Israel and Natural Gas Fees: The Root Causes Behind the Rift in Turkey–Azerbaijan Relations
While the ratification of the Turkey-Libya memorandum by Benghazi may have been a diplomatic victory for Ankara, as was the signing of the Mecca Agreement, Erdoğan’s dream of Turkish hegemony in the Muslim world remains far from realization. The crisis erupted where few expected it to. Ankara’s relations with its most loyal ally, Baku, are going through a period of tension, and the “two states, one nation” doctrine has begun to show cracks. The Azerbaijanis accuse Turkey of interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign state and of behaving in a hegemonic manner.
The trigger was the ban on the Islamic headscarf imposed by the Azerbaijani government in schools, which led to the removal of female students and teachers from classroomsclassrooms. Protests followed in both countries, instigated by the Erdogan regime and the Turkish secret services. In Ankara, lawmakers from the ruling AKP, such as Erdogan’s senior adviser Oktay Saral, strongly criticized Baku, calling on it to reconsider the decision.
Baku’s
Red Line The reaction was unusually harsh. Speaking to “Alpha on Sunday,” retired Lieutenant General and geostrategic analyst Konstantinos Loukopoulos assessed that Aliyev is unwilling to accept that a close alliance with Ankara entailspolitical subordination.
The ruling New Azerbaijan Party accused the AKP of exploiting the headscarf issue and called on it to respect Azerbaijan’s sovereignty. On Wednesday, Baku went a step further, barring entry to 31 Turkish lawmakers, party officials, journalists, and bloggers, who, according to the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry, were calling for the overthrow of the government and inciting hatred.
According to Konstantinos Loukopoulos, Aliyev’s reaction sends a message to the Turkish leadership: the alliance is strategic, not a relationship of tutelage.
And in the background, the strategic partner
. According to the Greek geostrategic analyst, behind the tension lies the deep strategic cooperation that Azerbaijan has developed with Israel. The straw that broke the camel’s back was Israeli President Isaac Herzog’s visit to Baku on October 14, at the height of the Turkish-Israeli confrontation. “It is clear that Ankara is bothered by the strategic cooperation between Azerbaijan and Israel, but Baku has no intention of changing its plans,” said Mr. Loukopoulos. This strategic relationship offers mutual benefits: Israel is a major supplier of advanced weapons systems to Azerbaijan, while Azerbaijani oil is of particular importance to Israel’s energy supply.
This cooperation took on a decisive military dimension during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war. Israeli unmanned systems, precision munitions, and other technologies significantly enhanced the capabilities of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces.
Money Above All
Another source of tension in the relations between these two otherwise brotherly states is the friction over pipeline tariffs. Turkey’s Botaş and Azerbaijan’s SOCAR recently found themselves at an impasse over proposed fee increases for transit through the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP).
Baku is seeking direct long-term sales based on European reference prices, while Ankara is pushing to secure re-export rights so it can function as a regional natural gas hub.
Blood is
thicker than water. Konstantinos Loukopoulos does not believe that the crisis portends a collapse of the Turkey–Azerbaijan alliance. The military, energy, and transportation ties between the two countries remain deeply entrenched, and the cost of a complete rupture would be significant for both sides. Moreover, Turkish support has been crucial in strengthening Baku’s defense capabilities, while Ankara allows Azerbaijan to channel energy to European markets via the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline.
Officially, Ankara maintains a tight-lipped stance to preserve an alliance of interests, with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Ilham Aliyev attempting to open a line of communication in an effort to de-escalate tensions.
