How the circumstances of each era influenced the form of proposals for a solution
The history of the Cyprus issue is characterized by successive plans and proposals for a solution, which reflected the geopolitical realities as well as the international environment, and, above all, the relations between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. These relations were largely shaped by the positions of the respective Turkish Cypriot leader and his dependence on Turkey, the will of the guarantor powers, and the willingness of Greek Cypriot leaders to make concessions.
From the Conference to the Bi-communal Riots
ΣΧΕΤΙΚΑ ΑΡΘΡΑ
The Cyprus problem did not begin with the invasion or the intercommunal riots of 1963–64.
The 1947–1948 Deliberative Assembly–1948 was the first organized British effort to establish a constitutional framework for Cyprus, with the aim of granting limited self-government under British supervision. The Conference failed, as the British constitutional proposals were not accepted by the Greek Cypriot side, a fact that contributed to the further escalation of the Cyprus conflict and strengthened the demand for self-determination.
The Greek Cypriot side sought union and, subsequently, self-determination, which was linked primarily to Cyprus’s accession to Greece. At the same time, Turkey began to view the prospect of unification as a threat to its interests and to the security of the Turkish Cypriots.
The 1956 Radcliffe Plan provided for a constitution with limited self-government, while Britain would retain control over defense, foreign policy, and security on the island. An elected legislature would be established, in which the Greek Cypriot majority would have significant representation, but British sovereignty would remain. It provided for limited representation of Turkish Cypriots. The proposal was not accepted, as it did not satisfy the demand for self-determination.
The 1958 Macmillan Plan reflects Turkey’s enhanced role in the Cyprus issue. The plan proposed a tripartite co-sovereignty arrangement among Britain, Greece, and Turkey, along with a form of autonomy for the two communities. Britain essentially proposed a tripartite division of Cyprus. The British governor would retain significant powers, while Athens and Ankara would assume an official role in the process. The proposal was rejected by the Greek Cypriot side, as it was considered not to lead to true self-determination.
Following the armed struggle of EOKA, the Republic of Cyprus was established in August 1960. A bicommunal state was created in almost every respect, with a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot Vice President, separate majorities, and intervention rights for the guarantor powers. With the establishment of the state, both federation and partition were abandoned. The constitutional dysfunctions and intercommunal conflicts of 1963–64 led to the collapse of the original constitutional order, with the state continuing to function to this day under emergency law and without Turkish Cypriots in decision-making centers or in the three branches of government.
The Cyprus problem was placed on a new footing and had become an issue between the two communities, which, with the blessing of the guarantor powers, had to find a way to bridge their differences and strengthen mutual trust.
The Acheson Plans
Amid the crisis of 1964, proposals by American diplomat Dean Acheson emerged. The first plan he submitted called for the union of Cyprus with Greece, while Turkey would acquire a sovereign zone in Cyprus centered on Karpasia, along with other guarantees for the Turkish Cypriots. The Greek side objected primarily to the cession of Cypriot territory under Turkish sovereignty.
Consequently, the American diplomat returned with a second proposal, replacing Turkish sovereignty with a long-term lease of a military base in Karpasia.
At the same time, it maintained the union with Greece and provided for international guarantees of the rights of Turkish Cypriots.
Turkey did not accept the replacement of sovereignty with a simple lease, nor did the Greek side say “yes” to all of the proposals.
Thus, the Acheson Plans remained on paper.
The Cyprus Problem as One of Invasion and Occupation
After 1964, and particularly following the Turkish invasion in 1974, the Cyprus issue took on a new form. Turkey now exercised effective control, having intervened militarily as a guarantor power and forcibly seized 37% of the territory. Efforts focused not only on restoring the prestige but also the independence and freedom of the crippled state.
The 1977 Makarios–Denktash High-Level Agreement recognized, for the first time, a bizonal, bicommunal federation as the basis for a solution. The two men paved the way not only for the negotiations that followed but also for the form that the Cyprus problem has retained to this day.
The “tongue-tied” plan that laid the groundwork.
It was in this context that the 1978 U.S.-British-Canadian Plan emerged. The U.S., Britain, and Canada laid out the new parameters by proposing a significant territorial readjustment in favor of the Greek Cypriot side, conditional return and compensation for refugees, special arrangements for the resettlement of Famagusta residents, demilitarization and the withdrawal of most Turkish troops, as well as a president and vice president from different communities. The plan made no provision regarding the percentage of territory that would remain under Turkish Cypriot administration.
Spyros Kyprianou and AKEL rejected the plan, since, as they stated four years after the invasion, society could not accept the separation of the two communities on a federal basis or the failure to return all refugees to their homes. The plan remains one of the most significant, as it formed the basis for subsequent efforts to reach a solution under the DDO framework.
These were followed by the proposals of Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar, which sought to define the federation and the powers of the central government in more detail, including provisions on territory, property, refugees, and security. The figures submitted at that time by the Secretary-General provided that the Turkish Cypriot area of the island would cover 23%–30% and the Greek Cypriot area 70%–77%, while quotas were also set for the island’s governance. It is worth noting that Kueyar was the only UN Secretary-General who had previously (1975–77) served as Special Representative to UNFICYP, and therefore had firsthand knowledge of the problem.
This was preceded by the illegal declaration of the pseudo-state, which was accompanied by new fait accomplis.
Cueyar was succeeded as UN Secretary-General by Boutros Ghali. In 1992, the Secretary-General presented his set of proposals on the Cyprus issue. He proposed a single sovereign state, a single international status, and a single citizenship, consisting of two politically equal communities within a bicommunal and bizonal federation with quotas in decision-making bodies. Security Council Resolution 750 explicitly endorsed this model.
During Gali’s tenure, Confidence-Building Measures were promoted for the first time, with the aim of creating a positive atmosphere. The blueprint allocated 27+% of the territory to the Turkish Cypriots, while within the Turkish Cypriot canton, the creation of two Greek Cypriot cantons in Karpasia was proposed, at a time when Morphou and Varosia were to be returned to Greek Cypriot administration. At the same time, as a confidence-building measure, it was envisaged that Varosia would be placed immediately under United Nations administration, in order to create the conditions for the return of its lawful residents.
Ultimately, Gali’s ideas were shelved due to Dektas’s intransigence as well as the defeat of Giorgos Vassiliou in the 1993 presidential election. Glafkos Clerides subsequently rejected them.
EU accession and the Annan Plan.
Cyprus’s accession to the European Union in 2004 once again changed the landscape. The resolution of the Cyprus problem had been decoupled as a precondition for Cyprus’s accession to the EU, while the state was now bound by the acquis communautaire. Against this backdrop, the then UN Secretary-General proposed the Annan Plan, the most detailed (9,000 pages) plan ever presented.
Its first version was completed in 2002, followed by revisions leading up to the Annan Plan 5 in 2004, which was put to a referendum. It was the first and only United Nations plan in which the Cypriot people had a direct say in its adoption or rejection.
In the referendums held on April 24, 2004, the Turkish Cypriots approved the plan, while the Greek Cypriots rejected it. Consequently, the plan was not implemented. The Annan Plan called for the creation of a United Republic of Cyprus. It called for a significant territorial readjustment, so that the area under Turkish Cypriot administration would cover approximately 28.5 percent of the island, with the return of territories and refugees to, among other places, Morphou, Famagusta, and part of Mesaoria, while a special status was envisaged for villages in Karpasia. On the issue of security, the plan called for the maintenance of a modified system of guarantees and a limited military presence by Greece and Turkey, to be gradually reduced. At the head of the state was a six-member presidential council consisting of four Greek Cypriots and two Turkish Cypriots. Two of them, from different communities, would be elected to the positions of President and Vice President of the state every 20 months. A Greek Cypriot would serve as President for 40 months, and a Turkish Cypriot for 20 months.
This was also the last solution plan submitted.
A key milestone followed with the convergence of positions between Christofias and Talat on fundamental issues, as well as the negotiations at Mont Pelerin and Crans-Montana in 2016–2017. The result was the collapse of the process on July 7, 2017. That day also marked the end of the negotiations, and nine years later, no one knows whether they will resume.
After 2020, the situation changed again, with Turkey bringing one of its long-standing positions back to the table. Ankara and Ersin Tatar were promoting a two-state solution and sovereign equality.
The Transition Period and Adaptation to the New Reality
Overall, the evolution of the solution plans and proposals regarding the Cyprus issue reflects its gradual development, as a living problem that was constantly changing and evolving based on new circumstances that arose and did not depend solely on the two communities.
It was never one-dimensional, nor was it a problem that could be exhausted in a few pages.
Today, it is perhaps going through its most critical phase in terms of negotiations, since for the first time in the last nine years, the substance of the problem and its essential aspects are not being discussed.
Today, it is fair to say that it is going through a transitional period. An effort is being made to salvage what remains of the agreements and adapt them to the new realities and conditions of the global landscape and international law, which are evolving into norms and principles.
This new momentum may present an opportunity, but on its own it does not constitute progress nor does it imply an immediate resolution of the problem, which is constantly changing form in response to social, political, and international shifts. The real test will begin when general declarations are transformed into concrete positions at the negotiating table. That is when it will become clear whether the Cyprus issue is truly entering a new era or whether yet another round of dialogue is simply beginning, with no prospect of a final agreement.
