We need a rational strategy: a comparison of the available paths, their likelihood of success, their costs, and the consequences of their failure
We have become accustomed to thinking about the Cyprus issue roughly as follows: there is an occupation, so the solution is liberation. The Turkish army must leave, our territories must be returned, and the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus must be restored throughout its entire territory.
This perception seems so self-evident that we rarely subject it to rational scrutiny.
ΣΧΕΤΙΚΑ ΑΡΘΡΑ
The Turkish invasion of 1974 and the ongoing occupation are fundamental aspects of the Cyprus problem, but they do not constitute the entire Cyprus problem. It existed prior to that and already encompassed the difficult issue of the coexistence of the two communities and their participation in the exercise of political power.
And here lies the first problem: exactly which Republic of Cyprus will be restored?
The Republic of Cyprus was not established as a unitary majority state with Turkish Cypriots as a mere minority. The 1960 Constitution provided for a Turkish Cypriot Vice President with significant powers, a veto on specific issues, and special participation by both communities in the state’s institutions.
If by “restoration” we mean a return to the constitutional order of 1960, we must also accept these features.
If, on the other hand, we mean that the Republic of Cyprus, as it functions today, will extend its control over the entire territory, with Turkish Cypriots as a numerical minority, then we are describing something different. And we must explain how that would come about.
Let’s simplify the question. Suppose that tomorrow Turkey withdraws its last soldier and abandons any role of intervention.
Would the Cyprus problem be solved? Not entirely.
A fundamental question of statehood would remain: How will Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots govern their shared state?
The invocation of a “unified state” often implies the notion that Turkish Cypriots would merely constitute a minority in a state governed by the principle of majority rule.
However, this is not the Republic of Cyprus that was established in 1960.
We may consider the provisions of the 1960 Constitution problematic or in need of a radical revision. However, we cannot invoke the continuity of the Republic of Cyprus—which protects our statehood internationally—while forgetting its founding architecture when discussing the position of the Turkish Cypriots.
Why should Turkish Cypriots accept a solution that would downgrade them from a community with institutionally guaranteed participation in power to a numerical minority?
And if they do not agree? Should it be imposed on them? By whom? Who has the power and the political motivation to impose such a constitutional framework?
There is also the obvious question: through what mechanism will Turkey withdraw?
It is not enough to declare that the occupation is illegal and that Turkey must withdraw. These points concern legitimacy and the goal. Strategy requires a path toward that goal.
What do we expect to happen that would cause Turkey, without a comprehensive political agreement, to relinquish the military and political control it exercises over the northern part of Cyprus? Who will compel it to do so, by what means, and how likely is such a scenario?
“Liberation” without an agreed-upon bicommunal settlement presupposes two developments, and we must explain how they could come about: Turkey’s withdrawal without a political compromise and the Turkish Cypriot community’s acceptance of a significantly weaker political position.
If we cannot convincingly explain how they will come about, we have not described an alternative resolution strategy. We have described the outcome we would like to see.
No one knows the future. That is why we need a rational strategy: a comparison of the available paths, their likelihood of success, their costs, and the consequences of their failure.
We rightly demand answers regarding a potential agreement. Will it be workable? Will it stand the test of time? What will happen if Turkey fails to meet its obligations? Is there a risk of deadlocks?
Yet we do not subject the alternative to the same scrutiny. When someone says, “We’ll keep going until liberation,” we rarely ask how we’ll get there, what the chances of success are, how long it will take, and what the cost will be if it fails.
Above all, we forget that the real alternative to an agreement is not an ideal Cyprus where the occupation has vanished and a perfectly functioning, unified European state has been created.
The real alternative is the continuation of the current situation. And time does not stand still.
What will Cyprus look like in 2036 or 2046 without a solution? What will have happened to the relationship between Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, property issues, demographics, development in the occupied areas, and the international response?
The status quo is not the safe choice in the face of the risk of a solution. It, too, is a choice, with risks and consequences that may become irreversible.
Perhaps, then, a significant portion of our society has not truly chosen “liberation” over a federal solution. It has chosen something easier: to act as if it does not yet need to choose.
To maintain the Republic of Cyprus as it functions today. For the occupied territories to be returned someday. For Turkey to leave. For the refugees to return. Let’s create a normal European state. And at the same time, let’s not accept any substantial sharing of political power with the Turkish Cypriot community.
Except that simply listing desired outcomes does not constitute a strategy.
The real dilemma is not between a problematic solution and ideal liberation. It is between different, imperfect, and dangerous paths.
A desire does not become a strategy simply because we have been repeating it for fifty years.
And refusing to choose does not mean we have avoided making a choice.
Time makes its own choices, even without us.
Frixos Vryonidis
Attorney – Coordinator of the Volt Institutions Committee
