How Prolonged Rumors Slandered Individuals, Disrupted Ministries, and Left the President Vulnerable to Blackmail and Pressure
“A cabinet reshuffle isn’t announced; it’s announced once the final decisions have been made,” said the President of the Republic last Monday in an interview with Elli Kotzamanis on ANT1. And he would be absolutely right, if he himself were not the main reason that the cabinet reshuffle was not only announced but also leaked. Over the past two months, the main topic of discussion has been the impending cabinet reshuffle, not because the media decided to focus on it in the middle of summer when there was a lack of news, but because it was something the President himself was discussing. Along with the rumors of a reshuffle, of course, the credibility of the cabinet and the competence of the President’s close associates have been called into question. There was a flurry of speculation about who was leaving and who was coming in, culminating in the leak of the President’s shortlist last Friday. All of this highlighted every wrong way a cabinet reshuffle can be carried out. Instead of strengthening the government’s work, improving the President’s image, and shifting the focus of current events, it triggered a new series of crises, conflicts, and once again fell short of expectations.
Through leaks
ΣΧΕΤΙΚΑ ΑΡΘΡΑ
The prolonged leaks regarding the cabinet reshuffle not only send the message that the President is indirectly dissatisfied with his cabinet, but also that he lacks decisiveness. The rumored cabinet reshuffle, which had been in the works, began before the parliamentary elections and was completed last Tuesday. However, in the meantime, the President of the Republic made sure to publicly announce to several groups his intention to refresh the government. It was the same—poor—handling, after all, as that which he employed during his first year in office. And if there’s one thing he should have learned since then, it’s that dragging out the whole issue only provokes further crises.
Shuffling Ministries
Just as in the past, so too today, the names of ministers who were out of favor and on their way out were well known. This alone undermined the ministers and short-circuited their work in their respective ministries. Ministers cannot assert authority over their staff when they are viewed as expendable; the staff await the new minister, and in the meantime, the ministry is unable to get any work done. Perhaps the most telling example was the Deputy Ministry of Culture, where the office was underperforming, with the director general—and husband of Irini Piki— George Papageorgiou, acting as deputy minister and fueling the backlash.
Discrediting Colleagues
The ongoing debate over who will leave the cabinet is leading to the smearing of the President’s close associates. This creates two problems for the President. Those who have left undoubtedly feel bitter, and the possibility of them helping with his re-election again is considered remote. This is because they were neither protected by the President nor properly informed about their departure. The cases of Anna Koukkidou Prokopiou and Michalis Giorgallas in the past are indicative of this, and something similar is reported to have happened today with Alexis Vafeadis. Yiannis Panagiotou, who is believed to have been made a scapegoat over the ATA issue and the reactions of key figures, as well as Giorgos Papanastasiou, who recently made pointed remarks to Apostolos Tomaras and the “Kathimerini,” hinted that he did not have the political support he had expected. At the same time, this perception that has taken hold—that the President is unwilling to protect his associates (with the exception of Maria Panagiotou)— is deterring people from accepting this 18-month ministerial appointment.
The President, at the mercy of blackmail and a source of conflict
The prolonged speculation about the cabinet reshuffle—about who was being sounded out and which names were on the table— gave people time to pressure the President but also allowed certain individuals to negotiate better terms. Consequently, rather than the reshuffle being the President’s personal prerogative, it gradually became the product of negotiations that left no one satisfied. The most telling example is DISY, which had the time to prevent—or at least attempt to prevent—the appointment of its officials to ministerial posts. The attempt to poach officials was also the catalyst for the right-wing party to set boundaries in its relations with the government and possibly intensify its opposition in the coming period by blocking bills. DIKO insisted until the very end on receiving more ministerial posts, which led relations between the President and Nikolas to reach a breaking point when the ministers—who were also vice presidents—effectively staged a coup against the DIKO President. However, the leak of the names also caused annoyance among incumbent ministers. Neophytos Charalambides, who had been the President’s staunchest defender at the infamous meeting of the DIKO secretariat, was upset by the possibility of being transferred to the Ministry of Transportation, with the result that both he and other DIKO members (Andreas Apostolou) to pressure the President to reverse his decision. An issue certainly arose as well in the case of Costas Koumis. He is a deputy minister whose name was slated for removal in the first cabinet reshuffle. A key factor in his retention in the cabinet was the strong reaction from Synergatiki figures in Paralimni, as well as from a well-known hotelier in the area. The leak of consultations with DIKO caused annoyance among DIPA members, who were excluded from the process of forming the cabinet—regardless of whether the President retained two officials in very powerful portfolios—as well as EDEK, which is now fractured and has no representatives in the cabinet. The frustration felt by all three parties does not imply any intention to withdraw from the government, as each party is locked in for different reasons; however, this does not mean that —with the exception of DIKO—the other two will strongly support Nikos Christodoulides’ reelection in 2028.
Focusing on 2028 rather than his legacy
Upon his election, the President had promised that his cabinet would consist of technocrats—experts in the portfolios they would assume—rather than party officials. Without even considering whether his campaign pledge was right or wrong, the result reveals a complete contradiction. Or at least a 180-degree shift in course. Today’s cabinet, with very few exceptions, consists mainly of party officials who supported Nikos Christodoulides. Viktoras Papadopoulos admitted as much when asked about the profile of the new cabinet, stating that it consists of individuals who supported Nikos Christodoulides from the very beginning. This does not mean, however, that these individuals will not rise to the occasion, as ministers with no prior experience in their respective fields have often proven successful; for example, Christos Senekis has no connection to the Ministry of Agriculture, nor does Evi Tsolaki to the Ministry of Transportation (who was initially rumored to be taking over the Deputy Ministry of Welfare). A serious issue, however, is the appointment of Ilias Myrianthos as Environment Commissioner, a position where one would expect a technocrat with knowledge of and sensitivity to environmental issues. This gives the impression that the priority is not to get work done by the end of the term (the Ministry of Health, for example, would be changing ministers for the fourth time) but rather to utilize party officials who have the support the President needs to be re-elected. The retention of Kostas Koumis also played a role in this, who, in addition to his influence among local figures, is considered a close associate of the former Vice President and very close to President Christodoulides, Lefteris Christoforou, and Theodosis Tsiolas. Most importantly, however, is the complete DIKO-ization of the cabinet. With the inclusion of two vice presidents who already act as the President’s allies within DIKO, two DIKO officials—ardent supporters of Nikos Christodoulides and Panagiotis Palates—in the position of director of the President’s office, a role considered, among other things, to be experiencedin the organizational work of the presidential election campaign, given that he was part of DIKO’s organizational structure and is a registered member. The question, of course, is what will happen with Marilena Raouna, whose name had been mentioned as a potential head of the President’s Office. She is widely regarded as having been successful in her role as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, yet she is currently out of the picture.
Falling Short of Expectations
President Christodoulides has once again raised high expectations. This time, he suggested that this particular cabinet reshuffle would mark a “new beginning” and form the government that would carry him through to the 2028 presidential election. However, when expectations of sweeping changes have been building for months— the inclusion of new faces, and a revitalization of the government, any final outcome that fails to meet these high expectations is perceived as a failure.
Conclusions and Challenges
The main problem is not only the choice of individuals but also the way the process unfolded. A reshuffle that drags people’s names through the mud, leading to a short-circuit and constant gossip, is not associated with renewal, but with fatigue and wear and tear. The reshuffle is over, and the ministers will be judged by the results of their work. In the meantime, however, the President will have to manage all the crises caused by this months-long leak of rumors about a reshuffle that keeps being promised but never materializes.
