the notion that there are two sovereign states that will retain their sovereignty in a future federation” and responded by citing Resolution 750, which reaffirms a single sovereignty, a single international legal personality, and a single citizenship (para. 48). He went on to state that “the exceptions raised by the Turkish Cypriot side essentially rule out the possibility of the return of any displaced Greek Cypriots” (para. 50). It also accused Denktash of aiming to have the two communities live separately and of seeking a solution that was incompatible with the Set of Principles, which sought to take practical difficulties into account, but not in a way that would abolish the right of return and property, as well as accepted international rules and practice (para. 55). He also accuses him of refusing to accept the charter of the Set of Ideas (para. 56).
Finally, the Secretary-General called on the Security Council to closely monitor developments, including joint meetings following the presidential elections, and to consider any action it should take to achieve a swift resolution of the Cyprus issue (final paragraph 67).
This, then, was the legacy that Glafkos Clerides inherited regarding the Cyprus issue. All he had to do was wait for Denktash to comply, as demanded by the Secretary-General and the Security Council, which adopted the Report with Resolution 789, at which point, either we would have a solution or all pressure would be directed toward the Turkish side, with all the resulting beneficial consequences. In short, the key was to pick up where we left off. Instead, however, Mr. Clerides agreed with the Turkish Cypriot leader to discuss far-reaching MOEs, precisely to avoid discussing the Package of Ideas. A year and a half later, he acknowledged that he could not continue in this vein, because ultimately we would be left with the MOEs as the solution to the Cyprus problem. In other words, we had reached square one, and that is when the familiar rhetoric—all the grand gestures, volcanic outbursts, and dogmatic posturing—began, lasting until the end of Clerides’ first term.
To be fair, however, we must acknowledge that during his second term, Glafkos Clerides made a sincere effort to find a solution, but he did not succeed, weighed down by the legacy of his first term and facing Denktash as his opponent.
What matters now is to look ahead. Revisiting the past is not an end in itself but a tool to ensure we do not repeat the same mistakes. Today, we are once again witnessing an effort by the UN Secretary-General to get the Cyprus issue back on track and to pick up where we left off, so that his successor, if he so desires, of course, can take it the final mile. For this very reason, the Secretary-General intends to present the convergence document to the two leaders shortly. From there on, it is up to us to either pick up where we left off or experiment with “new ideas.” If we choose the former, there is hope. If not, we will repeat the mistakes of the past once again, and a solution to the Cyprus problem will remain a pipe dream.
