DISY is now considered the main rival, while the coalition partners and ELAM should not be taken for granted

When the House of Representatives voted last Thursday against extending Marilena Raouna’s term as Deputy Minister of European Affairs, what caused a particular stir was the intensity with which the President’s Office expressed its dissatisfaction. It accused those who voted against her of being anti-European, portraying AKEL and DISY as thinking and acting in unison. And it emphasized that, for the sake of partisan gain, they were prepared to undermine the national interest. Whether extending Raouna’s term—or the presence or absence of a particular individual in a position—actually safeguards the national interest is a matter for another analysis. As is the question of why this bill was not submitted in a timely manner if it was crucial to the state’s standing in Europe. What is certain, however, is that this very situation confirmed not only that planning for the election campaign has begun at the Presidential Office, but also highlighted the pressure Nikos Christodoulides is now feeling. This is because the search for allies and support is not going as he initially anticipated. 

The implications of an extension

How all of this ties in with Marilena Raouna and the extension of her term is more or less obvious. Her presence in office at this juncture would bolster the President’s pre-election campaign for three reasons.

1. It would institutionally cement one of the government’s successes. At the same time, it would keep one of his closest and most valuable collaborators in a key role ahead of the election campaign.
2. It would strengthen the area he himself considers his greatest strength: foreign policy. He would leave behind, as both a legacy and a campaign asset, the creation of a Deputy Ministry of European Affairs.
3. The establishment of a new deputy ministry would allow him to make strategic appointments, keeping close associates and seconded officials by his side during a particularly critical period leading up to the elections.

There is, however, a fourth reason. The President had been considering for some time how to make the most of Marilena Raouna and strengthen her role. The initial plan was to move her to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and have Konstantinos Kompos take over as Attorney General. In this context, the leaks—which might have led to pressure—regarding the early retirement of Giorgos Savvidis were not considered coincidental. In fact, nothing of the sort actually happened.

But was that enough to account for the level of tension from the President’s Office? Certainly not. The primary reason for the tension was personal, as the President felt that following the departure of Charalambos Charalambous, he was losing yet another very close associate at a critical juncture.  And this particular incident reinforced within the government, on the one hand, that the opposition would now make things more difficult for the government in Parliament, and on the other hand, that the main rival of the Christodoulides government is DISY.

DISY and the Presidency at War

The victory of the Democratic Alarm Party—and especially the percentage of the vote it received—triggered a domino effect of negative developments for the Presidency. It permanently closed the door to its inclusion in the cabinet, significantly strengthened its main rival, Annita Dimitriou, and prevented Democratic Alarm officials—who had all this time had one foot in the Presidential Office and the other in DISY—from either aligning with him or defending the government within the party. The assessment is that DISY now has a serious chance of returning to power, and under these circumstances, very few seem willing to bear the political cost of a short-lived participation in the Christodoulides government.

For its part, of course, DISY is waging a war against the Presidency after a period of lackluster opposition, in an effort to win over Christodoulides’ voters in the parliamentary elections. It is not just a matter of prestige, given that the President has been trying to drive a wedge into the party by sounding out its officials all this time. It’s also the fact that both sides are vying for the same constituency in 2028.

A battle for prestige

As for the “Synagermika” soundings, the truth is that the President attempted to bring “Synagermika” officials on board and was rejected. Of course, what caused the most commotion was the case of Elena Kousiou. Ms. Kousiou was considered within the Presidential Office to be close to Nikos Christodoulides. They had been in contact, not only regarding her reappointment to the KOAG but also during the pre-election period. The offer made to her concerned the position of Commissioner for Citizens’ Rights—a post currently held by Panagiotis Palates—and not a ministerial portfolio. Her refusal, however, was commended by DISY in an effort to demonstrate that, despite Nikos Christodoulides’ efforts, the party is not losing key figures.  A similar situation unfolded in the case of Poly Kourousidis. Despite media reports, Mr. Kourousidis was never approached about becoming a minister. However, the media reports played a role in his taking on the interior affairs portfolio in the shadow cabinet.

Nikola’s demands

All of this inevitably affected the President’s relationship with DIKO, which, from the beginning of his term until today, has been witnessing a struggle to appoint Synergatiki members to ministerial posts and a disregard for his own contribution. Nikolas Papadopoulos, as “Alpha on Sunday” had revealed, emboldened by his poll numbers, set his terms for more ministerial posts, consultation on which DIKO officials would assume ministerial posts, a strong presence in parastatal organizations, and, of course, the need for the party to hold one of the key ministries, Interior and Finance.

The President of the Republic believed that having two vice presidents in the cabinet would keep DIKO close to him. According to behind-the-scenes rumors, he asked these officials to remain in the cabinet in the event that Nikolas Papadopoulos decided to leave, thereby keeping a significant portion of DIKO close to him. Both Nikolas Papadopoulos’s moves regarding DISY and Christiana Erotokritou’s recent statements that the party should field its own candidate sent a message to Nikos Christodoulides that things would not be so easy. The initial ideas considered were appointing Christos Senekis as minister, taking over the Agriculture- Environment, and to move Mr. Palate to the position of Director of the President’s Office. This could be presented to Nikolas Papadopoulos as a way to strengthen DIKO’s presence while also helping the President in his election campaign. On the one hand, because Christos Senekis will bring him closer to the Famagusta District, and on the other, because Panagiotis Palates, as a former organizational leader, maintains close ties with DIKO. This development certainly does not satisfy the leadership. The question, of course, is whether he will insist until the very end on a stronger presence, on having a say in which DIKO officials will become ministers, and whether he will claim one of the two major ministries.

At this point, however, Nikos Christodoulides is reworking his strategy. While during the pre-election period he had devised a plan to drive a wedge between DISY and Synagermos officials close to him, to isolate DIKO, EDEK, and DIPA, and to keep ELAM in check with the aim of securing its support in the presidential election, the situation is now shifting.  The President is expected to place emphasis on DIKO by strengthening ties between ministers and DIKO officials; he will attempt to keep EDEK-DIPA close to him, despite the fact that there are strong voices in both parties calling for a withdrawal from the governing coalition. And he will try to maintain an informal relationship with ELAM. While ELAM had hoped to informally support him in the 2028 presidential election, it now appears that Christos Christou will run for president in that election. Given these circumstances, the President is regrouping, as his main goal is no longer who will support him in the second round of the election, but whether those who support him on the first Sunday will be enough to secure his spot in the second round.