But what is the common thread linking these historic moments? The passion for power, which will always take precedence over any prospect of resolving the Cyprus issue
Averof Neophytou’s recent remarks on the Cyprus issue sparked a sense of unease—and in some circles, even annoyance. The historical events he referred to share a common thread that is not unrelated to the current situation.
If we set aside the U.S.-British-Canadian plan that emerged shortly after the Turkish invasion (1978), Averof Neophytou—and justifiably so—attributes responsibility to AKEL for the “NO” vote on the Annan Plan in 2004. But what preceded that? AKEL, even though all signs at the time foreshadowed the rapid developments to come, decided to support Tassos Papadopoulos in the 2003 presidential election. A hard-line politician whose long-standing stance on the Cyprus issue left little room for sincere negotiation. The first drafts of the Annan Plan were already on the table, and just two months after Papadopoulos’s election, the roadblocks were lifted. “The man has changed,” and “we will negotiate better,” were the arguments AKEL used to justify its decision to prioritize power over a possible solution to the Cyprus problem. The critical choice for AKEL was made in 2003. What followed in 2004 was the result of AKEL’s decision to prioritize its participation in government over capitalizing on the historic juncture in the Cyprus issue.
ΣΧΕΤΙΚΑ ΑΡΘΡΑ
And now we turn to DISY. Averof Neophytou holds the party responsible for burying the Gali Package of Ideas in 1992. Indeed, 5–6 months before the 1993 presidential election, Glafkos Clerides donned the patriotic mantle, promised to do away with the Gali Plan, and rallied the entire so-called “rejectionist camp” around him. And that is more or less how he won the presidential election against the “defeatist” Giorgos Vassiliou. Glafkos Clerides, the moderate politician of the realist school, also prioritized power over a possible resolution of the Cyprus problem. The second chapter of DISY’s responsibilities concerns the debacle at Kran Montana. Yet another historic moment that arose—an unfortunate coincidence—just six months before the 2018 presidential election. Nicos Anastasiades (and he was not alone) traveled to the Swiss resort with the upcoming election in mind, a fact that shaped his approach to the negotiations there. Once again, political expediency took precedence over the grave responsibility of the Cyprus issue.
I am well aware of the familiar refrain that in all cases, “Turkish intransigence was to blame.” But if we are a little more honest with ourselves, we will realize that this particular answer does not account for all the gaps in our own responsibility.
But what is the common denominator of these historic moments? The passion for power, which will always take precedence over any prospect of resolving the Cyprus problem. After all, the sharing of power is one of the major sticking points of the Cyprus issue for our side, even if we do not admit it.
This same factor also influences the current situation. In a scenario where everyone, without exception, is working feverishly toward the 2028 presidential election, it is rather unlikely that anyone would believe we’ll see the developments that would create any prospects. Especially in an international political climate that does not seem capable of bringing about positive developments.
P.S. Averoff’s critique is sound. However, it would have carried greater weight if it had been made at the time all this was happening, when there was at least a small chance that things might change.
