DISY’s Government Project Monitoring Council is explicitly inspired by the political tradition of the shadow cabinet. How does it compare to such a body?
So-called shadow cabinets are primarily found in parliamentary democracies, with Great Britain being the prime example. For example, this is an institution associated with the official opposition, and it is more firmly established in Commonwealth countries with similar systems of government, such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and South Africa. It is also found, however, in more hybrid systems, such as France. Although this tradition is not applied everywhere in the same way, it nevertheless has certain specific principles that are identical or similar across the board.
The Government Work Monitoring Council, launched by DISY’s new President, Annita Dimitriou, also draws on this political tradition. After approximately one and a half years of operation of the DISY Government Work Monitoring Council, there is now sufficient data to draw initial conclusions about its operation and how it compares to other models of shadow cabinets. The question that arises is whether the SYNAGERMOS shadow cabinet adheres to the basic principles of a shadow cabinet, or whether, ultimately, its mode of operation is more akin to a mechanism for rallying support around its leadership, specifically Anita Dimitriou. This is especially true when one considers its formation and composition, as reflected in the latest additions that have been made.
The Lessons of a 150-Year Tradition
The first early form of a shadow government emerged in the mid-1870s, when William Ewart Gladstone, as leader of the Liberals, organized a group of top officials around him with the aim of carrying out what we now know in parliamentary democracies as the official opposition. The idea behind this development was that the opposition must have a leadership team capable of functioning as an alternative government. In the early 20th century, the idea began to take the form we recognize today, that is, each of the opposition’s top parliamentary leaders is assigned a portfolio and serves as their party’s parliamentary representative for that portfolio. After World War II, the term “shadow cabinet” had already become established and took on its final form. Each senior member of the opposition party is assigned a portfolio corresponding to those of government ministers, with the aim of enabling each to hold the respective minister to account.
Naturally, this British practice spread to other members of the Commonwealth where parliamentary democracy existed—that is, to independent states that had been British colonies. Canada, South Africa, New Zealand, and Australia are prime examples. Although there are variations, the basic parameters are the same everywhere. Today, this practice is also applied in presidential democracies such as Turkey, Nigeria, and the Philippines, but much more as a partisan political practice than as an institutional component of the political system. The reason is simple. While in presidential systems, parliamentarism is not institutionally linked to the presidency, the opposite is true in parliamentary systems. The leadership of the state—and thus its governance—depends on the parliamentary majority, and therefore the opposition becomes an official one.
The General Parameters of a Shadow Government
In any case, there are eight basic parameters found wherever the institution of the shadow cabinet is in place.
- It serves as the primary vehicle for the main opposition party to oppose the government, rather than any party that happens not to be in government.
- It serves as a mirror image of the government, in the sense that each minister has a corresponding shadow minister with the same portfolio.
- Each shadow minister has a specific portfolio, for which they serve as the political leader and spokesperson for their party.
- The duties of shadow ministers include systematically monitoring the government’s actions in their respective areas of responsibility.
- Shadow ministers are also responsible for formulating their party’s policy on their portfolio, proposing alternatives to those of the government.
- Shadow cabinets are essentially “governments in waiting,” or “government in waiting,” with shadow ministers serving as potential opposition ministers should their party come to power.
- A shadow cabinet operates under the leadership of the party leader—that is, the leader of the official opposition—who is the country’s potential leader.
- A shadow government functions as a body that works to implement a specific, unified political vision, just as it would if it were to form a government tomorrow.
The Case of Cyprus
Cyprus is a presidential republic, and therefore the head of state is not institutionally linked to the House of Representatives within the framework of the separation of executive, legislative, and judicial powers. Currently, the DIPA, which is not a parliamentary party, has two ministers, while the DIKO, which is the fourth-largest parliamentary party, has four. Thus, while the powers of the President of the Republic remain constitutionally enshrined, the parties that support him do not form a majority in the House of Representatives, just as was the case during Nicos Anastasiades’ term.
At the same time, the country’s two largest parties officially belong to the opposition. In this paradoxical situation, where the two opposing political poles are both outside the government, neither can claim to be the official opposition. Because in the 2028 elections, the current situation may remain unchanged. It is not a foregone conclusion that one of the two parties will form a government, and thus the question arises: which of the two parties could assume the role of a shadow cabinet? Nevertheless, just as DISY has done, AKEL could do the same without either party necessarily having to prove which is the official opposition. This is a common practice in other presidential democracies, such as Turkey, where the formation of shadow governments by political parties serves as an example to the people of how they envision the country.
Shadow Cabinet or a mechanism for rallying support?
Does DISY’s Government Work Monitoring Council meet the criteria? Yes and no. First, it’s worth noting that the very fact that this is the first time we’ve seen something like this in the country constitutes an innovation, and it is innovative in the sense that shadow cabinets are not common in presidential democracies.
As for the correspondence between ministries and deputy ministries and the members of the Council, there is a clear discrepancy. There are 11 ministries and 6 deputy ministries. In the Synergist Shadow Cabinet, 23 portfolios have been established. The shadow portfolio holders are not members of Parliament; rather, those who were on the Council and were elected have stepped down to make way for others—in several cases, for candidates from the recent elections who were not elected.
Contrary to standard practice and despite the provision of Article 14 of the DISY charter, which stipulates that the Council is chaired by the party president and represented by the party president, the Council’s composition bears little resemblance to a typical shadow cabinet. According to the bylaws, in the absence of the party President, the Coordinator presides over the Council and may even represent the Council alongside the party President, regardless of the latter’s absence.
Alongside the Council, DISY also has Policy Secretariats, which, while operating in a framework of interdependence and close coordination with the Council, but the Secretariat Commissioners are not replaced by Council members. Therefore, based on DISY’s own bylaws, its shadow ministers do not preside over policy areas within the party, while the party’s senior officials hold either parliamentary or other party offices.
At the same time, despite the Council’s public interventions, because these take place outside of Parliament, they do not carry the same official weight as those of members of parliament, who could assume the roles of shadow ministers, given their participation in parliamentary committees, which, as is well known, are organized along very similar lines to those of ministries and deputy ministries.
It should also be noted that the President of DISY is simultaneously the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the second-highest-ranking official in the state, and the acting President of the Republic in the President’s absence, a fact that automatically renders this arrangement dysfunctional, or at the very least incomplete or problematic. This is particularly true when one considers that the party leader is called upon, at certain times, to act as the opposition and to stand in for the government.
It is therefore reasonable to ask whether the Council truly constitutes a shadow cabinet in the context of international standards, or whether it is merely a vehicle for rallying support around the party leadership—andspecifically around Anita Dimitriou’s leadership in the near future. This is particularly evident when one considers the individuals who have been appointed recently, as well as the fact that many portfolios have been “invented” to be distributed to individuals trusted by the President, or even to those who may have been dissatisfied with the outcome of the parliamentary elections. All of this is taking place in the run-up to the presidential election, with intra-party competition over who will secure the nomination for 2028 further exacerbating internal divisions within the party.
