Lack of transparency, weakening of parliamentary oversight, and institutional distortions

The revision of the Rules of Procedure of the House of Representatives should serve as a model of democratic accountability and institutional transparency. After all, these are the set of rules governing the operation of the country’s highest legislative body, the manner in which parliamentary oversight is exercised, and the procedures through which decisions affecting the public interest are made. However, instead of being the subject of an open public dialogue, the three-year process of revising the Rules of Procedure took place almost entirely out of the public eye, without meaningful public information, without consultation with civil society, and without publicizing the changes under discussion until their final adoption.

Furthermore, the amendments that were ultimately approved include provisions that limit the ability to exercise parliamentary oversight, further exclude smaller political forces from positions of influence, and create new institutional distortions in the functioning of parliament. Even more concerning is that, despite three years of deliberation on these changes, the very first sessions of the new Parliament revealed serious disagreements regarding the interpretation of key constitutional and regulatory provisions, a fact that raises legitimate questions both about the quality of the reform and about the way in which it was designed and adopted.

A three-year process conducted away from the public eye

The Ad Hoc Committee on the Revision and Modernization of the Rules of the House of Representatives worked from May 2023 through March 2026. During this period, there was no substantive public presentation of the proposed changes, no organized consultation with academics, experts, or civil society organizations, and no systematic briefing of citizens on the issues under consideration. Public debate was limited to a few leaks concerning mainly the method of electing the Speaker of Parliament, creating the impression that this was the central reform. However, once the process was completed, it became clear that the changes were much more extensive and substantial.

The exclusion of smaller parties from committee chairmanships

Among these is the new provision stipulating that the chair or vice-chair of a parliamentary committee may only be appointed from among members of a political party that has the required number of members to be recognized as a political party group. This provision explicitly excludes smaller parties from vying for committee chairmanships, regardless of their share of the vote or their contribution to parliamentary work. This is a significant shift in the distribution of power within the House, which was never the subject of public consultation or political debate prior to its adoption.

The Shift in Power Within Parliamentary Committees

At the same time, the new Rules of Procedure also alter the role of the chair of parliamentary committees. Traditionally, a committee chair served as the primary coordinator of the committee’s work, with significant institutional responsibility for advancing its agenda and ensuring the continuity of its proceedings. The new regulations appear to shift a significant portion of the power from the chair to the current majority of the committee members. Whether this will lead to more effective operation or to greater politicization of the procedures remains to be seen in practice.

The Weakening of Parliamentary Oversight

Even more problematic are the changes concerning the tools of parliamentary oversight. Until the latest amendment, the Rules of Procedure stipulated that upon completion of an examination of a matter initiated on its own motion, the relevant parliamentary committee was required to draft a report on the matter. This report served as the primary means of documenting findings, recording recommendations, and monitoring their implementation by the affected entities. Although in practice this provision was rarely applied, the Parliament, with its latest amendment, changed the drafting of such reports from mandatory to optional, further limiting the institutional weight of an already underutilized tool of parliamentary oversight.

More resolutions, less substantive oversight

At the same time, a special procedure was established for the submission and consideration of resolutions. Resolutions, however, do not produce binding legal effects, do not create obligations, and do not entail any direct institutional consequences. In essence, they are political statements of intent or position. It is therefore reasonable to ask why the Parliament chose to devote time and regulatory space to strengthening a procedure of limited practical value, while at the same time weakening tools for more substantive parliamentary oversight.

The distorted approach to live broadcasting of sessions

The amendment concerning the live broadcast of parliamentary committee meetings is also a cause for particular concern. The change was presented as a step toward greater transparency, since it now explicitly mentions the possibility of live broadcasts. However, behind this seemingly positive development lies a significant distortion. Live broadcasting of public sessions was already permitted both under the existing regulatory framework and in accordance with the constitutional principle of the public nature of the Parliament’s proceedings. Nevertheless, the new Rules of Procedure introduce a more restrictive definition of the concept of a “public session,” which may affect the extent of publicity afforded to parliamentary proceedings.

The First Tests of the New Rules of Procedure

Perhaps the greatest contradiction of the entire reform became apparent immediately after its implementation. Despite three years of work by the Ad Hoc Committee, as early as the third session of the new Parliament, serious disagreements arose regarding the interpretation of the constitutional provisions governing the formation of parliamentary committees and the appointment of their members. The fact that the legislature itself lacked a clear and commonly accepted interpretation of the rules governing its own operation constitutes an institutional paradox. It is difficult for the Parliament to expect citizens, the public administration, and other institutions to operate with legal certainty when it itself appears unable to agree on the content of its own procedures.

A modernization that raises more questions than it answers

The crux of the matter lies not only in the specific changes that were adopted, but also in the way in which they were formulated and approved. The rules of procedure of Parliament are not an internal administrative matter for the body itself. They determine how legislative functions are exercised, how the executive branch is held accountable, and how democratic accountability is ensured. Therefore, their revision must be the subject of open dialogue and public scrutiny. The recent reform aimed to modernize the functioning of the Parliament. However, the way in which it was implemented, combined with some of the amendments that were adopted, raises questions regarding the strengthening of parliamentary oversight, the transparency of procedures, and, ultimately, the quality of Parliament’s functioning itself.