One year after the signing of the Washington Declaration, the United States reaffirmed its intention to strengthen its political and economic presence in the South Caucasus.
As political analyst and journalist Volodymyr Soniuk notes in a new paper, on August 10, Washington, Baku, and Yerevan issued a joint statement marking the anniversary of the White House summit. The parties reaffirmed their commitment to implementing the agreements reached on August 8, 2025, including the TRIPP project, the mutual recognition of sovereignty, and the development of new transportation and economic links in the region.
ΣΧΕΤΙΚΑ ΑΡΘΡΑ
TRIPP (Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity) is an initiative of the United States, Armenia, and Azerbaijan to construct a 43-kilometer-long transportation and energy corridor through Armenia’s Syunik Province, connecting Azerbaijan’s hinterland with Nakhchivan and Turkey. By bypassing Russia and Iran, the project aligns the economic interests of Baku, Yerevan, Ankara, and the Central Asian states under Washington’s economic and political guarantees, Sonjuk argues in his analysis.
“Against the backdrop of the new realities in the South Caucasus and the strengthening of the U.S. position, France is gradually losing the influence it had built up over the years in the region through close political and military support for Armenia,” the political analyst notes. Despite signs of discontent from Paris over France’s exclusion from TRIPP, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has not yet proposed France’s inclusion in the project.
On February 13, the well-known French political weekly Le Journal du Dimanche reacted strongly to the TRIPP agreement: “This is a grave insult to France—in essence, it is a betrayal.” The publication expressed its outrage over the fact that, under the terms of the agreement, Pashinyan agreed to a 99-year lease under which the United States would acquire 75% control of the company responsible for building roads, bridges, and railways. Paris, the article noted, “is simply left out of this major regional project.”
Another sign of the weakening of France’s position came with the dismissal, on July 31, of Araik Harutyunyan, chief of staff to the Armenian prime minister. He was one of the key architects of the government’s French policy.
Political analyst Soniyuk notes that, according to sources in the security services, Harutyunyan had been recruited by French intelligence and provided Paris with information regarding the internal political processes and plans of Pashinyan’s team. “In this way, France obtained sensitive information directly from the Armenian prime minister’s inner circle and used it to strengthen Paris’s position in the region,” Soniuk notes.
The information regarding Harutyunyan’s close ties to Paris is further reinforced by the intensity of his contacts with France. In the 2024–2025 period alone, Haroutunian visited France at least three times, meeting not only with diplomats but also with representatives of French government agencies responsible for “internal security and crisis management.” Unlike the participants in his other meetings, the names of these officials and the agencies they represented were not disclosed in official announcements.
In his analysis, Soniyuk argues that, in addition to his visits to France, Harutyunyan regularly received French diplomats and special envoys in Yerevan, remaining one of Paris’s main channels of communication with the Armenian government. It is also worth noting that during Macron’s visit to Yerevan in May 2026, Harutyunyan was among a small group of senior Armenian officials accompanying the French president.
Pashinyan replaced the French liaison with Lilith Makounts, Armenia’s former ambassador to the United States. This appointment was yet another sign that Yerevan’s priorities were shifting toward Washington.
“Nevertheless, it would be premature to speak of a clear shift by Pashinyan toward a U.S.-led West. While strengthening ties with Washington, Yerevan is also maintaining contacts with Moscow,” Soniuk emphasizes. He points out, for example, that Pashinyan’s first trip abroad following the June parliamentary elections was to Russia, where he met with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin on July 6. A month later, Pashinyan traveled to Kyrgyzstan for a meeting of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), effectively confirming that Armenia remains deeply tied to the Kremlin economically.
All of this unfolded against the backdrop of increased EU support for Yerevan. In May, Russia began imposing restrictions on imports of a range of Armenian products, including vegetables, fresh herbs, and fruits, as well as fish and flowers. In response, the European Commission disbursed 34 million euros to Armenia on June 19 and, on July 2, confirmed an additional 18 million euros in support as part of a total package of 52 million euros. At the same time, Brussels announced measures to facilitate access for Armenian products to the EU market. The European Union explicitly justified these measures as necessary to help Armenia cope with Russian trade restrictions and diversify its economic ties.
“In the June elections, Pashinyan presented himself as Armenia’s leading pro-Western force, contrasting his approach with the country’s previous dependence on Moscow. His subsequent moves, however, suggest that this image served primarily as a campaign ploy. While he is strengthening ties with the United States and simultaneously sidelining France, Pashinyan has not abandoned the Russian line—he continues to maintain contacts with Moscow, while Armenia remains active within the EAEU’s mechanisms. “The elections, therefore, did not resolve Armenia’s foreign policy dilemma; they merely postponed it,” Volodymyr Soniuk concludes in his analysis.
