Despite the international vote of confidence in President Al-Sara, the reality is different
The rivalry between Israel and Turkey, centered on defining their spheres of influence over parts of Syrian territory, is nothing new. One could say that this development was entirely expected following the “power vacuum” left behind by the collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime in early December 2024. That overthrow, which in hindsight turned out to be more like an “unconditional surrender,” brought Ahmad Al-Sara to power; from being a fugitive and designated jihadist terrorist, he managed to gain acceptance from the East, the West, and the White House—with a slight delay from Moscow as well as from the conservative, pro-Western Arab monarchies. The new Syrian government showed very early on that it was willing to accept Ankara’s protection, while at the same time, its abrupt distancing from Tehran’s influence was an attempt to “give a friendly nod” to Israel, which it could not ignore, even if it had wanted to. However, Israel’s assessment of the new reality taking shape in Syria highlighted a key characteristic of Ahmad Al-Sara’s administration. Its defining feature is its temporary nature.
Intentions, Hopes, and Truths
No matter how clearly the international community has expressed its confidence in the Damascus government, on the ground Syria has many issues to resolve in order to ensure its vision of unity, unified sovereignty, and complete stability—both in terms of managing its internal minorities and securing its borders.
ΣΧΕΤΙΚΑ ΑΡΘΡΑ
The disbandment of the Syrian Kurdish armed forces last Tuesday (August 25) and their integration into the regular Syrian army, as well as the optimistic statements by their leader, Mazlum Abdi, undoubtedly serve as a very strong indication that the country has opened a new, promising chapter.
The leader of the Syrian Kurds, Mazloum Abdi, announced the disbandment of the Kurdish armed forces and their integration into the Syrian regular army.On Friday, August 28, it was announced that he had been appointed as an advisor to President Al-Sarra.
However, the Druze of southern Syria have not ruled out the possibility of gaining autonomy, and their leaders have from the outset “broken the taboos,” clearly stating that Israel and the Druze community—which has been fully integrated into the ranks of the IDF for decades—could very well play the role of ultimate patron.
At the same time, the Alawites of the Syrian coast, having lost their significant institutional influence during the Assad era, are making it clear in various ways that the Russian bases in Tartus and Latakia must not forget them—a demand that Moscow does not appear to be meeting, in the way they might have expected. The statements by Abdi, who just the day before yesterday (August 28) was appointed special advisor to President Al-Sara, do not necessarily reflect the views of the entire Kurdish minority in the country.
A quick glance at Kurdish news sources on social media platforms —which for years have been posting videos and information on a daily basis that are extremely reliable regarding the actual situation on the ground (often, in fact, in real time) —easily leads us to the conclusion that the Kurdish vision of independence has not faded.
Finally, the fact that the Israeli army in the south and the Turkish army in the north maintain control over Syrian territories leaves no doubt that the perception being cultivated everywhere of a new, unified, undivided, and stable Syria has been overstated. Just because the international community wants to believe something does not mean it is reality. Perhaps it will be reality in the future. For now, however, the situation is different. And the provisional nature of Ahmad al-Shara’s administration, even though the majority of foreign governments likely choose to downplay the significance of this fact, does not mean that this fact does not exist.
Druze in southern Syria are protesting against the Al-Sara administration, demanding autonomy
Everyone is talking to everyone
The bombing carried out by the IDF in the early hours of August 19, 2026, against the Syrian airbase Abu Al-Duhur was justified by Israeli political leaders as a warning to Turkey “not to violate the existing status quo.” A few days later, Reuters reported that the head of the Mossad, Ronen Gofman, had spoken by phone with Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Al-Sayyani, warning him that if Damascus did not take the necessary steps to remove the Turkish military presence from that specific base, then the IDF would take it upon itself to do so. This information has not been denied by either Israel or Syria, while the Israelis insist that the Americans had been fully notified prior to the attack. Interestingly, however, is a statement by Thomas Barak, the White House’s special envoy for Syria-Lebanon issues, who criticized Israel for failing to notify the Turkish side as well, thereby creating the risk of a direct military conflict between Israel and Turkey, which would have unpredictable consequences for the entire region. On the other hand, Turkey denies having had any presence at that particular Syrian base, which, since President Al-Sara took control of the country, has remained (and remains to this day) out of operation.
A simple review of public statements, unrefuted journalistic leaks, and the reality on the ground clearly shows that behind the military activity, there are backchannel communications between Israel, the Damascus government, Syrian minorities (Druze, Kurds, Alawites),—the U.S.—Turkey, and the Turkmen, who also play their own distinct role in the areas controlled by Turkish troops.
At the same time, equally important is the behind-the-scenes relationship between the official Al-Sarra administration and armed Sunni jihadist groups, which have proven capable of acting as “known-unknowns” when the official regime seeks to rein in separatist tendencies in regions with a strong Druze presence in the south and Alawite presence along the coast. Indeed, when the situation threatens to spiral out of control, or when the pro-regime “known-unknowns” have completed their mission, the regular Syrian army emerges as the only reliable stabilizing force that ensures (or, rather, imposes) Syrian national unity—whatever that may mean. And this is roughly how one could describe the internal “status quo” of today’s Syria, which brings together a variety of realities by default. As for the—officially undeclared— “zones of influence” of Israel and Turkey, numerous events on the ground have proven that the “undeclared border” that the Turks and Israelis are said to “must” respect is the Syrian military base T4, which apparently “draws” the invisible demarcation line between northern Syria (Turkish zone of influence) and southern Syria (Israeli zone of influence), ensuring greater flexibility in the use of military means to maintain the current balance of power.
Alawite residents of Latakia, holding flags of their community, protest the bloody raids carried out in their city by Sunni jihadist armed groups in November 2025.
Postcolonial Practices
But what about the Syrian military bases that have remained inactive since the Al-Sara administration took power? Developments related to the Israeli attack on the Abu al-Duhur base clearly demonstrate that, the post-colonial principle, known by its Latin legal term “Uti Possidetis,” is being applied to the Syrian puzzle; this principle is interpreted as “What you possessed—continue to possess.” This is the principle that was applied in Africa when the former European colonies gained their independence, in order to prevent a chain reaction of military conflicts that would have redrawn the, largely artificial colonial borders, the solution chosen was to ignore local ethnic realities and compel the new independent states to respect the colonial criteria for border demarcation. Exactly the same logic governs the borders of Latin American states, as well as those of the former Soviet republics.
The question
And how long will the current status quo in Syria remain in place under conditions that reflect post-colonial terms and practices?
Sooner or later, the answer is expected to be that the current provisional nature of President Ahmad Al-Sara’s governance will run its course.
