When independent public institutions are led by courageous officials, the common good is promoted. When they are run by spineless bureaucrats, public life is corrupted 

In the wake of the Independent Anti-Corruption Authority’s findings regarding the “Mafia State,” I suppose I suppose, why the establishment was so greatly disturbed by the way the Audit Office exercised its powers over Odysseas Michaelides.

It is now even clearer: just like the Authority does now, the Audit Office systematically and effectively exposed their shenanigans—it had become a thorn in the side of the powerful. The light it shed on the gross illegalities and/or irregularities committed by politically and institutionally powerful figures was such that, inevitably, made Odysseas Michaelides not only an unwelcome but also a dangerous official. The question is not why he was fired, but why it took so long for him to be fired!

I would like to remind you that the first person to raise the issue of the possible dismissal of the then Auditor General due to “inappropriate” behavior was the most honorable (of course!) President Anastasiades, back in 2020. Having appointed two of his former ministers to the key positions of Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General, he sought to complete his self-protection by ousting the unruly Auditor General. The task was carried out by his cronies in the Attorney General’s Office, with the consent of his successor. The system knows how to protect itself. But it is not invulnerable.

The recent findings of the Authority on the “Mafia State” reminded us of the power wielded by the independent authorities of the rule of law when they rise to the occasion —that is, when they operate impartially as guardians of legality and institutional checks on power. Their power derives, in principle, from their role: epistemologically speaking, they certify ex officio—even if only probabilistically, to the extent possible—what is true and what is false regarding the actions of public officials.

When the Authority officially concludes that it is more likely that N. Anastasiades and the other 14 individuals under investigation have committed specific offenses than that they have not, the Authority characterizes human actions based on evidence gathered by its investigators. This is what bothers those in power. The truth is revealed: the veil of oblivion and ignorance is lifted to bring to light what most likely happened. Although the deductive structure of the Authority’s reasoning (i.e., the explanation that best fits the available facts) makes its conclusions subject to revision, until such time as they are revised (if they are revised), they are considered valid.

Epistemological validity troubles those in power. Why? Because valid knowledge cannot be ignored in a state governed by the rule of law, since it is upon this that the assessment of legitimacy and the integrity expected of officials is based. Officials who plan—or are alleged to have engaged in—illegal acts are well aware of this. That is why they use the procedures and institutions of the rule of law to create the appearance of legality. Official findings and opinions, suitably doctored, “whitewash” their suspicious actions. To the extent that this happens, the appearance of legality supplants actual legality. To slightly paraphrase Groucho Marx, legality is a big deal, and if you pretend to serve it, you’ve won.     

Case Study: MO.K.A.S. as a Front

Consider the example of MO.K.A.S., as cited in the summary of the Authority’s findings. The Authority states:

“An allegation of money laundering has been made against the former President of the Republic, Mr. Anastasiades, and the law firm Nikos Chr. Anastasiades & Partners, through offshore shell companies and the concealment of the true beneficial owners, as well as regarding misleading statements about inactivity in the law firm after 1997.”

The Authority investigated the truth of this allegation. What did it find?

First, despite Anastasiades’ claim that, since his election as President of DISY in 1997, he had been a “silent partner” in the law firm bearing his name, nevertheless, “until his resignation as general partner on February 26, 2013, he maintained an active role in the law firm and general oversight of its activities […].”      

Second, to refute a report by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), “Mr. Anastasiades, while serving as President of the Republic, publicly called on the Unit for Combating Cover-Up Offenses (MO.K.A.S.) to investigate the OCCRP’s allegations.” According to the Authority, this action by the then-President “raises serious concerns about arbitrary institutional interference, inappropriate use of political/executive influence, and abuse of power.”

Third, just as it takes two to tango, Mr. Anastasiades’s public appeal was immediately answered—as if in a coordinated choreographed move—by the then-head of MO.K.A.S. The Authority reports that she claimed she “acted on her own initiative regarding the decision to conduct the investigation.”

However, the Authority’s investigation revealed that:

“while MO.K.A.S. had already received an official referral from an auditing firm regarding the specific transactions mentioned in the news report, eight (8) days before the former President of the Republic’s public appeal to MO.K.A.S. to conduct an investigation; it took no action until the former President of the Republic, Mr. Anastasiades, publicly called for an investigation.”

In plain English: MO.K.A.S. initially turned a blind eye. It took action only when the then-President asked it to do so regarding a matter in which he himself was implicated.

Fourth, the prompt and coordinated response from the head of MOKAS surprised the Authority. The Authority writes:

“While MO.K.A.S. findings are generally not published, Ms. Eva Rossidou Papakyriakou [ed. note: the head of MO.K.A.S.] issued a public statement dated December 20, 2019, regarding the outcome of the investigation in question, stating that “nothing reprehensible” had come to light, thereby exonerating the former President and the law firm.”

The Authority goes on to present findings that are a stinging rebuke and a source of shame for MOKAS:

“As the central national Financial Intelligence Unit, MOKAS had a duty to actively conduct its own investigation and secure evidence. Nevertheless, it merely accepted the explanations provided, without conducting the necessary independent investigation and verification of those explanations and without securing sufficient documentation to trace the origin and destination of the funds in question, despite the presence of incriminating evidence that warranted a further criminal investigation, MOKAS claimed that no criminal conduct was identified.

The report issued by MO.K.A.S. did not accurately reflect the incriminating evidence gathered during the investigation into the OCCRP’s allegations, indicating that the investigation was conducted improperly […].By way of example and without limitation, the transaction records showed glaring indications of money laundering, such as shell companiesregistered in the Caribbean that routed transactions totaling 220 million U.S. dollars through high-risk countries, as well as intercompany financing […] These actions may constitute mechanisms capable of obscuring illegal transactions, which were nevertheless overlooked by MOKAS during the course of the investigation.”

In plain Greek, according to the Authority, MOKAS functioned as Mr. Anastasiadis’s “money laundering operation.” So simple, and so painful.

The Covert Privatization of the State

When independent institutions are led by officials with backbone, determined to serve fearlessly, through their institutional role, the public interest—not only are mismanagement and scandals uncovered, and not only are those in power and their vested-interest cliques held in check, but barriers are also erected against potential corruption.

When, on the other hand, spineless officials willingly act as lackeys of the ruling power, their service is eroded, public life is debased, and unchecked power operates predatory. The state, then, becomes covertly privatized: it acts on behalf of the powerful, who use it as their own family business.

In the banana republics of Latin America, the powerful are, primarily, drug barons, who, by bribing officials and politicians, buy the legitimacy of their illegal activities.

In the “banana republics” of the Mediterranean, the powerful are, above all, the political bosses of the state. The corrupt among them use this power not only to enrich themselves and their families, nor merely to hand out favors in order to buy off voters and gain political capital, but also to acquire extremely valuable symbolic-political capital—the appearance of legitimacy for their actions.

I find it highly unlikely that Mr. Anastasiades and the others named in the Authority’s findings will face justice. The cabinet, headed by a former minister and political protégé of Anastasiades, despite the obvious conflict of interest, pretends to act impartially, appointing criminal investigators of its own choosing, indifferent to the widespread condemnation its critical decisions face.  They don’t give a damn about public opinion, which, in any case, on the one hand has no face or voice, and on the other has a short memory. What the establishment is concerned about is ensuring the appearance of legitimacy. It will most likely succeed.

However, the citizens of the Republic of Cyprus who are disillusioned by the corruption in public life and who care deeply about their country remain undeterred. From the heroes of EOKA and social struggles around the world, we have learned to keep the flame of hope burning brightly, even when everything around us grows dark. We are inspired by those few—perhaps few in number, but very real—principled officials who insist on doing their jobs well. For every head of MOKAS, there is always an Auditor General and the members of the Anti-Corruption Authority to defend the public interest. They are enough to show us that all is not lost.

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