How ELAM Stands by Nicos Christodoulides in Tough Times, What It Will Do in 2028, and the Swedish Model
2026 was a difficult year for Nikos Christodoulides’ government. This was because, just as the Republic of Cyprus was taking over the EU Presidency and the President hoped this would be his ticket to re-election, a video on X involving him and his inner circle went viral and cast a shadow. It sent the message that a scheme—either set up by the President or one of which he was aware— was providing preferential treatment to investors and businesspeople while simultaneously urging them to make contributions to funds, including the one managed by the First Lady. The revelations that led to the resignation of the President’s close associate and chief of staff, Charalambos Charalambous, inevitably provoked a fierce reaction from opposition circles and caused embarrassment for the coalition parties, which carefully avoided taking a position. The party, however, that appeared from the outset to fully support the government’s position—by adopting the narrative about a Russian —and even Turkish—involvement behind the video and echoing claims of a “hybrid war” against Nikos Christodoulides—was the far-right ELAM party. In fact, together with DISY and DIKO, they voted against making the donors to the First Lady’s Fund public in Parliament. A move that sent the message, on the one hand, that the party—which presented itself as anti-establishment—remained silent in the face of an alleged scandal and, on the other hand, that in times of trouble, it would not leave the Christodoulides government.
A tacit coalition government
ΣΧΕΤΙΚΑ ΑΡΘΡΑ
This was certainly not the first incident to raise questions about whether ELAM is an opposition party, whether it is searching for its identity, or whether it now supports the government. It was, however, the most telling example of its backtracking and the contradictions between its words and actions. This was preceded by the deadly fire, during which—while political parties and even government officials were discussing behind the scenes the need for resignations—ELAM never once raised the issue. Even during the foot-and-mouth disease outbreak, which affected a significant portion of their constituency, and while their officials were rushing from one infected farm to another to make statements, their attacks were aimed at veterinary services and EU policies, and at no point did they raise the issue of the resignation of Agriculture Minister Maria Panayiotou. The only minister who provoked their anger was, a year ago, Education Minister Athina Michaelidou, over the infamous field trip to the Occupied Territories organized by Imagine. And while some might have expected scathing criticism from the anti-federalist ELAM toward the Christodoulides government in the presence of Guterres, party officials were preoccupied with whether or not parents’ names would be listed on the new ID cards. This sent the message that they were either indifferent to the developments or knew in advance that nothing was going to happen. In short, one could arrive at three possible scenarios:
- That ELAM might be attempting to shed its anti-establishment image
- That the rise in its poll numbers may have led to confusion regarding its positions, policies, and possibly a loss of identity
- How ELAM’s goal is essentially to become an unofficial coalition partner with the ultimate aim of becoming the ruling party
Opening the door to the system
The first indication that ELAM wanted to build bridges with the establishment became apparent in 2021. Some note that this was long before, if one takes into account that they had financial support from the Church. However, when ELAM endorsed Annita Dimitriou for Speaker of the House, it marked the first step in this shift in course, and it became firmly established when, during the second round of the presidential elections, it worked in an organized and coordinated manner in favor of Nikos Christodoulides’ candidacy. This, combined with Christos Christou’s recent statements that he wants to make ELAM a ruling party, without ruling out the possibility of supporting another candidate in the 2028 presidential election, has created two key developments. It has become a magnet for Christodoulides supporters who are not affiliated with any party, and certainly for political figures who saw prospects for assuming office in a politically uncharted territory. It is by no means a coincidence that former members of the Synergatiki party, such as the former vice president and current spokesperson for ELAM, Marios Pelekanos, are in the party, as well as the former mayor of Strovolos, Andreas Papacharalambous, and former Member of Parliament Eugenios Hamboullas.
The question is what the party’s identity will be following this alliance between ELAM’s hard-line members and the new influx of former Synagermikos members who are now in Parliament. At present, the party’s longest-serving president, Christos Christou, is unchallenged by anyone, and his role appears to have been strengthened by his steadfast support for the party over the years. There are, however, questions about how the party operates, given that there have been no internal party elections to date. In the upcoming internal party elections in November, it appears that Mr. Christou will face no challengers, but there will be interest in the remaining leadership positions. That is when it will become clear what the dominant trend within the party actually is. This is because there are quite a few hardline party members who viewed the entry and rise of new leaders—who were not in the party from the start—with suspicion and annoyance. However, there are also new members who want ELAM to take a more moderate stance and seek cooperation with the government. The leadership that emerges will also determine the course ELAM will follow.
The Case of Sweden
ELAM is already the third-largest party and holds three parliamentary committee chairmanships—committees that carry particular weight with its base, such as the Environment, Defense, and Transportation. It has communication channels to serve its voters, maintains ongoing, informal dialogue with the President’s Office to secure concessions, and, more broadly, operates not only as a mainstream party but also as a potential coalition partner.
After all, it is not the first far-right party to attempt something like this. Although ELAM places particular emphasis on the Le Pen and Meloni model, the party with which it shares quite a few similarities in terms of tactics is the far-right Swedish party SD (Sweden Democrats). It began as a party with neo-Nazi ties and subsequently attempted to distance itself from its past. Like ELAM, it emphasizes immigration, nationalist rhetoric, and “traditional” social values. Today, it has become mainstream and, since 2022—without officially participating—has supported the center-right government through the so-called Tinto Agreement. ELAM does not officially participate in the government, but in theory, there is coordination. Members of the government noted in *Alpha on Sunday*—during the previous parliamentary term—that ELAM is supportive and cooperative in parliament. This was also evident from the behind-the-scenes discussions held at the Presidential Palace regarding support for Nikola Papadopoulos’s candidacy and efforts to undermine the DISY-DIKO coalition. However, the government also takes ELAM’s sensitivities into account. This was evident from the government’s awkwardness in the Imagine case, as well as regarding the issue that ELAM raised concerning the new ID cards. The Ministry of the Interior withdrew the draft following widespread backlash. However, the Christodoulides government also appears to have taken ELAM’s concerns into account regarding the sensitive issue of immigration. Although Deputy Minister of Migration Nikolas Ioannidis is not affiliated with ELAM, nor has he made statements in support of the far-right party, is particularly well-liked in those circles, and this may have helped avoid criticism in this specific area. The government therefore wants to convey that it does not govern in partnership with ELAM but benefits from its support.
Is this, however, enough for Christodoulides and ELAM to join forces? Obviously, Nikos Christodoulides wants ELAM’s support from the first round, given the difficulties that are likely to arise. However, he certainly does not want this to happen officially, as it could provide Nikolaos Papadopoulos with the perfect excuse to withdraw from this alliance. The Synergatiki-affiliated figures Hamboullas, Pelekanos, and Papacharalambous may play a role in this behind-the-scenes support and, potentially, in preventing Christos from running. The question, of course, is whether ELAM’s shift toward becoming a mainstream party will benefit it or cause it harm, given the contradictions involved. For while it built its identity on anti-establishment rhetoric, now, as a mainstream party, it is becoming part of the very decisions it once condemned, as well as an advocate for anti-popular proposals.
