The case of the major fire that broke out in Arakapa on July 3, 2021, has returned to the spotlight following the Court of Appeals’ decision, dated August 11, 2026, which overturned the defendant’s convictions for the offenses related to causing the fire. The defendant had been sentenced in 2023 by the Limassol Permanent Criminal Court to eight years’ imprisonment, with the Prosecution’s case relying on circumstantial evidence. After he had already served approximately three years in prison, the Court of Appeals ruled that the evidence was insufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he was the one who started the fire. It should be noted that his separate conviction for a previous incident of arson in the countryside remained in force.
The particular legal significance of the decision lies in the manner in which the Court of Appeals approached circumstantial evidence and the limits within which such evidence can support a criminal conviction. In a criminal trial, direct testimony—such as that of an eyewitness—is not always required; guilt can also be proven through a combination of indirect facts and circumstances. The crucial point, however, is that this evidence, when considered as a whole, must lead with the requisite certainty to the conclusion of guilt and not merely raise suspicions or render the defendant’s involvement probable. In the Arakapa case, this very distinction between probability and proof was at the heart of the appellate court’s ruling.
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In the first-instance ruling, the Criminal Court had taken into account a series of circumstances that were deemed to link the defendant to the outbreak of the fire. Among these were his presence in the orchard that morning, his ability to access the area where the fire was detected, the fact that he had been in the vicinity earlier, and that he left the orchard at approximately 1:20 p.m., while the fire was first noticed at 1:27 p.m. Two lighters were also found in his car, and the Court took into account his behavior after the fire broke out. At the same time, the expert witness testified that there was a high probability the fire had been caused by an open flame. Weighing this evidence, the Criminal Court had concluded that the circumstantial evidence pointed to guilt.
The Court of Appeals, however, reexamined whether the links in the chain of evidence could in fact support the required conclusion. It first clarified that access to the source of the fire was not possible solely through the defendant’s yard, as there was a second access route. At the same time, although it had been established that the defendant had walked to a spot between his property and the reed bed where the fire broke out, it had not been determined exactly when, between his arrival at approximately 10:00 and his departure at 13:20, this specific movement had taken place. These facts could indicate that he had the opportunity to approach the site, but they did not, on their own, prove that he was the one who started the fire. As the Court of Appeals aptly noted, “the existence of an opportunity to commit a crime does not, however, equate to the commission of that crime.”
Even more critical was the issue of the two lighters found in the defendant’s car. The expert witness testified that there was a high probability that the fire had been started with an open flame, “such as with a lighter.” The Court of Appeals, however, focused on a crucial detail: an open flame remained a possible—not a certain—cause of the fire’s outbreak. The fact, therefore, that the defendant was in possession of lighters could not, on its own, transform this possibility into proof that he used them to start the fire. This is precisely where the crucial question arises: when does the connection between two factual events lead to a reliable conclusion, and when does it merely become speculation?
The Court of Appeals’ answer is clear: “Speculation to fill gaps in the prosecution’s evidence is not permitted.” In simple terms, the fact that one event is probable and a second is proven does not mean that the connection between them is also proven. The likelihood of using an open flame and the possession of two lighters could have raised suspicions; but without anything more, they were not sufficient to prove that those specific lighters were used to start the fire.
It is precisely at this point that the principle of proof “beyond a reasonable doubt” takes on substantive meaning. In a criminal trial, it is not enough for the court to consider it highly probable that the defendant committed the offense. The burden of proof rests with the prosecution, which must prove the defendant’s guilt through sufficient and credible evidence. This does not mean that every hypothetical or improbable possibility must be ruled out. It does mean, however, that after evaluating all the evidence, no reasonable doubt as to guilt should remain. If such doubt persists, no matter how strong the suspicions may be, it cannot be supplanted by the most probable version of events.
In the Arakapa case, the Court of Appeals ultimately ruled that the evidence presented—the defendant’s presence in the area, his possession of lighters, and his subsequent behavior—could lead to a presumption of his involvement. However, it was not sufficient to prove with the required certainty that he had started the fire.
This approach is not new in Cypriot case law. In the case of Andreas Konstantinou v. Police, Criminal Appeal No. 166/2015, dated July 8, 2016, the Supreme Court also reviewed a conviction for arson. After finding the testimony of the prosecution’s key witness to be problematic, it examined the remaining circumstances that had been considered aggravating factors, including the possession of a lighter, the defendant’s prior presence at the scene, and the fact that he had lit a cigarette. It found, however, that these elements did not rule out another reasonable explanation. The principle reiterated by the Court was clear: circumstantial evidence must link the defendant to the offense without any gaps and in a manner incompatible with any other reasonable interpretation.
The Court of Appeals’ decision in the Arakapa case also highlights the importance of appellate review in criminal proceedings. This is not a retrial of the same case, but rather a review of whether the trial court’s judgment falls within the limits set by the law and the principles of evidence. In this case, the Court of Appeals ruled that the circumstantial evidence could not support a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Arakapa case ultimately serves as a reminder of a fundamental principle of criminal justice: suspicion is one thing, probability is another, and proof is yet another. A series of events may paint a compelling picture, even give rise to a very strong suspicion. However, when a person’s deprivation of liberty depends on that picture, “probability” is not enough. Because “beyond a reasonable doubt” is not merely a legal phrase; it is the line that separates suspicion from criminal liability.
