The Convergence of Decisions Leading to a Long-Term Deadlock

The atmosphere of euphoria that had been created by official statements, which had been echoed by the international media the day after the announcement of Trump’s peace plan to end the war in Gaza, is proving on the ground just how unfounded it was. The stalemate regarding the implementation of the Trump Plan, the extremely fragile ceasefire between Hamas and the IDF, and the inaction of the Peace Council—which is struggling to secure financial resources even to cover its operational needs— demonstrate the validity of the pessimism I expressed publicly as early as the day after the initial key details of the adopted plan were made public.

The only positive results that emerged from the implementation of the first phase of the U.S. plan were the release of all dead and living Israeli hostages, the release of a significant number of Palestinian prisoners, and the handover of a similarly significant number of deceased Palestinians so that they could be buried by their families. An additional positive outcome is the increase in the flow of humanitarian aid to the enclave’s civilian population, although much more still needs to be done to bring their daily lives even slightly closer to a tolerable level of normalcy.

Today, nine months after the release of the Israeli hostages and the release of Palestinian prisoners, the second phase of the Trump Plan has failed to be implemented beyond the partial withdrawal of the IDF to 70% of the enclave’s territory, with Hamas continuing to exercise de facto control over the rest of the Gaza Strip, while the Peace Council struggles to justify its existence. After all, it would not be an exaggeration to say that this was precisely the reason for its recent meeting in Cyprus.

Where do we stand today?

It is time to assess the current situation on the ground, without beating around the bush.

Undoubtedly, the very survival of Hamas—even in just 30% of Gaza—is today a “thorn in the side” of the Israeli political leadership, which is currently unable to claim that the Palestinian organization “has vanished from the face of the earth.” The fact that Hamas continues to exist and maintain its arsenal—which it refuses to surrender—proves that the Netanyahu government, after so many years of war, has failed to achieve the original objective it set for itself, from October 7, 2023, to the present. The only thing Israel can point to as a success is that, despite accusations of genocide, the IDF’s sporadic operations targeting Hamas leaders are carried out with the approval of the U.S. and the international command center that the Trump administration effectively imposed, headquartered in the Israeli town of Kiryat Gat—a fait accompli that the Israeli opposition “blames” on Netanyahu as a “surrender of national sovereignty” and, moreover, without any compensation. And it is a fact that for the first time since the establishment of the State of Israel, a foreign military body is being established on its territory, tasked with monitoring the IDF to ensure that its operations do not violate international humanitarian law.

What Hamas Wants

Hamas, for its part, is clearly trying to buy as much time as possible. Over the past month, Cairo has become the site of a series of behind-the-scenes meetings and consultations between Hamas representatives and officials from the Egyptian military and intelligence services, as well as with representatives of the Peace Council. Egypt and the U.S. are trying to pressure Hamas to surrender its weapons so that the second phase of the Trump Plan can be implemented, with the Palestinian technocratic government taking control of the enclave and the arrival of the “Multinational Stabilization Force,” which will consist of military forces from Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, and Albania—and, as of July 15, Morocco as well. However, Hamas has managed to fend off the pressure, initially raising objections to the composition of the Palestinian technocratic government, and now that this issue appears to have been resolved, it is now putting up strong resistance to the possibility of handing over its weapons to non-Palestinian armed forces, such as the “Multinational Stabilization Force.” Recently, Hamas rejected the Egyptian army’s proposal to hand over its weapons to the army “for safekeeping,” insisting that it wishes to hand over the weapons only to a Palestinian armed force, which will subsequently evolve into the regular army of the future Palestinian state—which, however, does not currently exist.

Finally, Hamas decided to restructure its political leadership, declaring itself now ready to welcome the Palestinian government of technocrats, which operates partly under the auspices of the Palestinian Authority. On the other hand, however, the Palestinian Authority does not seem at all willing to send administrative personnel who inevitably come from the ruling Fatah faction, knowing that its rival, Hamas, possesses armed forces. Thus, through ingenious maneuvers, the political and military wings of Hamas, on the one hand, have prolonged their presence on the ground and gained significant experience in successfully engaging with foreign political and military officials and international institutions.  Simply put, Hamas has found a way to express the following simple phrase in various ways: “I will not disarm because I want to exist.” All of this, however, does not mean that Hamas is not “cornered.” Of course it is.

What Israel Wants

The Israeli side is equally constrained. Despite its undeniable military superiority, Israel is bound by U.S. decisions. It may have carried out numerous commando operations, even in areas de facto controlled by Hamas, but it has not received authorization to retake them. At the same time, it is delaying the establishment of the “Multinational Stabilization Force” by preventing military officials from the countries that will make up the force from inspecting the areas to which they are to send troops, arguing that Hamas has not been disarmed—and therefore, at least for the time being, the second phase of the Trump Plan is impossible to implement. Finally, it is quietly advancing its military forces, steadily expanding the zone controlled by the IDF on the ground, with American tolerance.

Last week, IDF representatives who traveled to Cairo for consultations with their Egyptian counterparts reportedly made it clear that if Hamas is not disarmed “immediately,” then the Israeli recapture of all of Gaza will be only a matter of time.

And in the long run—Elections

Time, however, has its own rhythm and its own role. Specifically, parliamentary elections will be held in Israel on October 27, and Netanyahu’s faction is expected to want to prove that it has finally managed “close” at least one of the fronts of conflict it has opened. Why wouldn’t it want to “close” the Gaza front, since that is the one it “opened” first?

On the other hand, let’s not forget that on November 28, parliamentary elections will be held in the Palestinian Authority—the first in two decades. The ruling Fatah faction is very concerned that candidates affiliated with Hamas might win a large share of the vote in the West Bank. For this reason, President Mahmoud Abbas’s administration will think very carefully before deciding to get involved on the ground in Gaza, which is already a troubled area. Will it dare to send the Palestinian government of technocrats there, or will it prefer to “clear the air,” even with yet another new Israeli ground operation—and, accordingly, later take whatever steps might best serve Fatah’s political and public relations interests?

Finally, if we add the U.S. midterm elections on November 3 to the equation, then we must take into account that the Trump administration may want to demonstrate that the Trump Plan in Gaza is beginning to yield some initial tangible results —especially if, by that time, nothing positive has emerged on the front against Iran.