The Week That Turned the Tables on the Cyprus Issue, the Absolution in Olgin, and Turkey’s Role
Tensions in the Cyprus issue rose sharply last week, amid a flurry of activity that, admittedly, few had anticipated.
Antonio Guterres is preparing to hang up his diplomatic hat in 53 days. Whereas there had been a perception of inaction and superficial activity, the picture changed dramatically with the arrival of the Secretary-General’s personal envoy in Cyprus a week ago. While all eyes were on what she might be carrying in her briefcase, on the other hand, it was difficult to harbor expectations of any substantial developments. Ultimately, her visit to the so-called “embassy” in the occupied territories created a new atmosphere that led her to schedule emergency meetings with both leaders.
ΣΧΕΤΙΚΑ ΑΡΘΡΑ
RAI POLL: Citizens evaluate the president and his work
Greek Media: Christodoulidis on a pilgrimage to Mount Athos
Why Olgin’s Diplomatic Slip Was Overlooked
Maria Olgin’s meeting with the so-called Turkish ambassador was indeed a blunder, one that no one expected the UN Secretary-General’s personal envoy—who is expected to be the guardian of Security Council resolutions—to commit.
However, the illegality of the visit was ultimately downplayed, as she herself rushed to clarify that she had to go to the “embassy” to receive a very important message from the Turkish government regarding the Cyprus issue. In this way, the spotlight shifted away from the personal envoy, whom, under different circumstances, the Cypriot government might have sought to have removed through diplomatic protests to the UN. This is especially significant given that, until last week, Nicosia had viewed Ms. Olgin with suspicion. The atmosphere seemed to be deteriorating due to her op-ed, in which she gave some the impression that she was maintaining a policy of neutrality with the President of the Republic even making pointed remarks about her infrequent presence on the island. Amid such a tense atmosphere, one could hardly expect Nikos Christodoulides to take her major diplomatic blunder lightly.
Ultimately, despite his initial irritation, the President was convinced of the “necessity” of her visit to the Turkish diplomat, precisely because of the message it would convey.
A “Low-Key” Fidan
This flurry of activity culminated in Hakan Fidan’s visit to Cyprus on Friday, with the Cyprus issue as the sole item on the agenda, despite the fact that Turkish media reported that the visit had been finalized three weeks ago.
The Turkish foreign minister came, saw, and left almost unnoticed. He chose not to make any public statements and to maintain a low profile, which, strangely enough, did not derail the process with inflammatory remarks about a two-state solution. On the other hand, the so-called “presidency” limited itself to a brief statement without delving into the substance of what was discussed. These moves, on the one hand, deepen the veil of mystery surrounding Ankara’s intentions and, on the other, tend to confirm that something is in the works.
On the other hand, if one isolates Turkey’s actions and rhetoric—even up until a few hours ago—it becomes clear that not a single step has been taken, at least publicly, that could lead to a reassessment of its actions and narratives. This is because it remains the country whose actions constitute a crescendo of threats and unlawful claims in Cyprus and the wider region.
Cards close to the chest pending announcements
Despite the information being leaked, the official statements—particularly those from the Greek Cypriot side—remain terse. Nikos Christodoulides avoids speaking publicly about the substance of what is expected to be finalized, as well as about Turkey’s actions. This is a stance the President does not usually adopt; however, he believes it is necessary at this juncture to avoid derailing the process by preempting potential announcements and developments.
What Seems to Be Taking Shape
After more than a year of discussions with the Turkish Cypriot leader and 15 meetings, it appears that something tangible and substantial is in the works. According to information from Alpha on Sunday, a joint communiqué will be issued following Monday’s meeting, finalizing a package of confidence-building measures. Regarding the roadblocks, the opening of the Athienou-Pyroi-Aglantzia route over a stretch of approximately 11 kilometers has been finalized. The agreement will be part of a compromise arrangement, with the route passing largely through the occupied areas and, to a lesser extent, through the buffer zone.
An agreement is also expected to be reached on the new proposal included in Nikos Christodoulides’ 19-point plan to open the roadblock connecting the Tsakkistra Plain with the occupied Karavostasi. Opening this crossing point is expected to reduce the time it takes for residents of Kampos to travel to Nicosia by approximately 30 minutes.
According to diplomatic sources, this crossing serves as an alternative to the Kokkina roadblock, which Turkey and the so-called “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” have consistently vetoed. This does not mean that Kokkina is being abandoned. However, the President wanted to put an alternative proposal on the table—one that would be more easily accepted and, at the same time, provide some relief to the residents of the Plain, who have long been protesting their isolation.
With regard to the proposals from the Turkish Cypriot side, the opening of the roadblocks at Mia Milia and Louroujina–Lybia has been accepted. Tufan Erhurman is placing greater emphasis on Louroutzina than on Mia Milia, but he accepts it, as he states, because it was part of the agreements reached between Christodoulides, Tatar, and Guterres at the 2025 five-party talks. Ideally, he would seek to open a passage in Kaimakli for cars.
The issue about which reservations are being expressed—regarding whether it will be finalized—is demining. It concerns an area of approximately 70,000 square meters along the buffer zone, though it does not fall within the zone itself. No other measures are expected to be finalized at the trilateral meeting; according to ALPHA’s sources, these relate to the environment and technical committees.
The Presidential Office’s assessments and the need for progress
Given all this, it is very difficult to get inside Turkey’s mind to determine whether it will pave the way for progress or whether it is simply seeking to demonstrate strength and power, affectionately embracing the Turkish Cypriots.
On the other hand, the Greek Cypriot side is earnestly seeking to break the deadlock while also maintaining a climate of progress, announcements, and steps forward. Fifteen months before the presidential election, Nikos Christodoulides would not want the Cyprus issue to remain in limbo, given that one of his potential opponents, Averof Neophytou, is basing his campaign on what he claims is the inability of the President of the Republic and the two leaders to break through even a single impasse. Even a small window of opportunity will work in the President’s favor, paving the way for him to present tangible results during the campaign period.
Just before the momentum is lost and the final round comes to an end
A successful outcome of this final round for António Guterres would also have a positive impact on the Secretary-General himself. If there are no developments, in the worst-case scenario, António Guterres will leave his successor with yet another intractable problem, despite the efforts he himself has made over the past 10 years to resolve it.
The Secretary-General will hand over to his successor an international community in worse shape than the one he inherited, with dozens of unresolved conflicts, at the mercy of the major powers of the era and their interests. Among these is the Cyprus issue. However, even if progress is made on confidence-building measures regarding the Cyprus issue, he will still be handing over, a problem that is still very much alive, with signs of progress, rather than a Cyprus issue in a state of dormancy, which the international community will gradually begin to abandon.
Ahead of Monday’s trilateral meeting, the question that arises is what can actually change, even if two or four more roadblocks are opened.
How can a Turkey that speaks of two states and makes a point of proclaiming this in international forums be able, in less than two months, to agree to return to the negotiating table on the basis of a bizonal, bicommunal federation in a potential five-party talks? How can it unblock a process so quickly when—on the other hand—there are suffocating timelines and demands to prejudge the outcome of the negotiations?
The magic wand, if there is one, belongs to Turkey and to how it perceives its own interests and objectives, which it frames within the context of international developments and realities as they unfold. That is why it constantly reassesses them.
