By Paraskevas Rodosthenous
- Academic/Legal Scholar
- KD Correspondent on UK-EU and Cyprus Relations
The upcoming EU–UK Summit to be held in Brussels represents a significant opportunity to further strengthen a strategic relationship that goes beyond economic transactions and encompasses security, energy, trade, and people-to-people ties. However, its success should not be judged solely on the number of agreements announced, but primarily on their balance, sustainability, and institutional coherence.
Six years after Brexit, a fundamental question remains relevant: Can a third country selectively enjoy the most significant benefits of European integration without assuming the corresponding obligations?
This second summit is not taking place in a vacuum of negotiations. It essentially serves as a milestone for political assessment and confirmation of the progress achieved on the basis of the Common Understanding of the first Summit in May 2025, which took place in the UK, as well as the EU–UK Security and Defense Partnership. The goal, therefore, is not merely to announce new political commitments, but to translate the already agreed-upon guidelines into concrete, implementable results, while respecting the established procedures and the institutional autonomy of both sides. Substantial progress should be reflected both in the implementation of individual agreements and in the deepening of cooperation in areas of shared strategic interest, particularly in security and defense.
In the field of security and defense, moreover, the convergence of interests between the EU and the United Kingdom is substantial. London’s significant financial and defense contributions in support of Ukraine demonstrate its strategic role in European security. Beyond the Ukrainian issue, however, the upcoming summit offers an opportunity to further deepen cooperation on economic security, the protection of critical infrastructure, the resilience of supply chains, and defense cooperation. These are areas where there is significant convergence of strategic interests, with prospects for mutual benefit, provided there are clear commitments, a fair distribution of the financial burden, and respect for the Union’s institutional autonomy.
This strategic convergence, however, does not negate the need to maintain clear negotiating principles. Deepening cooperation with the United Kingdom is in our mutual interest, but it cannot lead to a peculiar form of à la carte participation in the EU.
Moreover, the EU already has various models of cooperation with third countries, such as Norway’s participation in the Single Market through the European Economic Area and the network of bilateral agreements with Switzerland. The case of the United Kingdom, however, differs substantially, as it chose to withdraw from the Single Market and the Customs Union. Consequently, the search for new sector-specific arrangements is legitimate, but it cannot entail equivalent rights without corresponding obligations.
“Cherry-picking” as a Long-Standing Negotiating Challenge
The British approach continues to be characterized by the pursuit of selective arrangements in sectors where access to the European market or to European mechanisms offers significant economic and strategicadvantages.
This is particularly evident in the negotiations on the creation of a common sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) area, the interconnection of emissions trading systems (ETS), and the Youth Experience Scheme.
Substantial progress has been made in the first two areas. However, critical issues remain regarding regulatory alignment, exemptions, and a level playing field. Seeking access to the benefits of the Single Market, while simultaneously maintaining extensive options to deviate from the European acquis, carries the risk of creating asymmetrical rights and obligations.
Even more telling are the negotiations regarding youth mobility and tuition fees at British universities. The EU is seeking substantive reciprocity and fair treatment for European students, while London cites the financial implications for its universities. The proposed tuition fee reductions are a sign of progress, but not necessarily a satisfactory solution. The difference between a limited financial concession and true proportionality remains substantial.
Recent reports of a British proposal to align tuition fees for European students with those of British students, at a level of approximately 9,000 pounds per year, certainly offer positive prospects, especially for thousands of Cypriot and European families who have been affected by the consequences of Brexit. This is a development that must be pursued and encouraged, without, however, prejudging the final agreement. Substantive reciprocity is not limited to financial concessions, but requires clear, binding, and sustainable arrangements that ensure the equal treatment of European citizens, without discrimination.
In this context, the renewed rapprochement between the EU and the UK in the field of education—highlighted by the latter’s participation in the EU’s Erasmus+ program starting in 2027 and a 30% reduction its projected financial contribution—following Switzerland’s precedent—is a particularly significant development. This outcome deserves to be recognized as a major achievement of the Cypriot Presidency of the Council of the EU during the first half of 2026. Above all, however, this cooperation must be viewed as a strategic investment in the younger generation, in educational mobility, and in strengthening European ties—and not as a bargaining chip to secure disproportionate concessions in other areas.
The possibility of postponing a final settlement until after the Summit should not be interpreted as an abandonment of European demands. On the contrary, any interim agreement must maintain clear commitments, a timeline, and a substantive link to the overall outcome.
The debate over a possible delay in the broader EU–UK agreement due to disagreements over university tuition fees highlights a crucial aspect of the negotiations. For the European Union, the mobility of young people is not merely a technical issue, but is directly linked to the principles of reciprocity, equal treatment, and meaningful access for European citizens to the opportunities offered by cooperation with the United Kingdom. The pressure to achieve a political outcome ahead of the Summit must not, therefore, lead to the acceptance of a settlement based on the framework already agreed upon at the first summit last year, which would perpetuate significant imbalances. Postponing the resolution of certain outstanding issues may be a legitimate negotiating option, provided that it does not weaken the substantive European requirements or prejudge the content of the final agreement.
“Made in Europe”: The New Boundary of Selective Participation
Particular attention must be paid to the UK’s push for access to the “Made in Europe” framework currently under development, “Made in Europe,” which is linked to European industrial policy, economic security, and the Union’s strategic autonomy.
The British argument regarding closely interconnected supply chains and shared economic interests is not without merit. However, recognizing this interdependence does not automatically entail the right to equal participation in mechanisms designed primarily to strengthen the European industrial base.
It would be politically and institutionally problematic to turn a concession on the issue of university tuition fees into a quid pro quo for the United Kingdom’s broad and preferential access to strategic projectsof European industrial policy.
This issue takes on even greater significance in light of recent reports that London is seeking to link the resolution of the university tuition fee issue both to its participation in the “Made in Europe” initiative and access to Eurodac—let alone politically sensitive issues. Linking issues of educational mobility to strategic industrial policy tools and sensitive European data management mechanisms highlights precisely the risks of a selectivenegotiating approach. European flexibility cannot be turned into the granting of privileges without equivalent commitments, nor should the need to find solutions to one issue create a fait accompli in others that are institutionally and strategically more important. Particularly when it comes to access to the European acquis, a political exchange of concessions is not enough; rather, a clear legal basis, strict guarantees, and full respect for the Union’s autonomy.
These are issues of varying scale, economic impact, and long-term consequences. Any potential linkage between them requires a careful assessment of the actual political balance of trade-offs, as well as the implications for Member States, European businesses, and the cohesion of the Single Market.
European strategic autonomy cannot be merely a negotiating concept. It must be reflected in concrete choices that safeguard the Union’s competitiveness, resilience, and ability to make autonomous decisions.
The Comprehensive Approach and the Unity of the 27
The most important lesson from the Brexit negotiations was that the unity of the Member States has always been the EU’s greatest negotiating strength. This principle, which stems from the conclusions of the European Council (EUCO), has not only retained its value but has taken on even greater significance today. On the contrary, it is becoming even more crucial at a time when individual sectoral agreements can create differing economic incentives and priorities among Member States.
A piecemeal negotiation, in which each issue is considered solely on the basis of its immediate sectoral benefits, risks undermining the overall balance of the relationship. For this reason, a “package approach” does not constitute negotiating inflexibility, but rather a necessary guarantee of reciprocity.
The need to maintain this balance takes on particular importance when the pursuit of a rapid political agreement creates pressure for mutual concessions across different areas of negotiation. The European side must distinguish between the necessary flexibility—which allows for practical solutions— and the surrender of strategic advantages in exchange for limited or temporary arrangements. A potential agreement on tuition fees, however important it may be for European students, cannot in and of itself be considered an equivalent trade-off for broad access to European industrial facilities or other strategic Union infrastructure. The overall approach must, therefore, serve as a mechanism to ensure a balanced agreement and not as a means through which individual concessions acquire disproportionate bargaining power.
This does not mean that every individual agreement must be concluded on the same day. It does mean, however, that concessions, financial contributions, regulatory alignment, and access rights must be assessed in the context of the overall relationship and existing agreements.
Equally important is that the Summit’s assessment not be limited to new outstanding negotiating issues, but must also encompass the full, timely, and good-faith implementation of existing agreements, first and foremost the Withdrawal Agreement and the Trade and Cooperation Agreement. This includes both the consistent implementation of the Windsor Framework and, of particular importance to the Republic of Cyprus, the full implementation of the Protocol on the Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus, with full respect for the established competences, applicable EU law, and the rights of affected citizens. The credibility of a renewed partnership strategy is judged not only by the new commitments undertaken, but also by the extent to which previously agreed obligations are upheld in practice, without selective interpretations or compromises in their implementation.
The debate over a more flexible European architecture, with varying degrees of cooperation and participation by third countries, does not negate this fundamental principle. Differentiated integration must not be confused with the selective enjoyment of rights without corresponding obligations. The very nature of European integration is based on reciprocity, the common application of rules, and the preservation of institutional cohesion. Therefore, the pursuit of an overall negotiating balance must be accompanied by substantive unity among the 27 Member States, particularly when individual agreements affect their national interests differently. No short-term sectoral arrangement should undermine the Union’s collective negotiating power or set precedents that could affect its future relations with other thirdcountries.
At the same time, horizontal coordination within the Council remains crucial, to prevent the creation of faits accomplis through parallel sectoral negotiations and to ensure that the concerns of all Member States, regardless of size or geographical location, are given equal consideration. The EU must strive for an ambitious, constructive, and mutually beneficial relationship with the UK. However, the political will for a rapprochement cannot replace the fundamental principles governing European integration.
In conclusion, unity at the level of the Council of the EU, reciprocity, and a balance of rights and obligations are not obstacles to cooperation. They are the prerequisites for cooperation to gain real depth and durability. The success of the upcoming summit will not be judged by how flexible and ambitious the EU can be in response to British demands, but by whether it can remain united, consistent, and strategically committed to its collective interests. The results of this rapprochement should not be evaluated solely on the basis of the speed with which new agreements are reached, but also on the substantive implementation of existing commitments and the quality of the overall balance that is taking shape. The political will for a fresh start must go hand in hand with reciprocity, the unity of the 27, respect for agreed obligations, and the Union’s long-term strategic autonomy.
