The ratification of the Turkey-Libya memorandum represents a defeat for Greek diplomacy, with repercussions for the Cypriot EEZ as well
When Greece chose to stake its diplomatic chips on Khalifa Haftar and the so-called Benghazi government, it consciously took a side in the Libyan civil war. In an effort to deflect Greek-Turkish tensions, Turkey shifted its diplomatic focus to Tripoli and signed the Turkish-Libyan memorandum with it in 2019. Consequently, Athens was forced to support Khalifa Haftar, who controlled the country’s parliament, in order to block the ratification of the memorandum through him. This was followed by efforts on the part of Greece to build closer ties with the internationally recognized government in Tripoli in order to completely thwart Turkey’s plans. In short, the ratification of the memorandum amounts to Greece’s complete defeat in Libya, allowing Turkey to unfold the next phase of its plan to realize the “Blue Homeland.” Already, the first attempt at contact between Ankara and Cairo has taken place, while the naval forces of the two countries have completed yet another joint exercise. Athens’ diplomatic response appears to be lagging behind, while Cyprus is monitoring developments with concern over the potential consequences of recent events. These developments reflect differing approaches to the economic division of the Eastern Mediterranean.
The chronicle of a resounding failure
ΣΧΕΤΙΚΑ ΑΡΘΡΑ
The history of Greece’s relations with Libya following the fall of Muammar Gaddafi has been marked by diplomatic inaction, which led in 2026 to a defeat that has sent shockwaves throughAthens’ aspirations regarding its EEZ. While Turkey entered the fray in 2011, today, 15 years later, it is reaping the rewards of a diplomatic marathon during which Greece limited itself to outbursts, scrambling to keep up with developments. The death of Muammar Gaddafi signaled the breaking of the sole unifying link in a country fragmented among various tribes. Turkey became directly involved the very next day, building relations with the government in Tripoli, which remains the internationally recognized government of Libya to this day. In contrast, Greece not only hesitated but also closed its embassy in the country’s capital in 2014. That was also the year that marked the country’s split into west and east, with Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar establishing his own capital in Benghazi.
Five years later, Turkey’s diplomatic efforts achieved their first success with the signing of the Turkish-Libyan memorandum of understanding. This development spurred Greek diplomacy into action after years of inactivity; having no room to maneuver in Tripoli, it turned its attention to Benghazi and Haftar. Haftar, for his part, had brought the Libyan House of Representatives under his control as early as 2015. Athens’ rapprochement with Benghazi temporarily put the brakes on Turkish plans. Despite Hakan Fidan’s statements regarding the activation of the Turkish-Libyan memorandum following its signing in 2019, Turkish diplomacy was seeking to legitimize the memorandum through its ratification by the Libyan Parliament. This, however, seemed very difficult, given the need for the two sides in the country to reconcile so that the Benghazi-controlled House of Representatives could ratify an agreement concluded by the rival government in Tripoli.
Therefore, the ratification of the memorandum by the Libyan House of Representatives, seven years after it was signed, represents the very scenario that Athens sought to avoid by reaching out to Haftar. While the Greek reaction may emphasize the illegality of an act that does not create legal obligations toward third states, however, the diplomatic backpedaling Athens has been attempting recently reveals that it recognizes the potential consequences of this development. Supporting this interpretation is Athens’ belated—in terms of its outcome—attempt to build closer ties with Benghazi last April.
Egypt Is Now the Apple of Discord
Having now lost the game in Libya, Athens naturally turned its attention to Cairo, where it had been a supplier—unlike in Libya—while also exploiting the rift between Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. Anticipating that sooner or later Turkey would also turn its attention to Egypt, and alarmed by the signing of the Turkish-Libyan memorandum, Athens brought Cairo to the Greek negotiating table. The result was the 2020 agreement on the partial delimitation of the two countries’ EEZs. Partial, however, because Cairo—which, in the current situation, sided with Greece by co-signing the declaration at the UN denouncing the Turkish-Libyan agreement— continues to recognize that it shares an EEZ border with Turkey, with which it does not wish to open a new front. The partial delimitation agreement excludes the area east of the 28th meridian, toward Kastellorizo and Cyprus. An agreement between Greece and Egypt, based on Greece’s officially stated positions, would create a triple point of contact with Cyprus’s EEZ, and would preclude any possibility of coordination between Cairo and Ankara, which explains the Egyptians’ hesitation. They showed the same hesitation west of the boundaries agreed upon with Greece, precisely because of the Turkish-Libyan memorandum.
Ankara is now attempting to capitalize on this Egyptian hesitation, having secured—in its own view—the western flank of the EEZ it claims. For this reason, Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Güler invited his Egyptian counterpart to talks. The Turkish Ministry of Defense also issued a statement, noting that if Cairo accepts Ankara’s proposal, “it will secure an additional maritime zone covering more than 15,000 square kilometers, compared to what it might acquire through a potential agreement with Greece.” The Turks are proposing a demarcation with Egypt at a point further to the northwest than provided for in the agreement with Greece and further to the northeast than in the agreement with Cyprus.
While Egypt may have sided with Cyprus and Greece regarding the Turkish-Libyan memorandum, for Cairo, however, security concerns also arise due to the border it shares with Libya. It is by no means a coincidence that, following the public announcement regarding the extension of the delimitation of the EEZs of Greece and Egypt, the Greek Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs were quick to speak—the former regarding the delimitation of the “remaining section” of the two countries’ EEZ boundaries, and the other about technical discussions that are beginning and will yield “tangible results soon.”
Nevertheless, Cairo is not expected to take any steps that would bring it into conflict with Ankara. Moreover, since last September, the two countries have resumed joint military exercises after a 13-year hiatus, as part of a defense partnership that has been steadily strengthening recently, with Turkey’s offer to demarcate an EEZ forming part of Ankara’s outreach strategy. As part of their renewed defense cooperation, the commander of the Turkish Land Forces, General Metin Tokel, visited Egypt on October 26 and 27. Another milestone was the stay of the Turkish corvette TCG Burgazada in the port of Alexandria from November 1 to 3, arriving directly from Souda, Crete. The culmination of these activities is the “Sea of Friendship 2026” naval exercise, which focuses on surface operations, anti-submarine warfare, air defense, and offensive submarine operations. The exercise took place between the 4th and 9th of the month, indicating, on the one hand, that Turkey will not give Greek diplomacy free rein and, on the other hand, that Cairo is keeping channels of communication open in all directions.
One need only visit the Egyptian Foreign Minister’s account on X. There, one will see that the day after the ratification of the Turkish-Libyan memorandum, Badr Abdel-Atti met, spoke, and posed for photos with his Turkish counterpart, even as posts highlighting Cairo’s rapprochement with Tripoli continue to multiply. On November 7, the Egyptian Foreign Minister visited Tripoli, where the Egyptian embassy reopened, and Cairo outlined its disagreements, with both sides looking toward cooperation, such as an agreement to expedite the completion of natural gas pipelines from Libya to Egypt.
The Road to Cyprus
Athens’ effort to reach an agreement with Egypt is aimed precisely at thwarting Turkey’s plans. For Ankara, the ideal scenario is, following the delimitation of the EEZ with Libya, to reach a similar agreement with Egypt as well. This would require finding common ground among the three countries due to the three-way intersection provided for by the Turkish approach. Obviously, this would mean Greece’s isolation—both from partners who understand and share its positions, and in practical terms, as it would block the route to Cyprus. The same applies to Cyprus, as any delimitation agreement between Egypt and Turkey would also nullify the delimitation agreement between the EEZs of Cyprus and Egypt.
On the other hand, the full extension of the boundaries of the Greek and Egyptian EEZs would create a triple point of contact with Cyprus at the boundaries of Block 4 of the Cypriot EEZ, isolating Turkey and Libya. Such a development would also pave the way for the start of discussions on an EEZ delimitation agreement between Cyprus and Greece. Although the Foreign Minister stated a few days ago that Cyprus is technically ready to proceed with these discussions, he indicated that for this to happen, the right timing must be found. The statement indicates that such a development is not in the works — nor is it even on the horizon — and reflects the reasons why Athens has not proceeded with a full delimitation with Egypt since 2020, but also limits its rhetoric regarding full delimitation, even though it has not denied it.
The key to the three-way relationship between Greece, Egypt, and Cyprus lies in Kastellorizo. Greece and Turkey disagree—as they do on many other issues of maritime zone delimitation—on the island’s jurisdiction. The Greek interpretation of the Law of the Sea grants the island a full EEZ, bringing the Greek and Cypriot EEZs into contact. On the other hand, the Turkish interpretation rules out such a scenario, just as it completely excludes Greece’s access to the Eastern Mediterranean. For this reason, it insists on the legitimacy of the Turkish-Libyan memorandum, and for this reason, it is not likely to easily abandon its efforts to build closer ties with Egypt.
