Why has AKEL consistently been behind schedule?

The criteria and timelines over time, as reflected in the history of his choices

ALPHANEWSLIVE

The long-standing criteria and timelines as reflected in the history of its decisions

DISY kicked off an unprecedented and early election campaign that, whether intentionally or not, led the other parties to the starting line of a 16-month process leading up to the presidential election in 2028. AKEL does not seem to be in a hurry, choosing to proceed toward the presidential election according to its own timetable. After all, it has never been a party that decided very early on who its candidate would be for the highest office in the state. The procedures of the Leftist party do not allow for easy decisions, expedited processes, or hasty moves, even though these have been observed in the past, since consultation with nearly all of the party’s organs and bodies is essential before selecting a candidate.

The Difficult Equation

In AKEL, unlike in DISY, not all party members make the decision. The candidate is determined after a series of steps is completed, with the Central Committee initially taking the lead; it sets the strategy for the presidential election and explores potential candidates’and potential alliances. This is followed by exploratory contacts with allies of the party, other parties, organized groups, or prominent figures. Next, the Central Committee drafts a proposal with one or more candidates and submits it to the party’s grassroots groups for discussion. Next, the final proposal is drafted, and finally, the electoral convention selects the candidate by secret ballot.

The greatest challenge for AKEL, aside from the procedure—which must be strictly adhered to—is that almost always, the party seeks a candidate who is not registered in the party’s membership rolls. This is a practice from which the left-wing party has “deviated” only once, in the 2008 presidential election, when AKEL independently fielded its own candidate. That candidate was the party’s own Secretary-General, Dimitris Christofias, who secured a historic victory for the party. On all other occasions, Ezechia Papaioannou sought a progressive candidate with specific political characteristics and, above all, high moral standing.

There were no taboos regarding a candidate’s political background—whether right-wing, left-wing, or centrist; rather, the candidate in question had to be on the same page as the party on a range of issues to which, depending on the times, greater or lesser importance is attached. Among these were the stance on the Cyprus issue, the implementation of policies to combat poverty and inflation, the rule of law, the fight against collusion and corruption, as well as convergence on human rights issues. Another criterion for AKEL is broad appeal. One of the reasons a party candidate is not typically chosen is that it is unlikely a voter who does not align with the Left would vote for a person with AKEL. This is mainly due to reservations about how economic issues are handled.

The choice is certainly not an easy one, but it often becomes a difficult one for the party, in the sense that it does not know whether the person who is ultimately chosen is the most suitable. Entrusting such a major undertaking to someone outside the party requires serious efforts to build trust with that person and to seek cooperation with other political forces, in order to lay the groundwork for success in the presidential election.

The History of Candidate Selection in Each Election

The history of AKEL’s selection of candidates in presidential elections has not been a consistent, uniform practice. The process, in the form of alliances, was first implemented in the 1983 presidential election. AKEL agreed with DIKO to support Spyros Kyprianou, based on a “minimum program.” The agreement had been finalized in April 1982, approximately ten months before the elections.

During the 1988 candidate selection process, Kokis Ioannides appeared poised to be nominated, having emerged through processes at the party’s grassroots level. His candidacy, however, did not proceed after Ezekias Papaioannou presented a photograph of Ioannidis in a Masonic lodge, arguing that the party—and especially one on the Left— could not risk endorsing a person suspected of being a Freemason. Beginning in April 1987, Giorgos Vassiliou came to the forefront. Vassiliou announced his intention to run for the highest office, and AKEL announced its support for him in July 1987.Vassiliou’s candidacy led AKEL to victory over Glafkos Clerides.

In 1993, AKEL once again supported Giorgos Vassiliou. The AKEL–Vassiliou Agreement was finalized in October 1992. However, the text of the agreement clearly stated AKEL’s complete disagreement with Vassiliou on the issue of Cyprus’s accession to the EEC. AKEL agreed to set this disagreement aside in order to support his candidacy due to their shared position on the Cyprus issue. Ultimately, Giorgos Vassiliou was defeated in the election by Glafkos Clerides, as a result of what some considered the late president’s arrogant attitude, who, carried away by his high first-round vote share, declared that if he were in Clerides’s position, he would withdraw from the election race. Furthermore, despite persistent appeals from the then-secretary-general of AKEL, Dimitris Christofias, for the party’s students to come to Cyprus to vote, Giorgos Vassiliou refused. This was because he believed he could easily prevail.

Iakovou’s decision two months before the election

For the 1998 presidential election, AKEL, the United Democrats, and EDEK had put forward the candidacy of Marios Iliadis in July 1997, but the effort fell through due to disagreements. In fact, the candidacy of Giannos Kranidiotis, then a Member of the European Parliament and later Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece, also appears to have been considered. The party then turned to Giorgos Iakovou, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Vassiliou government, who was ultimately endorsed by AKEL against incumbent President Glafkos Clerides. The left-wing party broke every record regarding the timing of its candidate selection, as it did not finalize Iacovou’s candidacy until just before Christmas 1997.

In the 2003 elections, AKEL participated in a broader cross-party agreement with DIKO and EDEK to support Tassos Papadopoulos. This came as a surprise to part of society at the time, mainly due to Papadopoulos’s uncompromising stance on the Cyprus issue. In fact, the phrase “a man can change,” attributed to Dimitris Christofias in his effort to persuade others of his choice, has gone down in history. The agreement was finalized in July 2002, several months before the February 2003 vote.

The most significant moment for AKEL in the history of presidential elections came in 2007. For the first time since independence, the party decided to endorse its own candidate, its then-Secretary-General, Dimitris Christofias. The decision was approved by an extraordinary Pan-Cyprian Conference on July 8, 2007, approximately seven months before the election. Dimitris Christofias was elected President of the Republic with the support of AKEL, EDEK, DIKO, and the Greens in the second round.

Stavros Malas X2

In the 2013 elections, AKEL—still bearing deep scars from criticism of the Christofias administration—returned to the strategy of fielding an independent candidate, backing Stavros Malas. His candidacy was approved by an extraordinary party congress on July 21, 2012. The outgoing president had initially favored the candidacy of Finance Minister Kiki Kazamias. He considered him a more popular candidate; however, Kazamias declined, citing health reasons.

On April 27, 2017, the Political Bureau of AKEL announced the start of discussions regarding the 2018 presidential election. The Central Committee considered the candidacy of businessman Mike Spanou and, on June 7, 2017, officially proposed his name for discussion among the party’s grassroots groups. The candidacy did not move forward because the party’s grassroots did not appear particularly enthusiastic due to differences of opinion, mainly on economic issues. AKEL returned to Stavros Malas, whose selection was ratified on September 2, 2017.

For the 2023 elections, AKEL endorsed independent candidate Andreas Mavrogiannis, after other names—such as that of attorney Achilleas Dimitriadis—had been considered. The proposal was ratified by the extraordinary Pan-Cyprian Conference on June 5, 2022.

A Critical Choice 15 Years After Losing Power

AKEL’s selection of a non-party candidate is usually a strategic choice for the party, with advantages but also inherent limitations. It is also no coincidence that AKEL usually waits for the right-wing candidate to be finalized before proceeding with its own announcement. This tactic is employed both to gauge the political landscape and because AKEL often requires more time to research and select its candidate compared to Synergismos, where the candidate typically comes from within the party ranks.

This broad-based approach can expand AKEL’s electoral appeal, attract voters beyond its traditional base, and facilitate the formation of political alliances. However, this practice carries the risk of policy divergences, internal party backlash, and difficulties, as there is a danger that AKEL and its respective candidate may ultimately not be on the same page.

The 2028 presidential elections are becoming even more critical for AKEL for another reason. After fifteen years in the opposition, it is reasonable to consider whether the search for broader alliances is linked to a more intense desire to return to power.