Nearly fifty minibuses carrying approximately 1,250 Turkish Cypriots passed through the Limnitis checkpoint in northwestern Cyprus this morning, traversed territory controlled by the Republic of Cyprus, and headed—escorted by the UN peacekeeping force (UNFICYP), toward the Turkish Cypriot enclave of Kokkina. There, in the presence of Turkish Cypriot leader Tufan Erhurman, the annual events commemorating the so-called “Kokkina resistance” are taking place.
In the free areas, August 8 is a day of remembrance for those killed in the Turkish bombings. In the Red Zones, it is a day to commemorate Turkey’s military intervention. Between the two ceremonies lies the same narrow strip of land, yet a completely different interpretation of history.
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Today’s crossing is being facilitated by the Republic of Cyprus, as has been the case for years, while Tufan Erhurman was expected to arrive at the enclave by military helicopter. The visit takes on additional political significance, as on August 26, T. Erhurman is scheduled to meet with President Nicos Christodoulides under the auspices of the United Nations, as part of preparations for a new, expanded conference on the Cyprus issue. Today’s visit to Kokkina and the upcoming meeting between the two leaders demonstrate just how close the effort to resume talks may be to the rituals that perpetuate the separate national identities.
The Kokkina Bridgehead
To understand the events of August 1964, we must first answer the question of why Kokkina held such great strategic value.
Following the intercommunal clashes of December 1963, the Turkish Cypriots gathered in armed enclaves. The coastal enclave of Kokkina and Mansoura was the only one capable of ensuring direct maritime communication with Turkey. Reports from there alleged that weapons, ammunition, and members of the Turkish terrorist organization TMT were being secretly transported.
This information did not come solely from the Greek Cypriot side. U.S. diplomatic documents from May 1964 record the Cypriot government’s allegations regarding the transport of men and weapons through Mansoura and Kokkina, as well as the inability of the UN peacekeeping force to effectively control the area. Nicosia warned that if the UN did not stop the trafficking, it would take military action. U.S. archives show that the crisis had been foreshadowed at least two and a half months before it erupted.
The issue therefore concerned an enclave that, for the Turkish Cypriot side, served as a supply line. For the Republic of Cyprus, it was an illegal conduit for military supplies and a potential bridgehead for a Turkish landing.
The Attack on the Enclave
In early August 1964, forces of the newly formed National Guard, with the participation of volunteer groups and under the operational command of General Georgios Grivas, moved against the enclave. The fighting peaked on August 7, when fortifications and strategic positions around Kokkina and Mansoura were recaptured.
The operation drastically reduced the size of the enclave, but failed to eliminate it entirely. Ankara had already warned that it would not allow the capture of Kokkina. On August 8, it moved from warnings to open military intervention.
Turkish fighter jets began bombing National Guard positions as well as residential areas. The raids continued on August 8 and 9, and in several cases, the operations lasted the entire three-day period from August 7 to 9.
The newspaper *Eleftheria*, in its August 9, 1964, edition, reported on attacks by approximately 30 Turkish aircraft within a three-hour period. Rockets, machine-gun fire, and incendiary bombs struck the villages of Pachyammos, Pigaenia, Pomo, Agios Theodoros, Kato Pyrgos, and other areas. The following day, two Turkish destroyers were spotted off the coast of Mansoura.
Napalm in the Villages
Turkey used napalm bombs, an incendiary weapon whose material sticks to the human body and burns at extremely high temperatures. The bombs fell on residential areas, farmland, and forested areas, causing fires that spread rapidly.
Even the hospital in Pachyammos was hit, where casualties from previous raids had been taken. The civilian population fled the villages, while the roads were filled with the wounded and burned-out vehicles.
The death toll stood at 53 Greek Cypriots and Greeks, including 25 military personnel and 28 civilians. Subsequent reports put the number at 55. As for the wounded, 69 were military personnel and 56 were civilians.
The Lonely Battle of the “Phaethon”
One of the most dramatic chapters of these events unfolded at sea. The patrol boats “Phaethon” and “Arion,” donated by Anastasios Leventis to the Republic of Cyprus, had been secretly sent to Cyprus and took part in the Tillyria operations.
The “Phaethon,” suffering from serious mechanical problems and with a crew of 23 men, set sail on August 8 from Mansoura toward Xeros Bay. There, it came under repeated attack by Turkish fighter planes.
The small vessel, equipped with essentially only one gun for its defense, attempted to engage the Turkish Air Force. Its captain, Lieutenant Commander Dimitris Mitsatsos, ultimately gave the order to run aground so that as many people as possible could be saved. He himself was seriously wounded and lost his right arm.
Six Greek officers, noncommissioned officers, and sailors were killed, as well as the Cypriot volunteer Antis Filitas from Morphou. Sixteen crew members were rescued. The mission remained shrouded in military secrecy for decades. The remains of five of the Greeks were repatriated only in 2018, following exhumations and identifications. The story of the “Phaethon” also serves as a reminder of how easily the so-called national interest can be turned into a convenient silence.
The Resolution and U.S. Intervention
On August 9, the Security Council adopted Resolution 193, calling for an immediate ceasefire and cooperation with the UNFICYP command. The resolution was approved with nine votes in favor and two abstentions—from the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. Resolution 193 avoided directly condemning Turkey and followed the familiar tactic of making an equal appeal to all sides, even when one of them had used military aircraft against populated areas of another state.
Pressure from the United States was decisive. American diplomatic cables record that Washington warned the government of İsmet İnönü that, if the air campaign continued in the face of the risk of a general massacre, neither the U.S. nor international public opinion would tolerate it. At the same time, pressure was exerted on Makarios to end the attack on the enclave. Ankara agreed to halt the raids on the condition that operations in Kokkina would be suspended. The declassified U.S. documents shed light on a behind-the-scenes reality that was not reflected in the resolutions.
A Rehearsal for 1974
The bombings of Tillyria were later characterized as a “rehearsal for invasion.” This characterization is not an exaggeration, since everything indicated that Turkey was preparing and seeking a pretext to intervene.
In 1964, Turkey did not land ground forces or occupy new territories. However, it did test in practice key elements of the plan that would be implemented ten years later. It invoked the protection of Turkish Cypriots, used military force outside its borders, maintained a bridgehead, and gauged the reactions of Greece, the United Nations, and the major powers.
In 1974, it would use the same arguments on a much larger scale, this time under the pretext of the criminal coup d’état by the junta and EOKA B against Makarios.
Two accounts, a dead end
For the Turkish Cypriot side, the events are referred to as the “Erenköy Resistance.” The official narrative refers to approximately 500 Turkish Cypriot students who abandoned their studies in Turkey to defend the enclave. A central figure is the Turkish pilot Cengiz Topel, whose aircraft was shot down and who lost his life after his capture.
The current political leadership in the occupied territories continues to link Kokkina to the maintenance of Turkish guarantees and Ankara’s military presence.
The Kokkina enclave remains to this day without a land connection to the rest of the occupied territories. At the same time, it cuts off the coastal connection between Tillyria and Paphos, forcing residents to take long detours. The area is experiencing population decline, isolation, and developmental neglect.
Sixty-two years later, Kokkina continues to serve as a military symbol for the Turkish side and as an open wound for the residents of Tillyria. Reopening the road could be a genuine confidence-building measure. However, every August 8, the road is temporarily opened to allow buses to pass through for a ceremony that “honors” those who kept it closed.
Source: Proto Thema
