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21.11.2026
INTERNATIONAL
13:13

Turkish intelligence agencies on high alert following the revelation of a plan to provoke Greece

New documents from "nordic monitor" take a swipe at erdogan and MIT
ALPHANEWSLIVE


Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MİT) attempted to limit the fallout from the publication of revelations regarding its plans to organize a covert false-flag operation (false-flag operation) against neighboring Greece, by secretly filing a criminal complaint against investigative journalist Abdullah Bozkurt and the individuals alleged to be his sources. This was reported yesterday by the Norway-based news website Nordic Monitor, noting that this move appears to have been intended to cast doubt on the revelations, create a plausible alibi to deny any involvement, and intimidate potential informants.

According to the Norwegian report, the intelligence agency’s intervention led to the issuance of an arrest warrant in February 2023 and the filing of formal criminal charges in November 2026, with Turkish authorities seeking to punish the journalist for revealing the identity of a secret service officer and his activities.

In a notable contradiction, the MİT characterized the investigation published by “Nordic Monitor” in October 2022 as baseless and unfounded, while at the same time accusing Bozkurt of revealing the agency’s operations, as well as the identities, positions, duties, and activities of intelligence agency officials. The agency invoked Turkey’s broad legislation on the confidentiality of information, despite insisting that reports of preparations for an operation against Greece did not correspond to reality.

The three-page classified criminal complaint, obtained by “Nordic Monitor,” is dated October 27, 2022, approximately two weeks after the revelations were published. It was addressed to the Ankara First Instance Prosecutor’s Office and bore the signature of Umut Ulvi Çanık, a senior legal advisor acting on behalf of the then-head of the MİT, Hakan Fidan.

Subsequently, Çanık followed Fidan to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he was appointed Director General of Legal Affairs after Fidan assumed the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs, in June 2023. According to the report, Fidan transformed the diplomatic service into yet another arm of the Turkish state intelligence services.

The criminal case remained pending for more than four years. An arrest warrant was issued for Bozkurt on February 22, 2023, while Prosecutor Abdulsamed filed an indictment on November 3, 2026, accusing him of violating Article 27 of Law No. 2937, which criminalizes the disclosure of information regarding intelligence service personnel.

The indictment lists the MİT as the complainant, while a separate communication from the agency, dated October 27, 2022, is included as part of the evidence.

On November 13, 2026, the 70th Ankara Criminal Court of First Instance issued a ruling referring the case to the 2nd Ankara Criminal Court of First Instance, which, under Turkish press law, is the competent court for hearing certain criminal cases involving online news websites.

A classified document from the Turkish intelligence services reveals the agency’s concern following the publication of information about the alleged false-flag operation (false-flag operation) against Greece, as well as its attempt to limit the fallout by filing a criminal complaint against investigative journalist Abdullah Bozkurt.

The most significant detail is that the court documents explicitly name Kemal Eskidan, the intelligence officer who had been identified in Nordic Monitor’s initial investigation as the person responsible for organizing the operation against Greece, as a member of the MİT staff. According to the documents, his identity, duties, and activities are protected by Turkish law.

The recently obtained documents offer an unusually detailed picture of how the Turkish intelligence service responded to a journalistic investigation into its covert activities, proceeding from the filing of a classified complaint to the issuance of an arrest warrant and the initiation of criminal proceedings against a journalist working from abroad, in self-imposed exile.

On October 10, 2022, Nordic Monitor published an investigation titled “Secret Unit of Turkish Intelligence Services Prepares to Carry Out Covert Operation in Greece.”

The report, which was based on information from sources familiar with the operation’s preparations, described the preparations of a specially trained covert unit, which had been formed within the MİT for the purpose of conducting military-style operations abroad, without relying exclusively on the special forces of the Turkish military or police.

According to the investigation, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the then-head of the intelligence services, Hakan Fidan, were considering various options for escalating tensions with Greece ahead of the 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections in Turkey.

Among the scenarios under consideration were acts of sabotage on Greek islands near the Turkish coast, the raising of Turkish flags on disputed or uninhabited islets and rocky outcrops, as well as the organization of a false-flag operation, which could be used as a pretext for a Turkish military response.

The investigation named Eskidan, a former Turkish Army officer who had transferred to the MİT, as the intelligence official responsible for organizing the covert unit and preparing the proposed operation. Eskidan, also known by the alias Abu Furkan, was described as a trusted associate of Fidan and a key figure in the expansion of the agency’s covert operations abroad.

According to the report, the proposals had been discussed within a limited circle of people close to Erdoğan and Fidan, though the Turkish president had not yet decided on a final course of action. The plan was shelved after it was revealed by Nordic Monitor.

The confidential complaint, marked GİZLİ (CONFIDENTIAL), was drafted after the article was published and was addressed to the Ankara First Instance Prosecutor’s Office. The agency named Bozkurt as the author of the article and also referred to other individuals—whose identities were to be verified—as potential suspects.

The inclusion of unidentified suspects broadened the scope of the investigation requested by the agency beyond the journalist, leaving open the possibility that whistleblowers (whistleblowers), who were suspected of providing information regarding the intelligence agency’s covert activities. The MİT attached a six-page copy of the Nordic Monitor investigation to its complaint, presenting it as evidence.

The intelligence agency summarized the key points of the report, including the formation of a secret unit, preparations for operations against Greek islands, the possible involvement of Turkish military assets, and Eskidan’s responsibility for coordinating the mission.

He also cited the claim that the operation’s goal was to artificially provoke a confrontation with Greece ahead of the 2023 elections, in order to strengthen nationalist solidarity and secure political support for Erdoğan.

The MİT characterized these allegations as baseless, without, however, providing a detailed factual rebuttal in its complaint. Instead, it requested the criminal prosecution of Bozkurt and others deemed suspects in the case.

One of the most revealing aspects of the classified complaint is the contradiction between the MİT’s denial that the alleged operation took place and its simultaneous assertion that the news report exposedintelligence officials and their activities.

The combination of these two claims raises a fundamental question: If the alleged covert operation against Greece was entirely fabricated, what actual intelligence information had the journalist illegally disclosed? The MİT did not provide an answer to this question in its three-page complaint.

Nor did it specify which specific claims regarding the operation were factually inaccurate, nor did it offer a different explanation of Eskidan’s responsibilities, nor did it present evidence refuting the preparations described in the article.

Instead, the agency argued that the publication constituted a criminal offense because it exposed intelligence officials and their operational activities.

The subsequent indictment and court ruling placed even greater emphasis on this contradiction, as they identified Eskidan as the intelligence officer whose information was allegedly disclosed.

The court proceedings revealed that the MİT’s complaint quickly escalated into a criminal investigation, which led to the issuance of an arrest warrant on February 22, 2023. The warrant was issued more than six years after Bozkurt had left Turkey and approximately four months after the publication of the article regarding the false-flag provocation operationagainst Greece.

The timing was also noteworthy, as Turkey was approaching the May 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections, the very same elections that Nordic Monitor’s initial investigation had identified as the political motive behind the proposed operation.

On November 3, 2026, Ankara Prosecutor Abdulsamed Barman drafted an indictment accusing Bozkurt of revealing the identities of MİT officials. In the indictment, Barman argued that the article disclosed information regarding MİT personnel and that there was sufficient evidence to initiate criminal proceedings under Article 27 of the legislation governing intelligence services.

The document did not substantiate that the original news report was false or that the journalist had obtained the information through illegal means. Instead, the criminal charge focused on the alleged disclosure of protected information through an online publication.

The indictment marked a significant escalation compared to the MİT’s complaint in October 2022, confirming that the agency’s effort to take action against the journalist had resulted in a formal criminal case, more than four years after the initial publication.

The court ruling of November 13, 2026, revealed one of the most significant new details of the case. In reviewing the indictment and the related allegations, the 70th Ankara Criminal Court of First Instance explicitly identified Kemal Eskidan as an MİT officer. The court stated that the criminal investigation had revealed that the Nordic Monitor article, published on October 10, 2022, publicly disclosed information regarding the identity, duties, and activities of Eskidan.

The ruling reiterated the prosecution’s description of the article, including the allegations that the MİT had formed a secret, specially trained unit with the aim of escalating tensions with Greece, that the unit would receive support from the Turkish military to conduct operations against Greek islands, and that the plans had been submitted to Erdoğan by the head of the intelligence services. He also reiterated the claim that, provided Erdogan gave his approval, the operation would be carried out by a covert unit under Eskidan’s command.

This confirmation is particularly significant, as Nordic Monitor’s initial investigation had identified Eskidan as the official tasked with organizing the covert operation against Greece. The court document thus confirms his status as an MİT official, a key element of the original journalistic report.

On November 13, 2026, the case was referred to the 2nd Criminal Court of First Instance in Ankara for trial.

The MİT’s confidential complaint was not directed exclusively against Bozkurt. It also called for an investigation into the involvement of other, unnamed suspects, using the Turkish phrase “tespit edilecek diğer şüpheliler” (“other suspects to be identified”).

The complaint did not explicitly name confidential journalistic sources nor did it specifically request that they be identified as such.

However, given that the initial investigation was based on information provided by individuals with knowledge of a sensitive intelligence operation, the request could potentially expand the criminal investigation to include those suspected of providing or facilitating the leak of the information.

For intelligence officials, former military officers, or other potential informants, the possibility of being identified in the context of a criminal investigation could act as a deterrent to providing information to the media.

A Nordic Monitor investigation in October 2022 portrayed Eskidan as a key figure in the transformation of the MİT from an organization focused primarily on intelligence gathering into an agency capable ofautonomous, covert military-style operations abroad.

Eskidan, a former officer in the Turkish Army, served as a project officer in the Counterintelligence and Security Directorate of the Army General Staff from July 2006 to June 2007, according to a military service record cited in the initial investigation.

He was subsequently recruited by the MİT after Fidan took over as head of the agency in 2010. According to a report by Nordic Monitor, Eskidan initially worked in a department responsible for providing security services before taking over the Special Operations Directorate in 2014.

This unit was described as becoming increasingly involved in covert missions abroad, including in Syria, Iraq, and Libya. The previous report claimed that Eskidan played a significant role in organizing and supporting armed groups operating in Syria, facilitating cross-border intelligence missions, and coordinating operations targeting Erdogan’s critics abroad.

The report also linked him to preparations for the proposed operation against Greece. The secret unit had been formed to provide the MİT with greater operational autonomy from the conventional special forces of the army and police, allowing the agency to carry out covert missions under its own command structure.

Nordic Monitor’s initial investigation was published during a period of heightened tension between Turkey and Greece, two NATO member countries. In 2022, Erdogan repeatedly escalated his rhetoric against Greece amid disputes over Aegean airspace, maritime borders, the militarization of the Greek islands, and conflicting territorial claims.

In this context, Nordic Monitor reported that the MİT had developed secret operational scenarios aimed at provoking a crisis, which could prove politically advantageous for the Erdoğan government ahead of the 2023 elections. The proposals reportedly ranged from symbolic provocations in disputed or uninhabited areas to acts of sabotage and a false-flag operation, aimed at creating the impression of an external threat.

The political goal, according to the report, was to stir up nationalist sentiment and shift public attention away from the deteriorating economic situation in Turkey toward an external security crisis.

The case against Bozkurt illustrates how an attempt by a national intelligence agency to challenge unwelcome journalistic reports can escalate into protracted criminal proceedingsagainst a journalist, particularly when broad provisions regarding the secrecy of intelligence agencies are used to restrict the publication of information about officials and their activities.

A case that began as an investigation into a possible covert operation intended to provoke tension between two NATO member states has, consequently, evolved into a formal criminal case, raising questions regarding the secrecy of intelligence services, journalistic disclosure of information, and the use of the Turkish judicial system against journalistic investigations published from abroad.

“Ruthless Turkish provocations”

DIKO-S&D MEP Costas Mavrides also commented on yesterday’s “Nordic Monitor” article in a written statement,  who stated that “Turkish policy since 1950 and thereafter has systematically exploited provocation as a means of action against Hellenism.”

“Provocation is a malicious scheme involving deliberate actions (bombings,  arson, misinformation, etc.) to manipulate a social group into intense or violent reactions, while simultaneously stigmatizing innocent and uninvolved individuals. Various Turkish provocations even involved crimes that were later proven by evidence or confessions from those involved, and where the motives are clear but the true perpetrators remain unknown.”

The Norway-based website “Nordic Monitor,” Mr. Mavridis notes, “revealed new classified documents regarding a Turkish provocation planned in 2022 by the then-head of the MIT and current Turkish Foreign Minister H. Fidan.”

“In October 2022, Bozkurt, a reporter for “Nordic Monitor,” published details about preparations for a Turkish covert operation against Greece, ahead of the Turkish elections in May 2023, with the aim of creating a Greek-Turkish crisis that would rally the nationalist base behind Erdogan and “distract” attention from economic problems. At the time, Turkey denied the report, but today’s revelations show that there was, in fact, a classified complaint filed by the MIT with the Turkish prosecutor’s office, which issued an arrest warrant for the criminal prosecution of the author. In October 2022, Bozkurt had described the plan outlining the proposed actions against Greece: acts of sabotage on Greek islands, the raising of the Turkish flag on uninhabited islets, and a disinformation campaign. While awaiting Erdogan’s approval of the plan, it was abandoned after it was exposed. “As the new classified documents in ‘Nordic Monitor’ indirectly demonstrate, the information at the time was authentic.”

Erdogan’s Turkish criminal record includes a multitude of criminal acts, most notably the bombing attack  in October 2015, against a crowd of Kurds protesting against Erdogan, which left more than 100 dead, the MEP states in his announcement, adding that “at that time, the Erdoğan regime was working closely with the ‘Islamic State,’ sparking a global outcry. The Turkish authorities attributed the deadly attack to the ‘Islamic State,’ and thus Turkey appeared to be… the victim.” 

“In November 2022, after the operation against Greece was exposed and abandoned, a new deadly bombing occurred ahead of the elections, and a few hours later, Erdogan announced that there had been a ‘treacherous attack,’ once again accusing the… Islamic State.”

Turkish politics, through the frequent and persistent repetition of a lie, systematically transforms it into a “truth” within Turkey, and it is gradually adopted by a segment of the victim’s population, says Mr. Mavridis, adding that “the most obvious example is Turkish action in Cyprus since 1950 and thereafter,” where “for decades, countless Turkish provocations were staged, involving organized crimes  (bombings, arson, massacres, “conveniently murdered” bodies in bathtubs, the Bairaktaris explosions, deliberate bombings and arson attacks on Turkish monuments and mosques, the creation of Turkish enclaves, etc.), all part of an organized Turkish plan, yet the blame was shifted onto Greek Cypriots!”

SEE ALSO: The West Bank is “bleeding”: A Palestinian was shot and killed by a guard at an Israeli settlement | AlphaNews

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