Fifty-two years after the treacherous coup that paved the way for the Turkish invasion, documents from the State Department’s archives stand as irrefutable testimony to the cold cynicism with which U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger treated the fate of an entire people.

While the messages coming from Ankara were ominous, the head of American diplomacy limited himself to calculations based on a single criterion: to prevent the establishment in Cyprus of a regime that would give the communists a significant role in the island’s internal affairs, and to ensure there would be no pretext for Soviet intervention in developments in CyprusCyprus.

For example, the minutes of the meeting held at the State Department, under his chairmanship, on July 18, 1974.

“We do not wish to see any theory or policy take shape that would pave the way for Soviet intervention, nor, on the other hand, do we wish to see a regime established in Cyprus that would give the communists a significant role in the island’s internal affairs. Nevertheless, we do not wish to rule out the possibility of Makarios’s return at this time.”

He continues: “Whatever our views on the Greek government may be, if we drive the current situation into a crisis that leads to its overthrow, then we will pave the way for Soviet intervention, we will provoke a Turkish military intervention, and we will set in motion a course of events that we will be unable to sustain or control.”

In another telegram from the same day, titled “Coup: U.S. Short-Term Policy and Medium-Term Assessments,” sent by the State Department and dictated by Kissinger himself, at the end, a series of positions are articulated that show that the Americans, rather than focusing on preventing a Turkish invasion—which was clearly on the horizon— were more focused on preventing a Greek-Turkish war, while flirting with the idea of recognizing Nikos Sampson.

“The best hope we see for avoiding war is to encourage Turkey to conclude that its interests are best served by dealing with a weak andregime, rather than being driven into a war to restore constitutional order—which would include the reinstatement of Archbishop Makarios, its greatest enemy.”

This miscalculation also served to lull Turkey into a false sense of security, since, as stated in the telegram in question, “Ankara might begin to believe that its interests are served just as well by an obedient and weak Sampson government, as by an invasion that could restore the detested Makarios to power.”

These arguments and assessments were far from sufficient to convince Turkey, which had already begun military preparations for the invasion less than two days later.

See the report by Christoforos Nestoros: