The far right shapes politics even when it does not come to power
In politics, real power lies not only in the votes a party garners but in its ability to set the agenda—the issues that others feel compelled to address. This is especially true if that party comes from the far right, a political movement that was considered a scourge after World War II and was officially banned in many countries from expressing itself through organized groups.
The results of last Sunday’s election in Saxony-Anhalt leave little room for misinterpretation. The AfD won 43.8%, recording the best election result in its history and leaving the CDU at 17.2%. Despite this dismal result, the party did not secure an absolute majority, and with the other parties ruling out any cooperation with it, the path to power is anything but easy as of now. But this is somewhat misleading. The far-right’s victory is even greater.
ΣΧΕΤΙΚΑ ΑΡΘΡΑ
The Other Form of Political Power
We’ve grown accustomed to measuring political success in terms of vote shares, seats, and participation in government. But there is another form of political power that isn’t so easily captured at the ballot box. It is a party’s ability to set the political agenda—in other words, to choose the issues that everyone else will be forced to address. And in this regard, the European far right has achieved far more than its election results suggest.
Immigration, borders, security, national identity, demographics, law, and order have moved to the center of the European political debate in recent years. Obviously, these are not issues exclusive to the far right. They are real problems, and societies have every reason to demand answers. The question is who sets the framework within which these issues are discussed and, above all, who decides that these are the issues on which governments and political parties will be judged.
How the parties of the democratic spectrum are being drawn in
Herein lies the trap for the other parties that oppose the far right: in their effort to halt its advance, they often adopt its agenda. Not necessarily its positions, but its questions.
There is now research data documenting this shift. Daniel Saldivia Gonzatti and Teresa Völker analyzed 520,408 articles in six German newspapers, examining the period from the 1990s onward. They found that the influence of the far right on the discourse of mainstream parties has increased over time, particularly on issues such as immigration, Islam, and integration. In fact, they use an interesting term: “Discursive mainstreaming” (normalization in public discourse): Issues and views that were once marginalized gradually gain visibility, legitimacy, and ultimately a place in the dominant political discourse.
This does not mean that traditional parties have become far-right. Nor, of course, does it mean that every hardline stance on immigration is far-right. That would be a convenient but dangerously simplistic interpretation. It does mean, however, that the political discourse can shift without the parties themselves shifting to the same extent.
The Case of Cyprus
As far as Cyprus is concerned, the issue is that immigration—on which ELAM has built its main narrative—does not exist as an isolated political issue. It is linked to the Cyprus problem, demographics, security, and, inevitably, national identity and anxiety about the future of Cypriot Hellenism. In a country facing an unresolved national problem and occupation, these issues cannot be treated as abstract concerns.
But precisely for this reason, the ground is particularly fertile for a political discourse that transforms complex problems into existential dilemmas. The distinction between “us” and “them” becomes much easier when “us” already feels threatened.
ELAM has understood this for years. But the other parties have realized the same thing as they see society “biting” on the populist dilemmas posed by the far right. They are monitoring changes in society, observing where citizens’ concerns are shifting, and adapting their rhetoric accordingly. The same is true of the government.
The Quiet Victory of the Far Right
Cyprus did not suddenly become a far-right country. Nor is anyone who is concerned about immigration, demographics, or security automatically far-right. If we start handing out such labels, we’ll likely achieve the opposite of what we’re aiming for. There is, however, one question that needs to be answered. Is ELAM’s political influence today greater than its electoral strength?
I’m not sure we have the answer yet. But we are seeing signs and trends. Issues that were lower on the political agenda a few years ago have risen much higher. Words and arguments that were once used mainly by a specific political camp are now heard much more widely. And the traditional parties are increasingly feeling the need to position themselves in a political space where ELAM feels much more at home.
Given these circumstances, ELAM’s strength should not be measured solely by election results. Because even though it may not have achieved the vote share it expected despite its dramatic rise in the last election, it may not be forming a government (though it’s very close to doing so today), and it may not control any ministries, but it has already achieved something politically extremely significant: defining the terms of the debate. And perhaps this is the far right’s quietest—and at the same time, most significant—victory: setting the agenda. And as the 2028 presidential election approaches, I very much fear that this phenomenon will grow exponentially.
