These are not isolated incidents. They form a recurring pattern in which a government avoids making difficult decisions
Case 1: In January 2023, the cancellation of the contract with the contractor for the Paphos–Polisi Chrysochous road was announced in a decisive tone. The reasons cited were delays in implementation, combined with the contractor’s demand for a cost increase of 36 million euros and a request to extend the project’s completion date to 2029. The contractor cited geopolitical developments that had increased the cost of transporting materials and the overall cost of completion. Consequently, the government made the—rather hasty—decision to cancel the project at that time, with the intention of re-tendering it later.
Since then, more than three years have passed before a new tender was announced in April 2026. Two bids were submitted, amounting to 124 and 128 million euros, respectively, which were deemed excessive, resulting in the cancellation of this tender as well. Following this fiasco, the government chose to raise the bar of expectations once again, announcing that it would launch a new tender in 2027 for a four-lane highway! Because, as the saying goes, “if you’re going to jump, jump far.”
ΣΧΕΤΙΚΑ ΑΡΘΡΑ
Vempo in Cyprus
Case 2: A few months after the cancellation of the Paphos–Polis Chrysochous project, the government announced, just as triumphantly, the suspension of the ambitious project for the integrated development of the Larnaca port and marina.
Under the pretext of the failure to renew the letter of guarantee in the amount of 4.2 million euros and the company’s demand that priority be given to the completion of profitable developments, the agreement with the Kition consortium was terminated, and the project was left in limbo.
It took 2.5 years to decide that the project would be transferred entirely to the Cyprus Ports Authority, which estimated the cost of a much more conservative version of the project at 415 million euros, with a cost variance margin of ±50%(!) and a completion timeline of 20 years. All of this was the case until the day before yesterday, when the spokesperson for the legal service made it clear that the state cannot grant jurisdiction over the development of the marina and the land area to the Cyprus Ports Authority without a competitive bidding process. So, back to square one!
Case 3: The same—and worse—happened in 2024 with the energy infrastructure project in Vasiliko, after we had all previously witnessed the celebrations and compliments on the CPP podium.
This was followed by a violent rift with the Chinese consortium, with public statements and accusations flying from both sides. The dispute moved to the courtrooms, where it continues to this day, with its outcome expected to be a long and difficult one.
In fact, European co-financing of 101 million euros had been secured for the Vasilikos project through the “Connecting Europe Facility” program. However, the Republic of Cyprus was forced to forfeit this funding and return the 67 million euros that had already been disbursed, and furthermore, it failed to even secure the necessary guarantees!
Against this backdrop, the government re-advertised the tender for the project’s completion, with an estimated cost of 180 million euros. There has been interest, and the final award is expected to take place in the summer of 2027. Nevertheless, even the most optimistic estimate now places the project’s completion in 2030. In other words, until then, there appears to be no possibility of importing natural gas into Cyprus via this specific infrastructure.
Case 4: The same—and worse—happened with the new generators at the Dekelia power plant. The initial cost was estimated at 40–50 million euros, but as time went on, the EAC rejected one bid after another on technical grounds, and ultimately, under the intense pressure caused by the requirement to permanently decommission the old generators by the end of 2029, the government ended up awarding the contract to Siemens last year for 140 million euros, with final delivery in 2030, provided everything goes according to plan.
These are not isolated incidents. They form a recurring pattern in which a government avoids difficult decisions, downplays or ignores the conditions for canceling projects, and when things go awry, continues to promise—with a smile and boundless optimism—new and better tenders, while taxpayers foot the sadconsequences. And this continues until the previous announcement is forgotten and we move on to the next one.
The result of all this mismanagement is that growth slows, costs rise, and critical projects for the future are postponed. And every time, instead of accountability, instead of taking responsibility, they hand out promises and once again strive for glory—while time is now counting down.
By Xenia Konstantinou
Deputy Press Spokesperson for DISY
