Is this the only way for him to get re-elected, given that he doesn’t belong to a political party, or is it the perfect recipe that will backfire on him and his candidacy?
Two separate incidents that unfolded last week were enough to reveal both the tone of the election campaign and its implications. On the one hand, the appointment of Nikos Tornaritis as the President’s special envoy on the Cyprus issue in Asia and Africa was enough to highlight the inward-looking mindset that pervades DISY and to cement the strategy the President of the Republic will follow until 2028. A strategy that involves driving a wedge between the parties and, above all, taking down the Alarm Party. The question, of course, is whether this method is capable of leading him to re-election or whether it will backfire on him and his candidacy. The belief that things won’t be so easy for him was further reinforced by Kyriakos Kenevezos’s move to put the possibility of his own candidacy on the table. Regardless of whether this actually happens and regardless of whether it has any real momentum, what has become clear is that individuals who supported him during the 2023 election campaign, whether because they didn’t benefit, because they were disappointed, or because they want to exert pressure for specific reasons, are considering alternatives. And they certainly won’t be as enthusiastic about the prospect of his reelection.
Then and now…
ΣΧΕΤΙΚΑ ΑΡΘΡΑ
During the 2023 election campaign, Nikos Christodoulidis was considered the clear favorite according to polls. Today, some of his potential opponents are very close to him in terms of popularity, to the point where it raises questions about which two will advance to the second round. At that time, he presented himself as a non-partisan figure who would lead a government of national unity and managed to draw the centrist parties to his side. Today, not only does he rely entirely on party officials, effectively controlling their leaderships, But he has caused such damage to them—through his interference in their internal affairs—that the leaderships of the coalition parties are now considering other options. In summary, the President’s strategy for 2028 is as follows:
- By declaring himself a member of Synergatikos, he is claiming a significant share of Synergatikos’s influence and ensuring it is highlighted through appointments and contacts
- He has attempted to corner the DIKO party. Knowing that his relationship with Nikolas Papadopoulos is not ideal, he is promoting his own agenda within the party through the vice-presidential ministers, the other two DIKO ministers, and other members of the secretariat
- He has bypassed the coalition partners—and now extra-parliamentary parties—DIPA and EDEK in the consultation process
- He has close ties with ELAM and with specific officials who promote his policies within the party, and he hopes they will unofficially stand by his side on the 28th
The Three-Way Split in DISY
The appointment of Nikos Tornaritis was enough to expose the identity crisis within DISY, the many personal agendas, and the serious internal divisions. The right-wing party has long been grappling with how to handle the faction led by Nikos Christodoulides, which is linked to the support he enjoys within the party. This was evident in the different treatment of party officials associated with him. For example, in the municipal elections, Andreas Papacharalambous was seen as a key figure to support in Strovolos, but not so for Kostakis Konstantinou in the Paphos Municipal Area. Elena Kousiou was President of the KOAG, but at the same time a member of the Shadow Cabinet, a candidate for Parliament, and when her name was being floated for a ministerial post, she took advantage of her position as deputy press secretary. At the same time, there was a game of appearances and power with Nikos Christodoulides, as they vied for the same people—the most striking example being Tina Pavlou. Although she was highly qualified, she faced the orchestrated outrage of Alarm Party officials when she was appointed minister. This has now led to the appointment of Nikos Tornaritis, which most party officials—with the exception of Yiannis Karousos—tried to smooth over. A contradictory and largely hypocritical political stance linked to the party’s loss of identity. Is it the opposition or is it part of the ruling coalition? And if it is the opposition, on what exactly does it disagree with Nikos Christodoulides, given that on economic and foreign policy issues, the two sides are in complete agreement? All of this causes confusion among the rank and file and provides the perfect pretext for party officials seeking positions to align themselves with the government. The President of the Republic evidently took full advantage of this confusion, abruptly changing his rhetoric. From being a nonpartisan candidate for all Cypriots, he now declares himself a member of Synagermikos; and given the party’s internal divisions, as well as the upcoming internal party elections that are intensifying conflicts, he is attempting to secure the support of roughly one-third of the “Alarm” audience, who, according to polls, view him favorably.
He has a plan for the future as well
He no longer has Nicos Anastasiades unofficially on his side, but he has made sure to maintain relationships with former party officials, such as Ionas Nikolaou, Lefteris Christoforou, and Panagiotis Antoniou, the President of the EEY, while his relationship with Nikos Tornaritis has always been excellent, to the point of misunderstandings in 2023. Anita Dimitriou does not seem inclined to enter into an open conflict, either because she does not want to exacerbate internal divisions ahead of the party primaries or because she is concerned about how Nikos Christodoulides’ supporters the supporters of Nikos Christodoulides might take punitive action against her. Of course, the President of the Republic maintains a good relationship with DISY Deputy President Efthymios Diplaros. In fact, party sources note that he may be the President’s preferred candidate in the battle expected to take place the day after the elections for the DISY presidency. This has not gone unnoticed and is evidently linked to the conflict he had with Yiannis Karousos outside of political institutions. Karousos, for his part, aspires to run for the same position and is trying to rally the anti-Christodoulides vote around him. The question, of course, is whether this confusion within DISY will continue even after a candidate is selected. It should be recalled that during the intense pre-election campaign of 2023, the party ultimately managed to rally to a large extent behind the candidacy of Averof Neophytou. It is therefore not out of the question that, following the move to appoint Tornaritis, party loyalty will be strengthened and the party—those who do not identify as Christodoulides supporters—be rallied behind the Alarmist candidate if it is deemed that Nikos Christodoulides is attempting to create serious rifts.
Nikos and the escape plan
Nikos Christodoulides’ move to infuse the cabinet with DIKO officials, as well as most parastatal organizations, had two possible interpretations. The first view was that the President was attempting in this way to heal the rifts with DIKO. The second view was that Nikos Christodoulides was attempting to secure the support of a number of DIKO officials who would step in should Nikolas Papadopoulos raise the issue of leaving the government. And who would work behind the scenes to support him in 2028. A strategy reportedly followed by Glafkos Clerides when DIKO ministers Michailidis and Mousiouttas remained by his side after DIKO’s withdrawal, but especially by Nicos Anastasiades in 2014 when he retained Giorgos Lakkotrypis, Marios Dimitriadis, and sent Kyriakos Kenevezos to the Cypriot Embassy in Greece. During the turbulent secretariat meeting ahead of the reshuffle, the DIKO President realized that Nikos Christodoulides had driven a wedge into the party and that figures in the top leadership were acting as Trojan horses. This perception has been reinforced following the vice presidents’ statements that DIKO has a choice for 2028, pointing to Nikos Christodoulides, regardless of the fact that, during a meeting the President had with DIKO ministers, it was agreed to keep a low profile regarding how DIKO will proceed in 2028. In fact, there are quite a few within DIKO who believe that Nikos Christodoulides is promoting Michalis Damianos for the position of DIKO President. This tactic of direct intervention in internal party affairs, combined with the fact that the President has not been consulting with the party at all recently, has provoked a furious reaction from Nikolas Papadopoulos. He makes no secret of his dissatisfaction or of the fact that he wants to have an exit strategy for 2028. The possibility of supporting Annita Dimitriou is currently considered highly unlikely. One option that appears to be under consideration is for the party to run independently. This is an idea that DIKO Deputy Chair Christiana Erotokritou also views positively. Such a scenario inevitably binds DIKO ministers to the party’s decision and undermines Nikos Christodoulides’ candidacy. This is also why the President has recently attempted to mend his relationship with Nikolas Papadopoulos and, in a recent meeting, invited him to work together on a plan for his re-election .
The issue of bypassing
However, it is not only the DIKO that is annoyed by the President’s behavior, but also the DIPA. A telling example is the statement by DIPA President Marios Karoyian, in “25 Minutes” and to Iakovos Iakovou, in which he does not rule out the possibility of other options and reveals that it has been a long time since he last spoke with President Christodoulides. At DIPA, they feel sidelined by the President, who did not even inform Marios Karoyian about the reshuffle. One interpretation is that the party, which is now out of parliament, should have no cause for complaint, given that it holds two powerful ministries. The other interpretation, however, points out that the two officials, Palmas and Mousioutas, were personally selected by the President. And through them, bypassing the leadership’s wishes, he will attempt to keep the centrist votes close to him. The only ones currently turning a blind eye to the relationship between these officials and the President are ELAM. ELAM has proven that it stands by the President, and it is not out of the question that it might support him in 2028, but given how the party operates, if the leadership perceives that the President will also interfere in their own internal party affairs, it is not out of the question that there could be a shift in stance to ensure the party’s survival.
Time will tell whether, given this complete fragmentation of the parties, the President will manage to get re-elected by relying on his own core supporters. Or whether this strategy will ultimately cause such discontent within the parties that it will backfire on him. As a result, he will not only have to seek allies but will also suffer a significant public relations setback regarding the way he handles the parties.
