A European Commission report on Turkey highlights Turkey’s refusal to cooperate with the Republic of Cyprus and its insistence on a two-state solution, while the Commissioner for Enlargement, Marta Kos, simultaneously emphasizing the importance the European Union attaches to the resumption and progress of talks aimed at resolving the Cyprus issue. It is important for Turkey to reaffirm its commitment to the talks, Brussels notes, calling for the avoidance of unilateral actions that increase tensions and hinder the resumption of talks.
The European Commission’s 2026 Report on Turkey, published today, Wednesday as part of the enlargement package, states that Turkey “continued to refuse to recognize and cooperate with the Republic of Cyprus, including on security-related issues, and to veto its application to join or chair various international organizations.”
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Furthermore, it notes that Turkey “continued to refuse to recognize the Republic of Cyprus and repeatedly advocated a two-state solution in Cyprus, contrary to UN Security Council resolutions.”
During the presentation of the Enlargement Package, Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos told members of the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) on Wednesday that there has been “a deterioration in the rule of law, fundamental rights, and democracy.”
“These developments are widening the gap between Turkey’s stated goal of joining the EU and its continued regression on the fundamental accession criteria. That is why accession negotiations have been at an impasse since 2018,” she added.
At the same time, Ms. Kos noted that “we are seeing intensified cooperation between the EU and Turkey in areas of mutual interest, such as regional security, trade, climate action, and migration, which brings benefits to both sides,” adding that “the EU has a strategic interest in developing a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with the country, one that reflects today’s new realities in Europe.”
Regarding the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean, the Commissioner warned that tensions “could create difficulties,” stating that Turkey is expected “to respect international law, good-neighborly relations, and the sovereignty of EU member states.” “The European Union attaches particular importance to the resumption and progress of talks on the resolution of the Cyprus issue as a means of further strengthening EU–Turkey cooperation. “We fully support the efforts of the UN Secretary-General to resume formal talks,” she added.
In its report, the Commission notes that, despite repeated calls from the European Council and the Commission, Turkey “has not yet fulfilled its obligations” arising from the Declaration of September 21, 2005, and the Council conclusions, including those of December 2006 and December 2015. It adds that Ankara “has also failed to fulfill its obligation to ensure the full and non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement and is not removing all obstacles to the free movement of goods, including restrictions on direct transport links with the Republic of Cyprus.”
Regarding the most recent developments, the report states that “in July 2026, Turkey signed with the so-called, internationally unrecognized ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ a Memorandum of Cooperation for the construction of an undersea natural gas pipeline, without the approval or consent of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. Furthermore, it continues to insist on its plans to create a cross-border electricity grid with the so-called, internationally unrecognized, “TRNC” in areas where the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control.”
Turkish military exercises in Cyprus’s maritime zones and flights by Turkish unmanned aerial vehicles in the flight information region and in Cyprus’s national airspace continued. Turkey further upgraded its drone base in Lefkoniko and its naval base in Bogazi, in areas where the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control, while it temporarily increased its military presence—including the deployment of F-16 fighter jets and air defense systems—in the context of the war in Iran, the report adds. Incidents of harassment of Cypriot fishing vessels and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing by Turkey also continued to be recorded.
Among other things, it is reported that Turkey once again criticized the Security Council’s decision to renew UNFICYP’s mandate for one year, until January 31, 2027, “without the consent of the Turkish Cypriot community.” Regarding Varosha, the report states that “Turkey has not reversed its actions to open the entire fenced-off area of Varosha, thereby further entrenching the fait accompli on the ground,” and that the restrictions imposed in 2022 on UNFICYP within the fenced-off area remain in place, “in violation of Security Council Resolution 789 (1992).”
The Committee calls on Turkey to “immediately” reverse the unilateral actions announced on July 20, 2021, and all steps taken since October 2020 that are contrary to the relevant Security Council resolutions.
According to the report, the EU remains “fully committed to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus issue within the framework of the UN.” On July 13, 2026, the Commission appointed Executive Vice President Raffaele Fito as its Special Representative for Cyprus, who “will support reunification efforts under the UN and facilitate the resumption of negotiations for a settlement of the Cyprus issue.”
The report adds that “it is important for Turkey to reaffirm its commitment to the UN-led settlement talks” and that “no unilateral actions should be taken that could increase tensions on the island and hinder the resumption of talks.” The Council extended the framework of restrictive measures regarding unauthorized drilling until November 30, 2026, with a blank annex. The report notes that Turkey has not conducted any unauthorized drilling in the Eastern Mediterranean since early 2021.
Regarding the Aegean, the report states that since 2023, bilateral relations between Turkey and Greece “have improved overall,” with no unauthorized drilling taking place. It adds, however, that flights over Greek islands have resumed and that violations of Greece’s national airspace and territorial waters “have increased significantly.” By presidential decree dated August 15, 2026, Turkey declared two marine parks in the northeastern Aegean and the eastern Mediterranean, which “extend primarily beyond Turkish territorial waters, into the open sea.” An increase in flights by Turkish military aircraft over Greek islands, “including inhabited ones,” was recorded, and in September 2026, while incidents of illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing by Turkish fishing vessels showed a “significant increase” compared to the previous reporting period.
Turkey, the report notes, “continued to systematically issue unauthorized general maritime warnings (NAVTEX) and to advance claims of demilitarization regarding the islands of the Eastern Aegean that belong to Greece under international treaties, thereby implicitly challenging Greek sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction.” It also continues to oppose the establishment of three Greek marine parks located entirely within Greek territorial waters and, most recently, within the framework of spatial planning for tourism, renewable energy, industry, and the supply chain. The inclusion of the “Blue Homeland” doctrine in Turkish school textbooks is, according to the report, “a cause for concern” that “risks affecting dialogue and regional cooperation.” The report notes that the 1995 declaration by the Turkish Grand National Assembly, regarding a casus belli in the event of a unilateral expansion of Greek territorial waters, remains in effect. Turkey is expected to make a “clear commitment” to good-neighborly relations, to international agreements, and to the peaceful resolution of disputes, resorting, if necessary, to the International Court of Justice.
In the Eastern Mediterranean, the report refers extensively to Libya. In October 2026, the House of Representatives, based in Benghazi, ratified the 2019 Turkish-Libyan memorandum on the delimitation of maritime zoneswhich, according to the Commission, “violates the sovereign rights of third states and does not comply with the Law of the Sea.” The Presidents of the European Commission and the European Council reiterated, in a joint statement, the EU’s position that this agreement is “null and void” and “cannot produce legal effects for third countries.”
The report notes that “a sustainable de-escalation has not yet been achieved,” as evidenced by the ratification. In February 2026, the Libyan National Oil Corporation granted an exploration license to the Turkish state-owned company TPAO. The report also notes that the EU’s efforts to enforce the UN embargo on Libya “continued to be challenged by Turkey’s skepticism” regarding Operation EUNAVFOR MED Irini. Regarding the Great Sea Interconnector project, a project of common interest to the EU, the report states that Turkey “continued to obstruct surveys,” while the observer status of the Turkish operator TEİAŞ within ENTSO-E was not renewed in June 2026.
In the area of foreign and security policy, the Commission notes that Turkey “remained open to substantive exchanges with the EU,” but “made no effort to improve its alignment with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), despite its stated strategic goal of EU accession.” The rate of alignment with the High Representative’s statements and the Council’s decisions on sanctions was “very low,” 4% on September 1, 2026, up from 3% in 2025.
Furthermore, Turkey did not align with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia, but “cooperated partially” to prevent their circumvention through its territory. Exports of products on the EU’s Common High-Priority List to Russia fell by 86% in 2025 compared to 2023, but remain higher than pre-war levels. Turkey has also emerged as a “major hub for the trade in petroleum products, effectively providing revenue to Russia,” while the Commission is urgently calling for greater efforts and warning of the risks posed by Russia’s “shadow fleet.” A European official who briefed the press emphasized that “circumvention of EU sanctions against Russia remains a significant issue. Turkey has made some progress, but it should do more.”
The report also states that Turkey “continues to seek participation in the ESDP and EU defense initiatives, while maintaining its policy of excluding an EU member state from cooperation with NATO.” It adds that Turkey’s “narrow interpretation” of the EU–NATO cooperation framework “continues to be an obstacle” to strengthening key aspects of a genuine and sustainable relationship between the two organizations. The same chapter notes the signing, on August 7, 2026, of the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement between Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, as well as the announcement by the U.S. president, on the sidelines of the NATO Summit in Ankara in July, regarding the lifting of CAATSA sanctions and a willingness to consider the sale of F-35s to Turkey, linked to the potential sale of the Russian S-400 system to a third country.
Regarding the Middle East, it is reported that Turkey has aligned itself with the EU’s position on the need for a diplomatic solution to the war in Iran and for the restoration of freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, and is participating in the International Coalition for the implementation of the two-state solution. Its position on Hamas, which Ankara considers a “legitimate political interlocutor,” the European Commission states that “cannot be reconciled” with that of the EU, which has designated Hamas as a terrorist organization. Relations with Israel “continued to deteriorate,” with Turkey having issued arrest warrants for dozens of Israeli officials, including the prime minister and the defense minister. The process of normalizing relations with Armenia “made progress” during the reporting period.
On the domestic front, the report cites “serious cause for concern” regarding the functioning of democratic institutions, with ongoing “democratic backsliding.” It refers to the ongoing detention of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, whose trial began on March 9, 2026, on charges carrying a potential sentence of up to 2,430 years in prison. It also refers to the May 2026 annulment by an appeals court of the CHP’s conventions, as well as the suspension or arrest of 22 CHP mayors since September 1, 2025, bringing the total to 49 since the last local elections.
Turkey remains in an “early stage of preparation” in the area of the rule of law and fundamental rights, while, as noted, “the regression continued.” The report points out that the reporting period provided “further evidence of the executive branch’s control over the judiciary.” The Grand Chamber of the ECHR characterized the prolonged detention of Osman Kavala as a flagrant denial of justice. Regarding freedom of the press, the report states that in October 2026, the Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF) seized Halk TV, appointed administrators, and took it off the air, and that 74 journalists and media workers were arrested, were imprisoned or remained in pretrial detention between September 2025 and September 2026, compared to 51 during the corresponding period of 2024–2025.
On migration, the 2016 EU–Turkey Statement continued, according to the Commission, to yield results and remained the key framework for cooperation. Turkey hosts 2.3 million refugees, and the EU has mobilized 12.5 billion euros since 2011. The Commission calls on Turkey to fully implement the March 2016 Statement, resume returns from the Greek islands, and implement all provisions of the Readmission Agreement with respect to all Member States. On visa issues, Turkey “continues to apply a discriminatory visa policy toward Cypriot nationals” and has made no progress on the six outstanding criteria of the roadmap for visa liberalization.
Economically, Turkey was the EU’s fifth-largest trading partner in 2025, with bilateral trade reaching a “record high of over 218 billion euros.” The Commission assesses that the country is well advanced in establishing a functioning market economy and has made some progress. Inflation remains high, at around 31% on an annual basis since late 2025, and the central bank’s independence has not yet been consolidated.
Source: KYPE
