For decades, the Turkish side portrayed the invasion of Cyprus in the summer of 1974 as a flawlessly planned “peacekeeping operation.” However, the testimonies of the Turkish protagonists themselves, as well as the analyses of international military observers, paint a completely different picture: an operation riddled with serious mistakes, organizational chaos, and the constant fear of a Greek military response.
Lieutenant General Demirel and the Fear of Collapse
ΣΧΕΤΙΚΑ ΑΡΘΡΑ
Lieutenant General Bedrettin Demirel, commander of the 39th Infantry Division, led the invading forces on the ground.
In his memoirs and subsequent interviews, Demirel did not spare his own side. He noted that the “Five Mile” in Kyrenia was unsuitable and dangerously narrow (just 300 meters), while his forces had no prior experience in amphibious operations.
The most critical point of his confession concerns the early hours: he openly admitted that on the night of July 20–21, the Turkish bridgehead was hanging by a thread. If the National Guard had launched a coordinated nighttime counterattack with tanks, the Turkish forces would have been driven back into the sea.
The Panic of “Friendly Fire”
Both Demirel and journalist Mehmet Ali Birand, in his book *Decision—Landing*, agree on one thing: the Turkish leadership’s greatest nightmare was the appearance of the Greek Air Force and Navy.
The fear of the Greek F-4 Phantoms and Type 209 submarines paralyzed the reasoning of the Turkish general staff. This nervousness led to one of the greatest tragedies of friendly fire in modern military history: On July 21, the Turkish Air Force bombed its own warships, mistaking them for a Greek convoy. Despite the desperate pleas of the Turkish sailors over the radio (“We are Turkish, don’t fire!”), the pilots were ordered to continue, dismissing the pleas as a “Greek ruse.” The destroyer TCG Kocatepe sank, taking 54 sailors to their deaths.
The Perspective of International Analysts
This picture is also confirmed by international military literature. Foreign analysts point out that, in terms of naval doctrine, the landing at Kyrenia was carried out with unprecedented sloppiness. The complete lack of coordination between the army, navy, and air force would, under normal circumstances, have led to disaster. What saved the Turkish operation was exclusively air superiority due to the short distance (just 40 miles from the Turkish coast), combined with the complete absence of Greek air and naval cover.
The Violation of the Ceasefire
With the July 22 ceasefire, Turkish forces had been trapped in a narrow and dangerous corridor. But Ankara did not passively await the Geneva talks. In the weeks that followed, it systematically violated the agreement, expanding its positions—the most striking example being the occupation of Lapithos and Karava in early August. At the same time, it transported hundreds of tanks and tens of thousands of soldiers unhindered to the port of Kyrenia, preparing for its next strike.
“Attila II”: Military Superiority, Diplomatic Setback
When the second phase began on August 14, there was no longer any risk to the invaders. With overwhelming superiority in tanks and absolute control of the air, the Turkish advance against the exhausted Greek Cypriot forces was only a matter of time. As foreign analysts note, the occupation of 37% of the island was not the result of military ingenuity, but of simple numerical superiority.
However, “Attila II” also shattered Ankara’s last remaining political narrative. With the junta having already collapsed in Athens, the new offensive clearly revealed the true objective: the violent partition of the island and the displacement of thousands of people. Turkey’s military gain was accompanied by a lasting diplomatic burden — from the U.S. arms embargo of that era to the international community’s ongoing condemnation of the occupation.
Kyriakos Psaras,
Active citizen
