The Revival of DISAKEL, the Contradictions Regarding 2023, and the Audience That Is Searching
Last week, the Isaac-Solomos memorial event was overshadowed by the dual role of the President of Direct Democracy and Member of the European Parliament, Fidias Panagiotou. Consequently, a pointed remark made by the President of the Republic on the sidelines of the event took a back seat. Prompted by the strong backlash caused by the appointments to parastatal organizations, as well as the questions raised about the role of the Advisory Council, the President, visibly annoyed, used the term “DISAKEL,” arguing that they were issuing identical statements, and urged the two parties to issue them jointly. It was a statement of particular political significance and with far-reaching political implications. Not only because of the President’s extra-institutional move to lump the two major parties together in this way, nor because of the loss of composure he displayed. It raised once again a question that has long been discussed behind the scenes. If the President seeks re-election, with whom will he be re-elected? And above all, to what audience is he addressing today?
ΣΧΕΤΙΚΑ ΑΡΘΡΑ
DISY and the Le Pen Example
The narrative of an alignment between DISY and AKEL had begun tentatively in 2008, when Tassos Papadopoulos was running for reelection as a centrist candidate and had to face thecandidates of the two major parties, Dimitris Christofias and Ioannis Kasoulides. It was adopted by the supporters of Giorgos Lillikas in 2013 and reached its peak in 2018 with the candidacy of Nikolas Papadopoulos. The term “DISAKEL” was used extensively in press releases, as well as by the DIKO President himself, who aspired to rally the centrist electorate, those opposed to the two major parties, and to become the voice of a third political pole. What is often overlooked, of course, is that this equating of the two major parties had originated with France’s far-right National Front in exactly the same way. By merging the acronyms of the right-wing UMP and the Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste), she referred to the infamous “UMPS.” And Marine Le Pen characteristically argued that “we have the right wing of the UMPS with Sarkozy and the left wing of the UMPS with Hollande.” This was to demonstrate that the two major parties were pursuing the same policies. Other far-right parties in Germany, Austria, and Belgium took a similar approach.
Conclusions
Whether the President of the Republic has now adopted the toxic rhetoric of Europe’s far-right parties—and whether he will continue to follow the political narrative of Nikola Papadopoulosin 2018, remains an open question. The following conclusions can be drawn from this statement regarding his objectives.
- He is attempting to convey the message that the leadership of DISY, which is identified with AKEL, has no connection to the party’s rank-and-file, who want no association whatsoever with AKEL
- At the same time, it appeals to the far-right audience—ELAM voters who are driven not only by anti-AKEL sentiment but also by anti-SYRIZA sentiments
Who is the “Middle Ground” now?
The question is how far such a narrative can take him. The powerful Tassos Papadopoulos, who ran for reelection as the representative of “NO” to the Annan Plan, failed to advance to the second round, as the centrist bloc was not strong enough to stand up to the two major parties. And it was believed that this toxic narrative of a rift with the two major parties also cost Nikolaos Papadopoulos the election. Not only because the majority of centrist voters do not want a complete break, but also because the political spectrum has become fragmented over time. Nikos Christodoulides of 2023 seemed to be aware of this, and in that context, he avoided criticizing the two major parties at the time. Instead, he played the non-partisan card, emphasizing that he represents society as a whole and that his candidacy could unite supporters across all parties.
The Enigma Known as ELAM
He himself seeks to rally as large a percentage as possible of the so-called “Center” behind him. He understands the dissatisfaction of the leaderships of the three parties, and for that reason, he has placed his own people from each party in key positions, who will be able to rally either the entire party or a large portion of it behind his reelection. At the same time, he is seeking the support of ELAM. He certainly does not want an official alliance at this time, which is why any concessions to the far-right party are being made behind the scenes. On the one hand, because such a move would make it harder for him to secure support from other parties, and on the other hand, for image reasons. President Christodoulides certainly does not want to be perceived as a candidate of the far right. What he does want, however, is to be supported tacitly—and certainly not to have Christos Christou run against him, which is currently a remote possibility. The question, of course, regarding this informal alliance is what ELAM will do in the event of developments in the Cyprus issue. The far-right party kept a low profile during António Guterres’s visit, but if developments do occur, will it be able to continue supporting the President of the Republic, and how might this affect the party’s base? And the question, of course, can be turned around: Given that Nikos Christodoulides has been taking a hard line toward the Cypriot public all this time, will he be ready to take bold steps to resume talks and make progress?
Alienating DISY
In 2023, Nikos Christodoulides was seen as the very embodiment of DISY. Today, he believes that if Annita Dimitriou runs, a large portion of DISY will follow him due to his government experience, whereas if Averof Neophytou were to run, the 2023 result would be repeated. However, he seems to be overlooking the following: In 2023, he presented himself as a victim persecuted by the ruling coalition. Today, he himself is attempting to undermine the party by poaching its officials. In 2023, behind the scenes, he appeared to have the support of Nikos Anastasiades as well as leading DISY officials such as Ionas Nikolaou. Today, even if he still has the former President’s tacit support, that support lacks solid grounding due to the shadow of scandals and his removal from the presidency. No matter how important the meetings with Ionas Nikolaou, Nikos Tornaritis, and Lefteris Christoforou, the three certainly do not wield the same influence over the “Alarm” audience that they did when they held key positions.
But that’s not all. In his effort to rally the Center and the Far Right around him, he has fallen into contradictions and trapped himself. The “DISAKEL” narrative will not be easy for the “Synergatiko” audience to swallow. Not only because it resembles the rhetoric of a centrist candidate, nor because it is considered toxic, but because it also carries an element of ingratitude. Ingratitude, given that Nikos Christodoulides rose to the highest positions of power as a member of the DISY administration.
