An Assessment of the Ankara Summit: The Benefits and the Long Road Ahead for Potential Membership

The Cypriot side views the NATO summit in Ankara positively, given that sensitive Cypriot issues were left off the agenda, at a summit where Ankara had home-field advantage. Even though Nicosia did not participate and, as a result, was unable to intervene in developments that could affect its geostrategic interests, it closely monitored the discussions and remained in constant contact with its allies who were participating in the Summit.

The Cyprus Issue

Defense Minister Vasilis Palmas, however, clarified to “Alpha” the context surrounding the issue that arose regarding the mutual assistance clause among EU member states on which Cyprus had placed great emphasis following the Iranian attack on Akrotiri. Recently, the European Union’s Political and Security Committee endorsed Article 5, which grants NATO primacy over the security of the 23 member states that are also part of the North Atlantic Alliance. This effectively relegated Article 42.7—which concerns mutual assistance among member states—to a secondary role. This had been interpreted as a negative development for Nicosia, which is not a member of NATO. As Vasilis Palmas explained, however, when Cyprus needed assistance, it did not invoke Article 42.7; rather, “of their own accord, five member states of both the EU and NATO were in Cyprus at the critical moment and provided the protective umbrella we needed.” In any case, as the Minister of Defense noted, the ESDP’s decision does not move in the direction of autonomous European defense and collective security.

The France Factor

Turkey did not contest the Cyprus-France military agreement, especially in light of the major deal for Ankara’s purchase of the Franco-Italian SAMP/T air defense system. It should be recalled that Turkey had threatened to denounce, at the Ankara Summit, the SOFA agreement that governs the status of French troops stationed on Cypriot soil, citing a violation of the 1960 Treaties and international law. Nicosia and Paris made it clear that they do not need anyone’s permission to conclude agreements, clarifying that, first, the agreement is not directed against Turkey, and second, that it does not provide for the establishment of a French military base or a permanent presence of French forces on the island. Cypriot-French relations appear to be at their best, a fact that will be further cemented by the President of the Republic’s visit to Paris on July 13, where he will participate in France’s national anniversary celebrations, accompanied by a military honor guard from the National Guard.

Casus Belli and SAFE

In any case, Ankara has sought to turn its role as host country into a strategic advantage, aiming for greater participation in European defense programs. However, once again, Erdogan’s demand to lift restrictions on participation in the SAFE program and European defense efforts ran up against Turkey’s casus belli against Greece. Greece, which was present at the summit, made it clear that Turkey’s participation in SAFE requires the unanimous consent of all EU member states and depends on progress in EU-Turkey relations. Athens has, moreover, made the removal of the casus belli a precondition for Turkey’s participation in the major €150 billion SAFE defense procurement program.

The Adana Headquarters

Vasilis Palmas, however, also allayed concerns about Turkey’s plans to expand its role in regional security in the Middle East by establishing a NATO Multinational Headquarters in Adana, which would place the Eastern Mediterranean region—including Cyprus—under its operational control. In such a scenario, critical questions arise. What will Cyprus’s role be in such a scenario, and how will it act in coordination with its allies, who are based at the Andreas Papandreou Base in Paphos, in the event of a crisis similar to that in Iran and NATO involvement? As Vasilis Palmas pointed out, Turkey will have to overcome many obstacles to achieve its goals, as such plans will be met with resistance from Israel and other regional powers, including Greece.

The Road to NATO

At the same time, however, the discussion regarding the possible accession of the Republic of Cyprus to NATO has resurfaced. As Vasilis Palmas pointed out, “realistically and frankly, we emphasize that at this moment we face obstacles to Cyprus becoming a member of NATO, for the very simple reason that Turkey will exercise its veto.” He clarified, however, that Cyprus is preparing. The President of the Republic also clarified that  “accession remains a goal and an objective; for this to be transformed into a formal expression of interest, we must ensure that the outcome will be positive. Until the political conditions are in place, we are preparing at other levels—administrative and operational.” The road to NATO is expected to be long, but the ball is already rolling, and developments on the chessboard of the key players involved in resolving the Cyprus issue are expected to unfold rapidly.