Disagreement is legitimate. What is not legitimate is replacing strategic thinking with ideological reflexes from a bygone era

Whenever the discussion on the Cyprus issue turns to the topic of security, most people look to the past for answers. This is perhaps our biggest mistake. Because Cyprus in 2026 is not called upon to face the threats of 1960 or 1974. It is called upon to survive in a world that is far more unstable and far more dangerous. The reintroduction of NATO into the public discourse surrounding efforts to resume a substantive dialogue to resolve the Cyprus problem touches on the hardest core of the Cyprus issue, as the history of negotiations to date has shown.

One of the most critical questions is who will protect a reunified Cypriot state in the aftermath of a solution, and how.

This is a fundamental question, because an agreement without a credible security architecture will not constitute a comprehensive solution. Rather, it would be a new, fragile arrangement, terribly vulnerable to the first major crisis.

In recent years, the prospect of closer ties between the Republic of Cyprus and NATO has been publicly supported by both the Democratic Rally and the President of the Republic. At the same time, AKEL categorically states that it will not accept a solution that would provide for NATO guarantees or a NATO presence in Cyprus.

Disagreement is legitimate. What is not legitimate is the replacement of strategic thinking with ideological reflexes from a bygone era.

The Failure of the Old System

The starting point for any serious discussion must be the acknowledgment that the 1960 security and guarantee system cannot serve as the foundation for the post-solution era. A modern European state cannot operate under the tutelage of third countries. Nor can it accept unilateral rights of intervention—whether real or alleged—from powers with their own strategic interests on the island. This, after all, was the argument put forward by the Greek Cypriot side during the last round of negotiations, which concluded in July 2017 in Switzerland.

The existing system has not only failed to prevent disaster but has, in essence, become part of the problem. Therefore, its replacement is a prerequisite for a sovereign, functional, and sustainable Cyprus.

From there on, however, the difficult discussion begins. For the abolition of the old guarantees does not eliminate the need for security. It creates the obligation to replace them with something better.

Cyprus is not the “Stone of the Greek”

The proposal for the complete demilitarization of the island may sound morally superior to some. A country without armies, weapons, or military conflicts is certainly a vision that few would reject on principle.

However, the image of Cyprus is not the Rock of the Romios, nor the little harbor of Kyrenia. The image of Cyprus is best understood by looking at a map of the region.

Cyprus is located in the Eastern Mediterranean, in close proximity to the Middle East, in a zone of war, instability, terrorism, missile threats, energy rivalries, cyberattacks, and hybrid operations.

It forms the southeastern border of the European Union, is located near critical sea lanes, and possesses infrastructure of broader strategic importance. At the same time, it serves as a hub for humanitarian operations, civilian evacuations, and the European presence in the region.

Given this geographical location, the idea that Cyprus can simply declare itself demilitarized and rid itself of threats is dangerously naive.

No resolution, no international law, can serve as a “shield” for a small state against the threats of our time. Threats cannot be addressed simply because a state has decided it does not wish to confront them militarily.

Demilitarization is not a security system

Demilitarization is not, in and of itself, a security policy. It describes what the state will not possess. It does not explain who will protect it, by what means, within what timeframe, or with what binding obligation to respond.

If a reunified Cyprus does not have armed forces or any credible defense capability, then the responsibility for its protection is transferred to someone else.

To whom?

To the UN? To the European Union? To a multinational force? To certain powerful states? To a new version of guarantor powers? Or to a collective defense alliance?

Those who reject both national defense and the NATO option must present a concrete and operationally credible alternative. It is not enough to invoke international law, however necessary it may be. International law sets the rules. It does not always have the means to stop those who decide to violate them.

Peace requires both legitimacy and deterrence.

Even the frequent examples of states without standing armies do not really strengthen the argument for an unarmed Cyprus. Iceland, for example, has no conventional armed forces, but it is a member of NATO. It has not entrusted its security to the goodwill of the international community. Instead, it has integrated itself into a strong system of collective defense.

This precisely demonstrates that the absence of a national army does not mean the absence of military protection. It usually means that others are providing that protection.

Why NATO Must Be Part of the Equation

To set the record straight, however, we must note that NATO is neither infallible nor a neutral humanitarian institution. It is a politico-military alliance in which states participate because they believe that collective strength offers greater security than isolation. This is precisely its key advantage.

A potential NATO dimension to the solution could help replace unilateral guarantees with a multilateral framework. It could integrate Cyprus’s security into institutional mechanisms for planning, consultation, and interoperability. It could also reduce one community’s dependence on Greece and the other’s on Turkey, shifting security from the level of national guardianship to a broader collective system.

Cyprus, in essence, must cease to need protectors. 

A multilateral architecture, with a strong European and possibly NATO dimension, could serve precisely this objective: not to replace Turkish or Greek tutelage with NATO tutelage, but to create a system in which no state would have unilateral rights over Cyprus.

At the same time, Cyprus could maintain a limited, defense-oriented, and bicommunal force, tailored to the needs of a small European state. Its mission would not be to wage war against a regional power, but rather to monitor air and maritime space, protect critical infrastructure, conduct cyber defense, countering asymmetric threats, and actively participating in collective security operations.

The choice is not between a hyper-militarized Cyprus and an unarmed utopia. There is also the sensible option of a small, modern state with its own core capabilities and strong international alliances.

The difficulties are real

Having noted the above, it should be perfectly clear that the path toward NATO membership is no simple matter.

The first and most obvious obstacle is Turkey. As a member of the Alliance, it can block the accession of the Republic of Cyprus. Consequently, no NATO prospect can be realized automatically or unilaterally. It must be part of a comprehensive political agreement.

There is also the issue of credibility. Turkey is the country that most Greek Cypriots view as the source of the primary military threat. At the same time, it is a member of NATO. The question of how an alliance would handle a crisis among its members or a violation involving a powerful member state is not unfounded. AKEL itself raises this as a key argument against the prospect of NATO membership.

This objection should not be dismissed with slogans. It must be addressed with concrete measures.

A solution could not simply include the word “NATO” and assume that the security problem has been resolved. It would require a clear system for monitoring compliance with the agreement, procedures for addressing violations, an international presence during the transition period, a dispute resolution mechanism, and an explicit ban on unilateral military action.

It would also be necessary to ensure that both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots do not feel that they are losing the security they believe is currently provided to them by the National Guard and Greece on the one hand, and by Turkey on the other.

Finally, it must be recognized that a solution to the Cyprus problem will have to be achieved within the framework of the UN. NATO’s involvement cannot be presented as a substitute for the United Nations’ legitimizing and mediating role. The UN, the European Union, and a potential NATO dimension could play distinct and complementary roles.

Realism is not militarism

The main political ploy of the opponents in this debate is to portray any reference to NATO or the need for defense capabilities as militarism. This is an easy but misleading dichotomy. Maintaining armed forces does not imply a desire for war, just as maintaining a fire department does not imply a desire for fires. It means acknowledging that dangers exist and that the state must have mechanisms in place to address them.

Consequently, Cyprus must stop confusing peaceful intentions with defensive weakness. History does not teach us that the unarmed are always safe. It teaches that the security of small states depends on a combination of legitimacy, diplomacy, internal resilience, national capabilities, and reliable alliances.

The discussion must take place without taboos

NATO cannot resolve the political differences between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, nor can it undo the consequences of decades of mistrust.

It can, however, be part of the answer to the most difficult question facing the future.

That is why rejecting it out of hand is not a serious policy. It amounts to an ideological ban on discussion.

The crucial question for those who reject the military, NATO, and any form of strong external guarantee all at once remains unavoidable:

Who exactly will protect a demilitarized Cyprus when diplomacy fails, when agreements are violated, or when an external crisis reaches its shores?

Until a concrete answer is provided, demilitarization cannot be presented as a comprehensive strategy.

Cyprus has every reason to seek peace. It does not, however, have the luxury of being unprotected. A reunified Cyprus requires the abolition of unilateral guarantees, the withdrawal of foreign troops, a strong European presence, a substantive role for the UN, limited but reliable defense capabilities of its own, and integration into an effective collective security architecture.

Within this architecture, NATO should be viewed neither as a savior nor as a demon. Rather, it should be assessed as a tool.

Nicholas Zannettos / Director of Redwolf: The PR