Manchester City was found guilty by the Premier League’s independent Commission on all charges examined regarding its financial obligations, with the sole exception of one specific charge concerning the club’s cooperation with the investigation.

The 40-page Core Decision published by the Commission is not merely a list of violations. It describes in detail the reasoning behind its decisions, examining City’s sponsorship agreements, their reflection in the financial statements, its obligations to UEFA and the Premier League, as well as the way it handled the league’s investigation.

The Commission notes from the outset that the Premier League had charged City with more than 100 individual violations, which were divided into four main categories: Charges 1, 2, 3, and 4. The first category was subdivided into 1(A), 1(B), 1(C), and 1(D), while the fourth was subdivided into 4(A), 4(B), 4(C), and 4(D).

City denied all charges. The Commission, however, concludes that, with the exception of Charge 4(B), all charges were proven to the required standard of proof.

A massive proceeding

The hearing began in September 2024 and concluded in December of the same year, following 42 days of proceedings.

A total of 27 live witnesses were examined, while the written depositions exceeded 700 pages. In addition, expert reports were used in areas such as accounting, financial analysis, market value assessment, soccer sponsorships, Swiss law, and the politics and governance of Abu Dhabi.

The Commission further notes that the transcribed testimonies of witnesses and experts totaled approximately 7,000 pages, following an initial review of millions of documents.

The Credibility of the Witnesses

One of the key points of the report concerns the witnesses’ testimonies.

The Commission states that the majority of witnesses attempted to testify honestly and to assist in clarifying the case. However, it determined that the testimony of certain key witnesses called by the City was false on several critical points.

In fact, the Commission found that some of them knew that their testimony was untrue and, as a result, characterized their conduct as dishonest.

These credibility assessments were then used to evaluate the individual financial charges.

The Commission rejected City’s objections

Manchester City had contested both the Premier League’s investigation and the league’s decision to proceed with the charges.

The Commission reviewed the objections and rejected them, ruling that they were not justified and could not lead to the consequences sought by the club.

At the same time, City had put forward a series of other legal and procedural arguments regarding the charges. The Commission concluded that the specific allegations were unfounded and that none of the arguments put forward by the club constituted a defense against the charges.

How the case began

According to the findings, following ADUG’s acquisition of City, the club faced significant financial losses.

By the end of 2009, management acknowledged that commercial revenue was falling short of budgeted levels, and it was estimated that losses would remain high in the coming years.

At the same time, there was already concern about the new Financial Fair Play regulations being prepared by UEFA. The Commission notes that capital contributions from the owner could not be counted as revenue for FFP purposes, whereas commercial revenue from sponsorship agreements could.

In this context, according to the Commission, a scheme known as the “Disguised Funding Scheme” was devised.

The “Disguised Funding Scheme”

The Commission describes a model under which amounts originating from ADUG as owner contributions were reported as commercial revenue from sponsors.

The agreements in question specified high sponsorship amounts, which, according to the Commission, were significantly higher than the fair market value of the rights granted by the City.

The actual sponsor paid only a portion—the so-called “Base Sum”—while the remainder, the “Tagged Sum,” was paid by ADUG.

Nevertheless, Citi recorded the total amount as operating revenue and, according to the Commission, concealed the fact that the remainder essentially constituted a capital contribution from ADUG.

The Commission assesses that this created the impression for auditors, regulators, and third parties that City’s commercial revenue was much higher than it actually was, while at the same time concealing the true extent of the financing from ADUG.

The sponsorship agreements were characterized as “shams”

The Commission concludes that the AD Sponsorship Agreements in question were “sham” agreements or, alternatively, that their economic substance was very different from that implied by their legal form.

According to the finding, the agreements were not the result of genuine commercial negotiations at fair market value. The amounts reported as sponsorship fees were higher than the actual value of the rights, while the portion not paid by the sponsor was covered by ADUG.

Citi’s Accounts

Here lies one of the most significant conclusions of the entire report.

The Commission found that Manchester City’s financial statements for the seasons from 2009–10 through 2017–18 did not present a true and fair view of the club’s financial position.

According to the decision, the financial statements reported as revenue amounts that should have been recorded as capital contributions from ADUG. As a result, City’s revenue for the period in question was found to have been overstated by more than £830 million.

At the same time, the Commission found that certain amounts paid by ADUG were not recorded as expenses for City, resulting in lower reported operating expenses.

The Fordham Arrangement

The Fordham Arrangement is given

special attention in the findings, and the Commission also characterizes it as a “sham.”

The agreement concerned the acquisition of players’ image rights. The Commission ruled that the amount paid to City for the acquisition of image rights was in fact a capital contribution from ADUG and not operating income.

At the same time, the payments for image rights constituted City’s liabilities, which were covered by ADUG.

As a result, the Commission states that £24.5 million was recorded in the accounts as operating income that should have been treated as a capital contribution, while operating expenses totaling £49.414 million were not recorded.

Other liabilities were also understated

The findings are not limited to the grants and Fordham.

The Commission also cites three separate agreements through which ADUG paid amounts related to City’s liabilities, without these being reported as such in the association’s financial statements.

Specifically, the report cites amounts of £8.866 million, £7.4 million, and £500,000, which, according to the Commission, should have been recorded as City’s expenses or liabilities.

What Happened with UEFA

The above findings were directly related to City’s compliance with UEFA’s Financial Fair Play regulations.

The Commission states that, if the accounts are restated to remove the overstated commercial and operating revenues and add the understated liabilities and expenses, City did not meet UEFA’s break-even requirement in any of the relevant seasons.

In fact, according to the findings, it fell short “by a very significant amount.”

The same conclusion emerges from an alternative analysis of the sponsorship agreements: even if some of the key findings were not accepted, the Commission determined that the agreements should have been valued at fair market value, which was much lower than the amounts City used in its calculations.

UEFA had already examined the case

The report also refers to UEFA’s previous investigation.

At the end of the 2013–14 season, UEFA had requested explanations regarding certain City sponsorship agreements and had examined whether the club had complied with the break-even requirement for previous periods.

The case, as the Commission notes, was not concluded at that time with a final determination regarding compliance, and UEFA and City reached the 2014 UEFA Settlement Agreement.

Later, following the publication of the well-known Der Spiegel articles in 2018, a new UEFA investigation and proceedings before the CAS ensued, as well as a separate investigation by the Premier League.

Violation of the PSR as Well

The Commission also examined the Premier League’s Profitability and Sustainability Rules (PSR).

After restating the financial data, as indicated by the previous findings, City did not meet the PSR requirements in any of the relevant seasons.

Here, too, the Commission states that the deviation was “very significant.”

Even under the alternative approach, in which sponsorship agreements would be valued at fair market value, City still failed to meet the PSR requirements.

The Commission: “Intent to circumvent the regulations”

The finding does not treat these specific violations as mere accounting errors.

Regarding Charges 1(A), 1(B), and 1(C), the Commission states that there was a common characteristic: deliberate conduct that concealed the true nature of revenues and liabilities and created the impression that City’s financial position was better than it actually was.

In specific sections of the report, the Commission states that City knew that the accounts it submitted did not present a true and fair view or, alternatively, was reckless in this regard.

This conclusion is reiterated in particularly clear terms: “By its conduct, the Club clearly intended to circumvent the PL Rules.”

Transactions with Related Parties

There

is another distinct section, Charge 1(D).

The Commission found that the AD Sponsorship Agreements constituted transactions with related parties and that City’s financial statements for the nine relevant seasons should have disclosed this.

This was not done, according to the findings.

The Commission clarifies that the absence of this specific disclosure did not in itself mean that the accounts did not present a true and fair view. It did, however, mean that they had not been prepared and audited in accordance with the applicable legal and regulatory principles.

The Premier League’s Investigation and the Lack of Cooperation

The final major section of the report concerns Charge 4.

The Commission concludes that Manchester City “made concerted efforts to stop and frustrate the PL investigation,” meaning that it made coordinated efforts to halt and obstruct the Premier League’s investigation.

The club was found to have breached its cooperation obligations:

* in the majority of the instances covered by Charge 4(A),
* in all instances covered by Charge 4(C),
* and in the instance covered by Charge 4(D).

In contrast, the Commission dismissed Charge 4(B), ruling that a breach of the obligations to cooperate had not been proven in that specific instance.

What Has Not Yet Been Decided

Despite the scope of the findings, this specific conclusion does not impose a penalty on Manchester City.

The Commission has ruled on the charges and its reasoning, but the process of imposing a sanction is a separate stage.

At the same time, Manchester City has the right to appeal the Commission’s findings by October 2, 2026.

Therefore, any specific sporting sanction that may follow is not, as of yet, part of the decision that has been made public.

The 40-page Core Decision essentially serves as the “roadmap” for the Commission’s decision. The detailed findings for each individual charge are contained in the appendices referenced in the document itself, which, together with the Core Decision, constitute the Commission’s decision and its reasoning.

*photo source: AP