A Second Look at the Tripartite Agreement in El Alamein and Herzog’s Visit to Cyprus
Egypt has not revealed its hand regarding the “Mecca Agreement.” Israeli President Herzog’s more moderate profile serves Nicosia’s communications strategy.
The text of the joint declaration issued by the Cyprus-Greece-Egypt Trilateral Meeting held last Tuesday (September 8) contained no unpleasant surprises. The three countries are continuing their close cooperation in the energy sector as usual, reaffirming their shared views on the application of the Law of the Sea and on the framework for a solution to the Cyprus problem. They also agree on the soundness of the Trump Plan for Gaza and are taking a common stance on resolving the hotspots of tension in Lebanon and Syria.
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Egypt’s Dilemma
However, the elephant in the room is always Turkey. It is clear that relations between Ankara and Cairo bear no resemblance to the chill that prevailed during the early years of President Sisi’s rule. Following the events of October 7, regional circumstances inevitably brought the two countries very close together, with Turkey, along with the Egyptians and the Qataris, assuming its own distinct role in the broader mediation process. At the same time, despite its initial reservations, the Sisi administration realized that it could not ignore Turkey’s role in neighboring Libya. The Turkish base in Somalia is capable of influencing regional balances in the so-called “soft underbelly” of Egyptian interests in the Red Sea, with direct implications for the functionality of the Suez Canal, in the perpetually unstable Sudan, and on the critical issue of water management—a matter that affects Egypt’s relations with Ethiopia. Geographically, Turkey may be far away. However, under very specific circumstances, its actions could significantly serve Egyptian interests, by pulling certain strings in the region, at a time when Cairo does not currently have as much control as it would like.
The “Mecca Agreement” Factor
On August 7, 2026, a new factor of pivotal importance was added—none other than the new regional defense mechanism of the “Mecca Agreement.” This new development, which, from Turkey’s perspective, among other things, aims to pave the way for an alternative energy corridor that competes with the IMEC plan, presents Egypt with an additional dilemma, in the following sense:
Until recently, Egypt’s energy cooperation with Cyprus and Greeceand Europe would not have precluded parallel cooperation with Turkey on other purely “Middle Eastern” issues of concern to Egyptian foreign policy and defense. The “Mecca Agreement,” however, once and if it proves its effectiveness on the ground, could allay significant Egyptian concerns, both regarding “Cairo’s position” in the region and regarding “Cairo’s position” in the era of new energy corridors.
This new Egyptian dilemma, arising from the “temptation” of the “Mecca Agreement,” is further compounded by the ambiguous stance taken by the Trump administration. Taking into account the occasional statements by the U.S. Ambassador to Ankara, Thomas Barak, it is clear that the Trump administration is not particularly concerned about whether the “IMEC solution” or the solution proposed by the rival “pro-Turkish IMEC” will ultimately prevail. It believes that, one way or another, the economic benefit for the United States remains largely guaranteed.
No Answers
Given these facts, it should come as no surprise that Egypt has so far avoided taking a clear stance on the possibility of joining the “Mecca Agreement.” Turkey’s invitation remains open, and Saudi Arabia is leaking information suggesting that (perhaps) there is a certain coolness between Mohammed bin Salman and President Sisi. Cairo’s constructive ambiguity was ultimately not clarified at the El Alamein Trilateral Summit. The text of the joint declaration does not explicitly state that the Egypt-Cyprus-Greece trilateral cooperation “blocks Cairo’s path” to Mecca. No clear answers were provided by Egypt—and this is certainly not a positive development.
The Egyptian military parade of 2026 and the bloody February 18, 1978
On the other hand, in terms of public communication, Cairo has indeed sent clear messages to Turkey that the quality of its bilateral relations with the Republic of Cyprus will not be compromised.
A telling example was the wording of Egypt’s condolences to the “friendly Republic of Cyprus, its government, and its people” regarding the shipwreck that occurred “off the northern coast of Cyprus,” which left no room for Turkey to assume that the Sisi administration might perhaps upgrade its relations with the occupying regime of the “TRNC.”
On a symbolic level, the participation of an Egyptian military unit in the October 1 military parade in Nicosia takes things a step further: It brings full circle the course of relations between Egypt and the Republic of Cyprus, which began on February 18, 1978. On that day, National Guard forces opened fire on Egyptian commandos who had been dispatched by the Sadat government to Larnaca Airport to take control of an airplane that had been hijacked by anti-government hijackers. However, the arrival of the Egyptian commandos had not been previously approved by the Cypriot government. The fact that 15 Egyptian commandos were killed by Cypriot fire cast a significant shadow over Cyprus-Egypt relations for years.
So, when we see the Egyptian contingent marching in the October 1 parade in downtown Nicosia, it would be good to reflect on the symbolism of this interesting historical aspect of Cypriot-Egyptian relations.
President Herzog as a Communication Alternative
The one-day working visit by Israeli President Isaac Herzog, to Nicosia last Thursday (September 10) took place in a completely different atmosphere. Although, according to the Israeli political system, he lacks executive powers, President Herzog, following the issuance of an international arrest warrant against Netanyahu, has taken it upon himself to “fill institutional gaps,” acting as a messenger and intermediary, drawing on his extensive political experience.
This visit essentially reaffirmed that IMEC remains a shared goal, while the possibility was not ruled out that, in the future, that Cyprus might host the next rounds of Israel-Lebanon talks currently underway with U.S. encouragement. At the same time, given that the process of forming the new Israeli government following the October 27 elections is expected to take some time, it is deemed necessary to establish parallel coordination between the Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs and President Herzog’s diplomatic office in order to address any “gaps” that may arise.
On the other hand, Cyprus and Israel do not appear to underestimate the importance of communication at all, especially given the many difficulties facing Israeli diplomacy. Thus, the more moderate tone of President Herzog’s public statements—in contrast to the “bellicose rhetoric” of Netanyahu and Katz’s remarks —certainly better serve the stance that the Cypriot side wishes to maintain toward Israel, both within the EU and in terms of domestic public opinion. Moreover, the strong criticism voiced by the Cypriot opposition regarding the close ties maintained by the Christodoulides government with the current Israeli leadership cannot be ignored.
