In his statement, Turkish Cypriot leader Mr. Erhurman noted that the property issue cannot be resolved through lawsuits and that such actions constitute, in his view, “instrumentalization” of the issue by the Greek Cypriot side.

He also argued that the property issue must be addressed exclusively within the framework of a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem.

This stance, however much it may be presented as an institutional or negotiating position, in reality reveals a deeper political perspective. Namely, that the law does not operate independently, but is subject to the political process.

For when seeking justice for property rights under conditions of ongoing uncertainty is characterized as “instrumentalization,” then in practice the rule of law is called into question. 

The right is transformed into a political choice subject to scrutiny, rather than a fundamental and enduring institutional means of protection.

This logic leads to a clear conclusion: that the law does not function as a permanent framework, but as an element that must be suspended until a comprehensive political solution is reached. 

In other words, it is effectively placed on hold.

This is not a neutral position. It is a political concept with a clear institutional imprint.

For in the Cyprus issue, the law is not merely a byproduct of the solution. It constitutes the framework within which a solution must be built. When this relationship is reversed, the very balance of the problem shifts.

The property issue, in particular, is not an abstract matter for negotiation. It is a matter of ongoing rights and consequences as long as there is no definitive settlement. For this reason, legal action does not constitute political pressure, but rather an institutional mechanism for redress.

Most crucially, however, this approach does not stand alone. It is part of a broader conception in which the political process attempts to override legal reality, under the guise of a “comprehensive solution.”

And this is where the fundamental question arises. 

Can there be a sustainable solution when the exercise of rights is presented as an obstacle rather than as the foundation of normality?

For if the law is suspended until a solution is found, then it ceases to function as the basis for that solution and becomes a variable that is adjusted retroactively.

Footnote:

And for this very reason, among others, it is not permissible—not even at the level of rhetorical honesty—for the Greek side to voice the assumption that “the solution cannot be fair.”

Dr. Kyriakos A. Kenevezos