The Changing Landscape and Expectations on the Eve of a New Effort

When, on July 7, 2017, the effort to reach a solution at the Crans-Montana resort in Switzerland fell through, many said that the last golden opportunity for a solution had been lost. Nine years later, with no progress and no official talks on the Cyprus issue, the country’s political leadership is calling for negotiations to resume where they left off in Crans-Montana. The big question that arises is exactly where the negotiations left off and, above all, whether the passage of time has inevitably changed the circumstances. 

The Role of the Key Players

In the talks that got into full swing a little over a year before Mont Pelerin, in the summer of 2017, the curtain fell on what was perhaps the biggest failure in the history of the Cyprus issue. Anastasiades and Akinci, despite the positive atmosphere that was developing, ultimately failed to reach an agreement on a final and comprehensive solution plan. 

For some, Crans-Montana represents a major missed opportunity, since even Nicos Anastasiades himself admitted that he had been negotiating with the most conciliatory Turkish Cypriot leader in history, who outwardly appeared willing to distance himself from Turkey’s rhetoric. Mustafa Akıncı, despite the occasional suspicions cast regarding his insincere stance on certain aspects of the Cyprus issue—such as the territorial question— he certainly stood out from his predecessors, even though, as it turned out in the end, every step he took had to have Turkey’s blessing.   

For the record, at Mont Pelerin in 2016 and in Crans-Montana in 2017, several points were finalized regarding internal matters as well as the commitment to a federal state. However, since nothing is agreed upon until the ink of the signatures dries, the aspects that were settled remain on the back burner to this day. At this critical juncture, the famous Guterres framework was also submitted, containing points regarding territorial issues—with references to the Greek Cypriot side’s willingness to return, among other things, the town of Morphou— property, the rotating presidency, security, troops, guarantees, and political equality. To this day, a gulf of differing views and approaches between the two communities persists regarding this framework.

Since 2017, the Greek Cypriot side has been repeating the oft-cited phrase about “resuming talks from where they were suspended at Crans-Montana.” However, not all parties involved interpret “picking up where we left off” in the same way. That is why the President of the Republic had proposed, as early as last fall, that the meetings be documented with the assistance of the United Nations.

“Good Luck”

On the night of the Shipwreck, António Guterres wished “Good luck to Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.”

His words continue to haunt the Cyprus issue to this day. Since 2017, the key players have changed—and while some have remained the same, such as Erdoğan, they have made sure to appear more extreme and intransigent than ever since the shipwreck. A decisive turning point was the succession of Mustafa Akinci by Ersin Tatar. With the support of Turkey—of which he had been a puppet for five years—he cemented the two-state solution for Cyprus in Geneva in 2020. Since then, Turkey has appeared averse to a bizonal, bicommunal federation, which it considers doomed to failure.

The Two-State Solution and the Longest Period of Inaction

The “two states” approach was certainly not a new narrative; but rather an old approach that had been well hidden behind the moderate and pro-European facade that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had presented since his rise to power in 2003 right up until Crans-Montana.

For Ankara and the pseudo-state, the opportunities presented by the Annan Plan in 2004 and the Crans-Montana talks in 2017 were the last chances to resolve the issue in accordance with the resolutions of theSecurity Council.     

From 2020 through 2025, Turkish rhetoric in favor of a two-state solution reached a fever pitch, as did provocations in the Cypriot EEZ and the Eastern Mediterranean involving research vessels. Erdogan made most of his visits to the occupied territories in an effort to demonstrate the pseudo-state’s complete dependence on the motherland. He inaugurated dozens of projects that Turkey had financially backed, culminating in the new “presidential” palace in Agios Dometios, where he cut the ribbon in May 2025.

In 2023, Nikos Christodoulides succeeded Nicos Anastasiades as President of the Republic. A sense of optimism was brought about by the two five-party meetings convened by the UN Secretary-General in 2025 in Geneva and New York.

Despite these efforts, however, the two leaders—in the presence of the guarantor powers—limited themselves to an agreement on confidence-building measures. The election of Tufan Erhurman—by an overwhelming majority, no less— to the Turkish Cypriot leadership in October 2025 brought a sense of relief but not enthusiasm. A man who, in the past at least, had described a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation as the appropriate solution—albeit with caveats to safeguard the interests of Turkish Cypriots.

Positive progress was made in December when the two leaders, in a joint statement, referred to political equality. Over the past seven months, no atmosphere conducive to the resumption of talks has been fostered, despite occasional social meetings between the two leaders.

Between 2017 and 2026, the Secretary-General appointed two envoys to help resume the talks: Jane Hall Lute and María Ángela Olguín, who is currently in the midst of a new effort to bring the two sides back to the negotiating table.

Crans-Montana must be viewed not through the lens of the past, but through that of the present. No matter how much some people hoped that the two communities could get back on track with talks, nine years later it is clear that progress on the Cyprus issue is by no means a given. The national issue is experiencing the longest period of deadlock in its history, one that threatens to create irreversible facts on the ground. For the first time since the Turkish invasion, such a long period has passed without any progress.

Today, there is a growing sense that developments are on the horizon once again. Beyond the change in leadership in the occupied territories, efforts to involve the EU in the Cyprus issue in a supporting role to the United Nations, it seems that the timing may allow for some cautious optimism. The momentum of 2002–2004—before the Annan Plan, when the international and domestic landscape was more favorable to the talks than ever before—but it is not out of the question that new hope may emerge.

Crans-Montana – 9 Years Later

Antonio Guterres is stepping down as UN Secretary-General and intends to make one last push for a solution, handing the Cyprus issue over to his successor at a favorable stage in the talks, just as his predecessor Ban Ki-moon did in 2016 following the Mont Pelerin talks.

However, there is another factor that could have a positive impact on the entire effort, provided, of course, that it is utilized in the right context. For the first time, the fates of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots are in the hands of people who belong to the postwar generation. Nikos Christodoulides and Tufan Erhurman were born shortly before the Turkish invasion.

 This can be leveraged as an asset in the Cyprus peace process, given that the two leaders did not experience the polarization, the division, and the painful consequences of the Turkish invasion at an age when they could identify with it as emotionally as previous leaders did.

In the past, the Cyprus issue built political careers, as it was the top priority and the most important issue of the day. Today, society itself has shown that, precisely because of two failed attempts in 2004 and 2017—and in light of Turkey’s intransigence— it is not approaching the problem in the same way, with many having already buried it deep within themselves.

As strange as it may sound, if someone hasn’t experienced something firsthand, it’s hard for them to identify with it emotionally; however, they may be able to view it with a more level-headed and perhaps more effective perspective—and not necessarily a perfunctory one.

The fact that the people—as well as the two leaders—are looking back from a distance at the consequences of 1974 and that difficult period allows them to move forward—if they so choose—guided by reason rather than the bitterness of the past, building on the past while looking toward the future—realizing that opportunities to resolve this problem no longer arise easily, and that no one can guarantee how much longer it will remain a priority for the United Nations and the international community.