The debate surrounding the Great Sea Interconnector (GSI) usually centers on energy security, maritime jurisdiction, and Greek-Turkish disputes. There is, however, a third dimension, perhaps more significant in the long term, which is described as the risk that the repeated contestation of rights could create a reality in which the exercise of those rights depends on the tolerance of third states.
The developments of November 2026 are illustrative. The issuance of a Greek NAVTEX regarding GSI surveys, the Turkish reaction, and the French diplomatic contacts highlighted the fine line between crisis management and acceptance of a mechanism of informal consent. Athens clarified that no Turkish permission was sought. Ankara, on the other hand, attempted to portray the communication as a process of acknowledging its involvement. This difference in interpretation is not merely diplomatic. It touches on the very essence of the regional balance of power.
ΣΧΕΤΙΚΑ ΑΡΘΡΑ
The crucial question is whether a state can, through systematic reactions, make its presence necessary in processes over which it has no recognized jurisdiction. International law does not automatically recognize legal validity in fait accompli. The repetition of a unilateral claim does not render it legitimate. Nor does the operational adaptation of third states necessarily constitute acceptance of it. However, in international politics, the systematic imposition of practical restrictions can influence the behavior of states and economic actors.
This highlights the importance of distinguishing between legal status and the actual ability to exercise rights. A state may retain its rights in full but face increasing political, economic, or military costs in exercising them. For Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, the issue at stake is therefore not exclusively the completion of the electricity interconnection. It is ensuring that any future energy, research, or undersea project will not be subject to an informal process of prior political approval.
The European dimension is equally crucial. The GSI is a project of European interest. If its implementation depends on withstanding pressure from third countries, then Europe’s strategic autonomy is put to the test in practice. The European Union cannot treat energy interconnection as a mere investment activity, disconnected from the security conditions and international legal framework that enable its implementation.
A coherent approach is therefore required, one that encompasses clear legal documentation, diplomatic coordination, operational readiness, and European political support. De-escalation is a legitimate goal, but it must not create the impression that exercising legitimate rights requires negotiation with every state that challenges them.
Ultimately, the GSI reveals a broader problem with the contemporary international order: the gap between the existence of a right and the ability to effectively exercise it. For the greatest challenge to international law is not always its outright violation. It is the gradual emergence of a reality in which its application is treated as a matter for negotiation.
